Opinion
INDICTMENT NO. 7361/11
07-16-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, v. SAMUEL MURRAY, Defendant.
Present:
Hon. Elizabeth A. Foley
DECISION
AND ORDER
Defendant moves pursuant to CPL §220.60 to withdraw his plea of guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree as a lesser included offense under Count 8 of the Indictment, claiming his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was "frightened" and "unable to think clearly" during the plea proceeding as a result of not taking his medication for several days prior thereto. After a review of the moving papers, the People's Affirmation in Opposition, the pertinent Supreme Court file and relevant statutory and caselaw authority, defendant's motion is denied.
Under the instant Indictment, defendant stands accused of acting with another person to commit two separate early morning gunpoint robberies of different individuals inside the same laundromat located at 537 North Conduit Boulevard, Brooklyn, New York, on August 2 and August 25, 2012. Defendant was subsequently identified in a police arranged lineup as a perpetrator of the first robbery, and pursuant to a "point out" identification as a perpetrator of the second robbery. Thereafter, defendant was charged under Indictment No. 7361/11 with multiple counts of Robbery and Criminal Possession of a Weapon, as well as other related charges. As asserted by the People, immediately after the second robbery, the police observed defendant and codefendant exiting the subject location, whereupon a pursuit ensued, and proceeds of the robbery as well as a firearm were ultimately recovered from inside and outside an apartment where defendant had fled. In addition, it is alleged defendant may be seen on video surveillance from inside the laundromat during each of the robberies, and there is also video surveillance footage of the police vehicle involved in the pursuit of the codefendants following their commission of the second robbery.
With respect to the first robbery, an unapprehended individual was also involved. With respect to the second robbery, participant/codefendant Kenneth Samuel was jointly indicted; codefendant Kenneth Samuel pleaded guilty under Count 9 of the Indictment in full satisfaction thereof, on November 30, 2012.
Upon the papers before the Court, it would appear the parties do not dispute defendant has a history of treatment for mental illness and other medical ailments, and further, that for a period of several days leading up to and including the date of defendant's plea, defendant was not taking all of his prescribed medications.
The decision of whether or not to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court, which will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of that discretion; "such a motion must be premised upon some evidence of possible innocence or of fraud, mistake, coercion or involuntariness in the taking of the plea []." People v. DeJesus, 199 AD2d 529 (2nd Dept. 1993) (internal citation omitted); People v. Smith, 54 AD3d 879 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 11 NY3d 857 (2008).
The minutes of the plea proceeding held March 12, 2013 reveals that following off-the-record discussions between the parties and this Court, a plea bargain of a determinate term of 5 years incarceration with a period of post-release supervision of 5 years in exchange for a plea of guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree as a lesser included offense under Count 8 of the Indictment was under consideration by defendant. The Court informed defendant that at any time during the ensuing plea colloquy, if he wished to speak to counsel, he would be able to do so, and in fact the proceedings were paused by the Court in order to give defendant and his prior attorney an opportunity discuss this possible disposition before permitting defendant to enter his plea. The Court then engaged defendant in appropriate colloquy, during which he stated, in response to the Court's pointed questions, the property he stole was "money", he "was with somebody who had a weapon" and "[w]e asked him to give us some money and he gave it to us." Defendant confirmed he knew the codefendant had a gun and was going to pull it out, and acknowledged they had gone to the laundromat to steal money and that he himself had been given the money by the robbery victim. Thus, defendant pleaded guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree as agreed, in full satisfaction of all the charges against him in the pending Indictment, in exchange for the promise that defendant would be sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration with post-release supervision in accordance with the plea agreement, the only open question to be determined later being whether defendant would be sentenced as a predicate violent or non-violent felony offender.
Upon the record before the Court, including, inter alia, the minutes of the plea proceeding, defendant, with the aid of competent counsel, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree (PL §160.10[1]) as a lesser included offense under Count 8 of the Indictment in exchange for a negotiated term of imprisonment, followed by a period of post-release supervision. Moreover, during his plea allocution, defendant confirmed he was able to proceed, he had not been threatened or coerced to accept a plea and was voluntarily waiving his constitutional right to a trial by jury, to confront witnesses, present a defense and remain silent, he understood the Court's questions and all the terms of his plea agreement and no other promises had been made to him to induce his plea, he had had enough time to speak with his prior attorney -- conferring with counsel several times during the allocution -- and had understood his discussions with counsel, and admitted he was, in fact, guilty. The Court also ensured defendant's execution of the waiver of his right to appeal was knowingly and voluntarily made.
The Court finds defendant's claim that he "was in a frightened state" and "was incapable of thinking clearly or rationally" during the plea proceeding as a result of not taking his medications is unsubstantiated and contradicted by the record, and moreover, does not comport with the Court's recollection of the interactions between defendant, the attorneys and the Court on that day, particularly during the colloquy between the Court and defendant, when defendant was alert, appropriately responsive, and coherent. In the Court's opinion, defendant's behavior at his plea allocution demonstrated competency, and his responses were more than merely monosyllabic answers to the Court's questions and indicated mental fitness, demonstrating his clear understanding of the proceedings and the elements of his bargain. This, coupled with defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system, may be reasonably interpreted as a complete comprehension of the terms of the agreement, the discussions and the proceedings, and there is nothing in the record to support defendant's contention that any failure to take his medications affected his cognition, thereby undermining the voluntariness of his plea. People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d 482 (2002); People v. Wager, 34 AD3d 505 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 7 NY3d 929 (2006).
Notably, although the "NYC Correctional Health Services" medical progress notes attached to the moving papers -- generated by a variety of medical personnel including medical doctors in relation to defendant's medical care and treatment while incarcerated during a period before and following the plea proceeding at issue, March 7 to April 2, 2013 -- report defendant's mood at times as "angry", "depressed" or "slightly irritable", in the Court's view the assertion by defendant's current counsel that at the time his client pleaded guilty his mental state "was one of being frightened and being unable to think clearly" is refuted by the record of the plea proceeding and the progress notes fail to support his current assertion. In fact, defendant's mood and "mental status" was consistently reported in these records over this time frame as being calm and cooperative, oriented to time, place and person, exhibiting an organized, relevant thought process and adequate judgment with no perceptual distortions, all of which does comport with this Court's observations of defendant, who was able to maintain good eye contact while providing relevant and appropriate answers to the Court's inquiry and did not engage in any unusual or fearful behavior. Moreover, in the progress note dated April 2, 2013, defendant states "they made me cop out to 5 years." However, not only does defendant fail to allege he was threatened or coerced to plead guilty in support of his application to withdraw his plea, such a conclusory claim is insupportable upon this record in any event. See, e.g., People v. Seger, 171 AD2d 892 (2nd Dept.), app dmd, 78 NY2d 1081 (1991).
In addition, defendant's prior attorney secured a plea bargain that was extremely advantageous to defendant, whereby he shielded himself from the possibility of: receiving a longer term of imprisonment upon a trial conviction of the charge under Count 8 of the Indictment to which he pleaded guilty or of the top charge in the Indictment under Count 1, Robbery in the First Degree; receiving terms of imprisonment made to run consecutively, based upon trial convictions of charges pertaining to defendant's commission of separate gunpoint robberies on two different dates. People v. Ladelokun, 192 AD2d 723 (2nd Dept.), lv denied, 81 NY2d 1075 (1993).
As there is no evidence defendant was unable to comprehend the plea proceedings, and because the minutes of that proceeding do indicate defendant understood and was coherent and was cognizant of the charges in the Indictment, admitted his guilt of his own free will and assured the Court he had not been threatened or coerced to do so, this Court finds defendant's current claims to be without basis. People v. Alexander, supra; People v. Martin, 204 AD2d 353 (2nd Dept.); lv denied, 84 NY2d 829 (1994); People v. Gonzales, 231 AD2d 939 (4th Dept.), lv denied, 89 NY2d 923 (1996).
The Court notes that although not directly urged as a basis upon which to grant defendant's application, his current attorney's statement that "defendant denies any involvement in the robberies charged" is also unavailing. Such an unsupported and bare claim of innocence cannot withstand judicial scrutiny in the face of the strong evidence amassed against defendant, as well as what the Court here finds to be his voluntary and open admission of guilt. People v. Ford, 44 AD3d 1070 (2nd Dept. 2007); People v. Fridell, 93 AD2d 866 (2nd Dept. 1983); compare, People v. DeJesus, supra.
Thus, there is no credible dispute that the plea proceeding was not understood by defendant, and, as his plea bargain was not baseless (see, People v. Marcano, 114 AD2d 976 [2nd Dept. 1985]), his contentions are devoid of merit.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that defendant's motion is denied.
ENTER
______________________
ELIZABETH A. FOLEY, J.S.C.