Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC950579
RUSHING, P.J.
I. Statement of the Case
Defendant Angelina Murillo pleaded no contest to felony assault and misdemeanor battery and admitted having a prior juvenile adjudication for an offense that would qualify as a strike because it involved the infliction of great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 667.5, subd. (c)(8).) The court dismissed the strike (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and placed her on probation with conditions, one of which required that she take “psychotropic medication or other mood altering medication that is prescribed by a therapist that she may be involved with.” On appeal from the judgment, defendant challenges that probation condition.
Both defendant and the Attorney General refer to this court’s decision in defendant’s prior appeal in an unrelated case—People v. Murillo (Feb. 18, 2009, H032409) [nonpub. opn.] (Murillo I). Defendant requests that we take judicial notice of it, noting that the trial court apparently took judicial notice of and then considered it in imposing the probation condition challenged in this case. We grant defendant’s request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 453, subd. (a).)
We affirm the order of probation.
II. Background
Murillo I
Defendant pleaded no contest to having engaged in unlawful sexual intercourse with a 16-year-old boy. (Pen.Code, § 261.5, subd. (c).) She admitted having relations with him for almost a year. In a statement in the probation report, she explained that she was no longer taking illegal drugs, which she had been doing since she was 12. She further explained that she used to cut herself and had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Bi-Polar Disorder. At the time, the probation department recommended probation with conditions directed toward her alcohol and substance abuse. The trial court granted probation and imposed various conditions. The court required chemical testing and a substance abuse treatment program and prohibited defendant from possessing or consuming alcohol and illegal drugs or being where they were used or sold. The court further ordered that defendant enter a psychological counseling program and take any and all medications proscribed by her doctor. (Murillo I, supra, H032409 [pp. 1-3].)
On appeal, defendant challenged these conditions. Given defendant’s admitted use of drugs and alcohol, we upheld the conditions related to both because these conditions were reasonably related to her rehabilitation and reformation. We also upheld the required counseling because it was designed to address the psychological and emotional issues underlying her admitted self and substance abuse and reasonably related to her rehabilitative needs. However, we concluded that the medication condition was invalid. We observed that it implicated her state constitutional right to privacy and a liberty interest protected her right to due process under the federal constitution. We found the condition to be unconstitutionally vague because it was not clear whether defendant risked violating probation if she declined to take medication prescribed for some mundane medical condition unrelated to her psychological problems and rehabilitative needs. Moreover, because the condition was not narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to address those problems and needs and thus minimize and justify the interference with her constitutional rights, we found the condition to be unconstitutionally overbroad. (Murillo I, supra, H032409 [pp. 4-14].)
The Current Offense
On July 27, 2009, defendant and her codefendant Lisa Marie Baxter were out walking Baxter’s pit bull. They approached Tiffany D. and her family, who were in front of their house. Baxter punched Tiffany several times. Tiffany’s father tried to intervene, and Baxter punched him. She told defendant to “finish the fight, ” and defendant went over to Tiffany and punched her. Baxter then ordered her dog to attack Tiffany’s father. A neighbor grabbed the dog and threw it toward the front yard. Baxter then punched Tiffany again.
Proceedings Below
At the hearing on defendant’s request to dismiss her strike, defense counsel told the court that defendant knew she suffered from mental problems, but he explained that on the day of the incident, she was not on her medication. Counsel informed the court, however, that that once she was in custody, she went back on medication and found that the regimen “really helped her.” According to counsel, defendant “knows how important that is in her life, to stay on top of her medication.”
Counsel further opined that defendant’s mental health issues stemmed from a traumatic experience of sexual abuse. “And it’s a part of why she needs treatment for mental health issues which she is, having experienced this most recent incident, aware of how important it is to stay on top of her mental health issues and seek therapy, and she intends to do so should the Court give her an opportunity on probation.” Previously, when defendant entered her plea, she informed the court that she was taking various anti-depressants that had been prescribed for her in jail, including Zoloft, Topomax, and Diprarcol.
In dismissing defendant’s strike and granting her probation, the court opined that “with proper medication and structure [defendant] can succeed and not be a frequent flyer here in the criminal justice system.” The court noted that defendant was not on her medication at that time of the current assault, she was taking medication because she was abused by a relative, and “medication in her life is extremely important.”
After dismissing the strike, the court imposed the conditions of probation. The court acknowledged Murillo I and that the medication condition in that case had been stricken because it was not narrowly drawn. The court stated, “therefore, I am narrowly drawing [the condition] to this extent: That she is to take any psychotropic medication or other mood altering medication that is prescribed by a therapist... that she may be involved with.” Defense counsel objected to the condition, but the court overruled the objection.
III. Discussion
Defendant contends that the medication condition is overbroad and not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
The California Constitution guarantees the right of privacy, which encompasses “ ‘the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of his bodily integrity, ’ ” and unwanted medication. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14, quoting Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 531-532; Cal. Const., art. § I, 1.)
The liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right to avoid the unjustifiable administration of psychotropic or antipsychotic drugs. (Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 221-222; Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, 133-134; Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 180-183.)
Probation conditions that interfere with a probationer’s exercise of constitutional rights are permissible if they are reasonably necessary to accomplish the state’s compelling interests in rehabilitating and reforming the probationer and ensuring the public safety; and if they are narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to the individual probationer. (People v. Smith (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1250; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 703; People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 351, 362; In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 146.)
We do not find that the probation condition here suffers from the type of vagueness and overbreadth that rendered the condition reviewed in Murillo I defective. Rather, we agree with the trial court that the condition here is narrowly drawn and specifically tailored to address defendant’s admitted psychological problems and needs as her needs are perceived and treated by those who are authorized to prescribe medication.
Moreover, the record before the trial court revealed that defendant had long suffered from mental problems for which she had taken prescribed medication. She admitted that she was not on her medication when she committed her prior offense and, more importantly, she was not on medication when she committed the violent assault in this case. Finally, defendant acknowledged through counsel that she was taking psychotropic medication for depression and now appreciated both the benefits from and importance of maintaining that regimen.
Under the circumstances, the court reasonably could infer that (1) defendant’s mental health issues contributed to her violent misbehavior; (2) the types of medication that she had started taking was having a beneficial impact on her ability to deal with her mental health problems, especially depression, and her awareness and self-control; and (3) requiring that she take medication that may be prescribed by those treating her and authorized to prescribe it was reasonably necessary to maintain the benefits she acknowledged, facilitate her rehabilitation and reformation, and protect the public from future violent behavior.
Although the court’s order referred to medication prescribed by her “therapist, ” we read that term as short hand for those whom she may be seeing for psychotherapeutic reasons and who are legally authorized to prescribe medication.
We acknowledge that in United States v. Williams (2004) 356 F.3d 1045, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a probation condition requiring that the probationer take psychiatric medication. There, the defendant sent threatening e-mails to a teacher and was charged with stalking and harassment. However, he was deemed incompetent to stand trial and hospitalized. There, he was found to be dangerous and involuntarily medicated with psychotropic drugs that caused him to suffer serious and disagreeable side effects. However, the drugs helped him regain his competency, and he later pleaded guilty to the charges. At sentencing, there was no evidence, and the prosecutor did not claim, that the defendant was currently dangerous. There was no evidence that before the defendant’s offenses, he had been diagnosed with a mental illness for which he was taking medication. And there was no evidence linking the defendant’s unlawful conduct to his failure to take medication. Nor did the prosecutor present any evidence that the defendant currently suffered from a mental illness for which he was taking medication or for which medication might be necessary or appropriate. However, the defendant admitted that he was taking the anti-psychotic drug Haldol that made him feel terrible, and he said that eventually he would stop taking it. Despite the lack of evidence, the court concluded that the defendant currently suffered from some mental illness that rendered him delusional and a presently dangerous if not treated, and, therefore, as a condition of probation, the court required that he take any psychotropic medication that was prescribed by doctors treating his mental illness. (Id. at pp. 1047, 1049-1051.)
In striking this condition and remanding the matter, the appellate court stated that a sentencing court properly could impose a condition requiring a probationer to take strong psychotropic medication if the condition served the goals of probation. However, because such a condition was akin to the forced administration of drugs to a prison inmate, the probation condition had to comport with the same procedural requirements and limitations applicable in the prison context: (1) it had to be narrowly drawn to minimize the impact on the probationer’s liberty interest; and (2) there had to be express findings based on a medically-informed record that the condition is both appropriate and reasonably necessary. (United States v. Williams, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1056.)
Although we consider the Williams court’s analysis and procedural requirements to be reasonable, they are not binding on us. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190 [lower federal court’s not binding authority].) Moreover, because we find the circumstances here distinguishable, Williams does not persuade us to conclude that the condition here is invalid or inappropriate. (Cf. In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 186-188 [distinguishing Williams].)
Although there was no expert medical testimony below to support the medication requirement in this case, defendant, in essence, acknowledged that she has long suffered from mental health issues, for which she had been prescribed and taken medication. She implied that there was a link between her failure to take medication with her subsequent unlawful conduct. And, that conduct involved unprovoked assaultive violence against others. Defendant did not suggest that the medication she was taking for depression had any disagreeable side effects or that she found it difficult to take. On the contrary, she acknowledged that the medication was beneficial and conceded the need to maintain her medication regimen, or, as counsel put it, she “knows how important that is in her life, to stay on top of her medication.”
Under the circumstances, we do not find the probation condition to be constitutionally defective.
IV. Disposition
The probation order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J., ELIA, J.