Opinion
1-22-1143
06-30-2023
In the Interest of C.K.R., D.K.R., and C.M.K.R., Minors v. M.R., Respondent-Appellant). (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Nos. 21 JA 00358, 21 JA 00359, 21 JA 00360 The Honorable Levander Smith, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Oden Johnson and Tailor concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
C.A. WALKER JUSTICE.
Held: We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text messages into evidence at the adjudication hearing. Furthermore, we find trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the admission of the temporary custody transcript, agency contact note, medical records, and counseling records at the adjudication hearing.
¶ 1 The State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship and motions for temporary custody alleging C.K.R., D.K.R., and C.M.K.R., minors, were abused and neglected. At the adjudication hearing, the circuit court made a finding of abuse and neglect of the minors. The case immediately proceeded to a dispositional and permanency hearing, and the court adjudicated the minors to be wards of the court and placed them under the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). On appeal, respondent argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting text messages into evidence at the adjudication hearing without proper foundation and despite the messages containing inadmissible hearsay statements. Respondent also argues that the temporary custody hearing transcript, DFCS contact note, Oak Park Counseling Center records, and Weiss Hospital medical records were inadmissible at the adjudication hearing, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to their admission. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On April 13, 2021, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship and motions for temporary custody alleging C.K.R., then 15 years old, D.K.R., then 2 years old, and C.M.K.R., then 1 years old, were abused pursuant to section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2020)) and neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). Respondent is the minors' mother. The petitions alleged C.K.R. was struck about his body by an adult male residing in the home on December 15, 2020. C.K.R. was also grabbed by the hair and pulled about the home by the adult male on January 11, 2021, and C.K.R. ran away from home. C.K.R. reported that the adult male also struck his baby brother. C.K.R. reported that the adult male made him engage in sexual touching. C.K.R. informed respondent about the sexual touching, but the family continued to reside with the adult male. Respondent was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had a history of housing instability. Several assessments and services were recommended to respondent, and she completed her assessments but eventually became non-cooperative with individual therapy and verifying medication compliance. On April 7, 2021, C.K.R. threatened his grandmother with a knife. Respondent was present and did not redirect C.K.R. When the police arrived at the residence, respondent struck the grandmother and directed C.K.R. to do the same. Respondent's whereabouts had been unknown since the April 2021 incident.
¶ 4 On May 25, 2021, the court held a temporary custody hearing. Ashley Dowdy, a DCFS child protection specialist, testified that she was assigned to investigate the instant case after an allegation was reported that respondent hit D.K.R. and C.M.K.R. at a homeless shelter. On January 11, 2021, Dowdy received a call that C.K.R. had been kicked out of his home by respondent's boyfriend named Sean. The next day, Detective Hund informed Dowdy that he found C.K.R. at Uplift Community High School with a bag of clothes and that C.K.R. stated his mother's boyfriend kicked him out of the house. Dowdy spoke with C.K.R. on January 13, 2021. C.K.R. stated, while his mother was out getting groceries, Sean grabbed him by his hair and handcuffed him. Sean also hit D.K.R. while changing his diaper. C.K.R. had a bruised knee, arm, and waist and did not feel safe at home. Respondent agreed to a service plan in which the minors would stay with their aunt, respondent would get supervised visits, and Sean would be prohibited from seeing the minors.
¶ 5 Dowdy spoke with C.K.R. again on January 22. C.K.R. stated Sean watched him use the restroom and touched his penis on January 11. C.K.R. also stated that, in December 2020, Sean showed C.K.R. his penis and said he was going to "beat up" C.K.R. C.K.R. informed respondent about the incident but respondent did not believe him, and Sean continued to stay in the home. In the same month, Sean grabbed C.K.R. by his hair, put handcuffs on him, and knocked him unconscious. After speaking with C.K.R., respondent agreed to participate in intact services. Respondent underwent a mental health examination and was diagnosed with adjustment mood disorder and depressive disorder. Dowdy testified that respondent had not been to individual therapy although Dowdy had not checked on respondent's participation in over a month.
¶ 6 On April 7, 2021, Dowdy spoke with Janet Pineda, the minors' grandmother. Janet stated that C.K.R. "tried to stab her in the arm at the urging of mom." Specifically, C.K.R. wanted to play outside and Janet would not let him. C.K.R. became upset and Janet called him "a big baby." C.K.R. told Janet that respondent stated Janet could not "speak to him this way." C.K.R. then got a knife from the kitchen and "poked" Janet with it causing superficial scratches. Janet called the police and respondent became upset. Janet claimed that respondent and C.K.R. began beating her up before police arrived.
¶ 7 Respondent testified C.K.R. had a 3.94 grade point average and missed only five days of school in the past school year. Respondent and C.K.R. had an open relationship and C.K.R. could tell her when he was feeling down or being bullied. Respondent denied telling C.K.R. to stab Janet. Rather, when respondent heard Janet screaming her name, respondent came out of the bathroom, saw them arguing, and told C.K.R. to put the knife down. C.K.R. had already scratched Janet when respondent saw them arguing. Respondent asked Janet why she was provoking C.K.R. and stated, "if he stabbed you, it's because you provoked him." Respondent denied texting Janet that C.K.R. should have killed her. Respondent testified C.K.R. did not tell her about the physical or sexual abuse by Sean. C.K.R. had accused a person named Nancy of touching his penis. Respondent said that she made a police report against Nancy and that Nancy was "found guilty" but the charges were dropped because Janet made another accusation.
¶ 8 Janet testified she took care of C.K.R. after he left respondent's care. She described C.K.R. as "very distressed" and "doesn't have good coping skills." She believed it would be in the best interest for C.K.R. to remain with his mother if "he was allowed to have a phone and he as getting his therapies and they would make monthly visits." Janet told Dowdy that C.K.R. stabbed her and that respondent did not intervene to stop C.K.R. Clarifying Dowdy's statement, Janet explained that C.K.R. and respondent were not "beating me up" after the knife incident and that her comment to Dowdy was in reference to another incident where respondent attempted to grab Janet's phone out of her hand. During Janet's cross-examination, the State presented a printout of text messages that Janet claimed were between her and respondent. The court admitted the text messages without objection.
¶ 9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court placed the minors in temporary custody of DCFS. On July 5, 2022, the court held an adjudication hearing. The State admitted five exhibits into evidence. People's exhibit 1 was a redacted transcript of the temporary custody hearing. The assistant state's attorney informed the court that the parties went through the transcript and "redact[ed] certain portions that we all thought were inadmissible at the time of adjudication."
¶ 10 People's exhibit 2 was a contact note from DCFS documenting a conversation between Dowdy and a receptionist at Oak Park Counseling Center on April 8, 2021. Dowdy called Oak Park Counseling Center to get the contact information for respondent's therapist and medical prescriber. Dowdy spoke with someone named Nicole who told Dowdy that respondent had been in once for mental health assessment but did not participate in any sessions. Nicole also stated respondent's therapist and prescriber only met respondent once because respondent had not returned their phone calls to schedule further sessions.
¶ 11 People's exhibit 3 was the printout of the text messages purportedly between Janet and respondent. Respondent's attorney objected to the text messages on the basis that the messages "were originally sent to a sister, and then the sister sent them to the grandmother. So I would be objecting to that, mainly because of hearsay." The State responded "it's the People's understanding that the mother's name was Claudia. That was the claim that was placed on the petition at the time of filing. The text messages identified as People's Exhibit 3 are an exchange of messages between the mother and her mother, Ms. Pineda." The State called Janet to testify about the text messages. The following dialogue took place:
"Q. Ms. Pineda, are you related to the children, [C.K.R., D.K.R., and C.M.K.R.]?
A. Yes, I am. I'm their grandmother.
Q. And their mother is your daughter; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. What's their mother's name?
A. Her birth name is Claudia Ramirez. She changed it to Mia Kekuan-Ramirez.
Q. And you exchanged text messages with your daughter back in, I believe, April or May of 2021; is that right?
A. I exchanged messages with her all the time. I would need to see the messages because I'm always messaging her. Since I have her children, I message her everyday.
* * *
Q. So Ms. Pineda, do you see a screen shot of text messages on your screen?
Q. At the top of the page that you're looking at do see [sic] that it's labeled People's Exhibit Number 3?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And below where it's written People's Exhibit Number 3, do you see the name Mulan in the middle of your screen?
A. Yes. That's my icon for her, Mulan.
Q. When you say her, who is her?
A. My daughter, Mia Kekuan.
Q. The person you named Claudia at birth?
A. Yes. My daughter, yes.
Q. Okay. Would you say that - I'm going to show you this - you see one page here, right? Is that correct?
A. Yes. I see it.
Q. Okay. I'm going to scroll here. Do you see a second page of text messages?
A. Yes.
Q. And I'm going to scroll a little bit more. Do you see a third page of text messages?
A. Yes.
Q. Are these all text messages between yourself and your daughter Claudia, also known as Mia Ramirez?
A. It's been so long, I guess if they're coming from my phone number, that's me. They could be me.
Sometimes my daughters were here, so it could be me or my daughters. If it's from my number, they're mine. It's been a year. I can't remember. But if they're from my number, I sent them.
Q. You've testified previously in connection with this case; is that right?
A. Honestly, I don't remember; but if you say I did, I did.
Q. Well, do you remember being shown these messages in a prior court hearing?
A. I remember a prior - they had shown me some texts, yes.
Q. Okay. And at that point in the past, you verified that the text messages were accurate; is that correct?
A. If that's what the script says, I did it, yes. Q. Well, and there is no script. I want to know whether or not you did or didn't.
A. You're asking me to verify texts from how long ago. I text my daughters every day. So, if they came - I'm saying if they came from my phone number, most probably I did. This is - this sounds like something I would say to her, you know, just relax and things like that. It sounds like my dialogue.
MR. SOTO [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Okay. That's all the questions I have regarding these messages."
After Janet's examination, the court overruled respondent's objection, stating:
"I also believe that the mother - grandmother has laid the foundation. She has confirmed what the mother also stated off record. The grandmother has stated on record and under
oath, and this is also what is confirmed in People's 1, and so it is allowed into the evidence, okay, as are all the exhibits."
¶ 12 People's exhibit 4 was respondent's initial intake assessment and care plan records from Oak Park Counseling Center. In the record, respondent's therapist concluded respondent exhibited symptoms of adjustment disorder and reported depressed mood and irritability. The therapist recommended weekly individual therapy sessions and medication management.
¶ 13 People's exhibit 5 was C.K.R.'s medical records from Weiss Hospital. In particular, the record documented on January 12, 2021, states C.K.R. was found outside of a high school shivering and shaking with chills. C.K.R. told school security that he was being abused by his babysitter and mother's boyfriend and was kicked out of the house between 3 and 4 p.m. He stated that he "hit the babysitter hard." He walked to the school, got lost, and ended up in a park where he spent the night. The next morning, he went back to the school and sat outside. C.K.R. had "multiple red marks" on his body similar to bug bites. C.K.R. stated there were bed bugs in his room and that the marks were bug bites. C.K.R. also had "questionable bruising on lower and upper right arm," left knee, and left leg.
¶ 14 At the end of the hearing, the court made a finding of abuse and neglect of the minors. Based on the temporary custody hearing transcript, the court found C.K.R. "went into detail about the abuse, both sexual and physical that he was undergoing from this male in the home" and did not feel safe at home. The transcript also showed C.K.R. "attack[ed]" his grandmother and that respondent "encouraged him to basically stab or stick, however you view it, the grandmother with the knife." Respondent also stated in the text messages that "maybe he should have killed the grandmother." The court found C.K.R.'s home life "was so bad that [C.K.R.] actually left the home, seemly at nighttime for quite a while." The Weiss Hospital records corroborated the allegations that C.K.R. spent the night outside.
¶ 15 The case proceeded to a dispositional and permanency hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court found respondent was unable and unwilling to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minors. The minors were adjudicated wards of the court and placed under the guardianship of DCFS. This appeal follows.
¶ 16 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 17 On July 5, 2022, the court entered a disposition order adjudicating the minors, wards of the court and awarding guardianship to DCFS. Respondent filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2022. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), and 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001).
¶ 18 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, respondent argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the text messages between Janet and respondent without proper foundation and despite the messages containing Janet's inadmissible hearsay statements. Respondent also argues: (1) the temporary custody hearing transcript was inadmissible where Dowdy was available to testify and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to its admission; (2) the DCFS contact note contained inadmissible hearsay statements and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to its admission; and (3) the Oak Park Counseling Center and Weiss Hospital records were inadmissible where they were not supported by a certification sworn under oath and penalty of perjury and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the records. As it pertains to the last three issues, respondent does not request that we consider the unpreserved issues of admissibility of evidence under the plain error doctrine, which allows us to review forfeited claims. Instead, respondent only makes cognizable claims of counsel's ineffective assistance. Consequently, we review these claims under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 20 A. Admissibility of Evidence
¶ 21 Respondent argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted the text messages between Janet and respondent because the text messages were not properly authenticated and contained Janet's inadmissible hearsay statements. The State argues the text messages were authenticated by Janet's testimony. The State further contends the text messages contained circumstantial evidence of authenticity including references to Dowdy, the knife incident, and the minors. Furthermore, Dowdy testified about the contents of the text messages at the temporary custody hearing when she stated Janet informed her that respondent was using an illegal substance.
¶ 22 At the outset, the parties dispute whether respondent preserved the issue of authentication for review. "To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must, even in child custody cases, object at trial and file a written posttrial motion addressing it." In re Matter of Chance H., 2019 IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 45. While trial counsel objected to the admission of the text messages, he made the objection based on hearsay, not lack of authenticity. See In re Jaber W., 344 Ill.App.3d 250, 256 (2003) (finding respondent waived hearsay issue where counsel objected based on narrative and made no objection based on hearsay). Moreover, respondent did not file a posthearing motion on the issue of authentication. Therefore, the issue is forfeited. Alternatively, respondent argues we should review the issue for plain error. This court may address a forfeited issue under the plain error doctrine if the evidence is closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights. Chance H., 2019 IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 47. While the plain error doctrine is most applied to criminal proceedings, a parent's right to raise his or her biological child is a fundamental liberty interest, and rulings affecting that right may be reviewed for plain error. Id. The first step in conducting plain error review is to determine whether error occurred at all. Id.
¶ 23 The rules of evidence apply at an adjudication hearing. Id. ¶ 48. The admission of evidence by the circuit court will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court." People v. Watkins, 2015 IL App (3d) 120882, ¶ 35.
¶ 24 To establish a proper foundation for admissibility, text messages are treated like any other form of documentary evidence. People v. Watkins, 2015 IL App (3d) 120882, ¶ 36. A proper foundation is laid for the admission of documentary evidence when the document has been identified and authenticated. Id. To authenticate a document, the proponent must present evidence to demonstrate that the document is what the proponent claims it to be. Id. "The proponent need only prove a rational basis upon which the fact finder may conclude that the document did in fact belong to or was authored by the party alleged." Id. The circuit court, serving a limited screening function, must then determine whether the evidence of authentication, viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that authentication of the item of evidence is more probably true than not. Id. Documentary evidence may be authenticated by either direct or circumstantial evidence Id. ¶ 37. Circumstantial evidence of authenticity includes such factors as appearance, contents, substance, and distinctive characteristics, which are to be taken into consideration with the surrounding circumstances. Id. Documentary evidence, therefore, may be authenticated by its contents if it is shown to contain information that would only be known by the alleged author of the document or, at the very least, by a small group of people including the alleged author. Id.
¶ 25 Here, Janet testified to distinctive characteristics in the text messages. To establish authenticity, the State presented printouts of the text messages to Janet. Each printout depicts a text message screen with the time at the top middle portion of the screen. Underneath the time is a face emoticon (emoji) icon followed by the name "Mulan" and another emoji icon. A text message exchange follows beneath the icons. Janet stated that the name "Mulan" was her icon for respondent. Janet could not remember if the messages came from her or her daughters. However, Janet believed that "if they're from my number, I sent them" and that the text messages "sounds like something I would say to her, you know, just relax and things like that. It sounds like my dialogue." Moreover, the text messages referring to the knife incident suggest Janet was one of the messengers. One of the messages in the thread stated, "I'm one who [got] knife in her arm not you." Janet previously testified that C.K.R. "poked" her with a knife. Given these facts, we find a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that authentication of the text messages, viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, is more probably true than not.
¶ 26 Respondent also claims the text messages contained Janet's inadmissible hearsay statements. The State does not dispute respondent's argument. Rather, the State claims that respondent's text messages are more relevant to the circuit court's findings than Janet's text messages. "[E]rror is considered harmless where ample evidence supported the court's finding." Charles H., 2019 IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 53. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding of neglect based on an injurious environment and abuse based on a substantial risk of physical injury. The evidence showed Janet informed Dowdy that C.K.R. stabbed her and that respondent did not intervene to stop C.K.R.; Sean physically and sexually harmed C.K.R.; Sean kicked C.K.R. out of the home; C.K.R. had bruises on his knee, arm, and waist after he was found shivering and shaking with chills outside of a high school; C.K.R. informed a security guard that he was abused by Sean and his babysitter; C.K.R. was found with other marks on his body that he described as bed bug bites; and Sean hit D.K.R. while changing his diaper. Therefore, even if the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the text messages, the error was harmless.
¶ 27 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 28 The sixth amendment right to counsel implies the right to effective assistance. In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 42. The right to counsel has been codified and extended to the parents of a minor who are party respondents in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. In re R.G., 165 Ill.App.3d 112, 127 (1988). "Though the statutory right to counsel in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act lacks constitutional footing *** that right is closely linked to its constitutional counterpart." In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 42. As such, our standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims in criminal cases is the two-prong standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43. Under the standard, respondent must show substandard performance by trial counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. "That is, respondent must show that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had there not been ineffective assistance of counsel." In re R.G., 165 Ill.App.3d at 127-28.
¶ 29 1. Temporary Custody Transcript
¶ 30 Respondent argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the temporary custody hearing transcript. Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) allows the admission of former testimony when a witness is unavailable. Dowdy was available to testify at the adjudication hearing and, therefore, the transcript, which contained her prior testimony, was inadmissible. The State contends section 2-18(6) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(6) (West 2020)) allows for the admission of Dowdy's prior testimony and does not conflict with Rule 804(a). We note Dowdy's testimony contains C.K.R.'s hearsay statements. Respondent does not take issue with the admission of C.K.R.'s hearsay statements in themselves and acknowledges that such statements are allowed under section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2020)). The issue before us is whether Dowdy's prior testimony was admissible given Dowdy was available to testify at the adjudication hearing.
¶ 31 Section 2-18 addresses evidence at an adjudication hearing. 705 ILCS 2-18 (West 2020). Pertinent here, subsection (6) provides:
"In any hearing under this Act, the court may take judicial notice of prior sworn testimony or evidence admitted in prior proceedings involving the same minor if (a) the parties were either represented by counsel at such prior proceedings or the right to counsel was knowingly waived and (b) the taking of judicial notice would not result in admitting hearsay evidence at a hearing where it would otherwise be prohibited." Id.
¶ 32 Respondent argues that Dowdy's former testimony is "prohibited" under section 2-18(6)(b) because it does not fall under any hearsay exception. Illinois Rule of Evidence 802 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides, "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or by statute as provided in Rule 101." Rule 101 (eff. Jan. 6, 2015) provides, "A statutory rule of evidence is effective unless in conflict with a rule or a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court." Hence, hearsay is not prohibited when it is authorized by statute. However, hearsay is prohibited under any statutory exception to the hearsay rule when the statute conflicts with an Illinois Rule of Evidence or an Illinois Supreme Court decision. See People v. Walker, 119 Ill.2d 465, 475 (1988) ("where such a legislative enactment directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a rule of this court within the court's authority, the rule will prevail"). Section 2-18 provides a statutory exception to the hearsay rule where it allows for the circuit court to take judicial notice of prior sworn testimony. However, Dowdy's testimony is only admissible under section 2-18 if the statute does not conflict with any Illinois Supreme Court decision or Illinois Rule of Evidence-specifically, Rule 804(a).
¶ 33 Our supreme court's decision in People v. Deroo, 2022 IL 126120, is instructive. There, the supreme court examined whether the statutory language in section 11-501.4(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code conflicted with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6). Id. ¶ 18. The court noted that section 11-501.4(a) authorizes the admission of the results of chemical blood tests as a business exception to the hearsay rule in driving under the influence cases whereas Rule 803(6) expressly excludes medical records from the business records hearsay exception in criminal cases. Id. ¶ 22. The court found that both provisions "codify a form of the business records hearsay exception" but each provision "directs different action; Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6) prohibits what section 11-501.4(a) allows." Id. ¶¶ 22, 27. Thus, the court determined that the statute and rule were in conflict. Id.
¶ 34 Rule 804(b)(1) provides:
"Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness (A) at another hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in an evidence deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, or (B) in a discovery deposition as provided for in Supreme Court Rule 212(a)(5)." Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
¶ 35 Contrary to the provisions examined in Deroo, Rule 804(b)(1) does not expressly prohibit prior testimony when a witness is available. Rather, Rule 804(b)(1) merely allows for the admission of prior witness testimony under circumstances when the witness is unavailable. Thus, no conflict exists between Rule 804 and section 2-18(6). Because section 2-18(6) allows for the admission of Dowdy's prior testimony and such admission does not conflict with Rule 804, the transcript was admissible. Consequently, we find trial counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of the transcript. See In re Charles W., 2014 IL App (1st) 131281, ¶ 42 ("[c]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue"). Because we find no deficient performance, we need not address prejudice. People v. Givens, 237 Ill.2d 311, 331 (2010) (to prevail under the Strickland test, a defendant must show both that his counsel was deficient and that his deficiency prejudiced the defendant). Though we need not address prejudice, we note that the results of the hearing would not have been different had counsel objected to the admission of the transcript. Despite the admission of the transcript, there was other evidence supporting the circuit court's finding that the minors were neglected based on an injurious environment and abused based on a substantial risk of physical injury. Specifically, the evidence revealed that Sean kicked C.K.R. out of the home. C.K.R. was found outside of a high school shivering and shaking with chills. C.K.R. told school security that he was being abused by his babysitter and mother's boyfriend. C.K.R. had "multiple red marks" on his body similar to bug bites. C.K.R. stated there were bed bugs in his room and that the marks were bug bites. C.K.R. also had "questionable bruising on lower and upper right arm," left knee, and left leg.
¶ 36 2. DCFS Contact Note
¶ 37 Respondent argues the DCFS contact note was inadmissible where it was not authenticated by live testimony or certified by the head of the hospital or its designee in accordance with section 2-18(4)(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2020)), Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236(a). Furthermore, the note was not sworn under oath and penalty of perjury under Illinois Rule of Evidence 902(11). The State does not respond to respondent's argument regarding the admissibility of the note. Instead, the State argues that, regardless of any error, respondent cannot establish prejudice. We first examine the note's compliance with section 2-18(4)(a) because it specifically applies to the admission of evidence at adjudication hearings. See Ill. R. Evid. 101 (eff. Jan. 6, 2015) ("[a] statutory rule of evidence is effective unless in conflict with a rule or a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court"); see generally In re Craig H., 2020 IL App (4th) 190061, ¶ 46 ("where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail").
¶ 38 Section 2-18(4)(a) provides:
"Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof of that condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the document was made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. A certification by the head or responsible employee of the hospital or agency that the writing, record, photograph or x-ray is the full and complete record of the condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it satisfies the conditions of this paragraph shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained in such certification. A certification by someone other than the head of the hospital or agency shall be accompanied by a photocopy of a delegation of authority signed by both the head of the hospital or agency and by such other employee. All other circumstances of the making of the memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall not affect its admissibility." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2020).
"Absent such certification, *** to be admissible as a business record under [this section], the proponent must establish a foundation showing that the writing was (1) made as a memorandum or record of the event, (2) made in the ordinary course of business, and (3) made at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter." In re M.H., 2020 IL App (3d) 190731, ¶ 17.
¶ 39 Here, the contact note was not certified by the head or a responsible employee of DCFS and, thus, there was no prima facie showing that respondent satisfied the business record exception under section 2-18(4)(a). Moreover, the record does not show that respondent established foundation on the note at the adjudication hearing. Therefore, the note was inadmissible under section 2-18(4)(a).
¶ 40 However, we agree with the State that the results of the hearing would not have been different had counsel objected to the admission of the contact note. Notwithstanding the contact note, there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the minors were neglected based on an injurious environment and abused based on a substantial risk of physical injury. The evidence revealed that Sean showed C.K.R. his penis. When C.K.R. informed respondent, she did not believe C.K.R. and allowed Sean to continue to stay in the home. That same month, Sean grabbed C.K.R. by his hair, handcuffed him, and knocked him unconscious. On January 11, 2021, Sean watched C.K.R. use the restroom and touched C.K.R.'s penis. As previously noted, Sean also kicked C.K.R. out of the home. C.K.R. was found outside of a high school shivering and shaking with chills. C.K.R. told school security that he was being abused by his babysitter and mother's boyfriend. C.K.R. had "multiple red marks" on his body similar to bug bites. C.K.R. stated there were bed bugs in his room and that the marks were bug bites. C.K.R. also had "questionable bruising on lower and upper right arm," left knee, and left leg. Sean also hit D.K.R. while changing his diaper. On April 7, 2021, C.K.R. "poked" his grandmother with a knife. The court admitted text messages between the grandmother and respondent in which respondent stated, "he should have killed you." Based on the overwhelming evidence of abuse and neglect, no prejudice resulted from the admission of the contact note.
¶ 41 3. Oak Park Counseling and Weiss Hospital Records
¶ 42 Respondent argues the Oak Park Counseling Center and Weiss Hospital records were inadmissible where they failed to meet the requirements of section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act. Specifically, the Oak Park Counseling and Weiss Hospital record certifications contain illegible names of the head official and the official's designee and the Oak Park Counseling Center certification does not identify the signers by printed name. Respondent further claims that the certifications were not sworn to under oath subject to penalty of perjury in accordance with Illinois Rules of Evidence 902(11) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018).
¶ 43 As previously stated, under section 2-18(4)(a), a certification by the head or responsible employee of the hospital that the record is the full and complete record of the condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it satisfies the conditions of section 2-18 is prima facie evidence of the facts contained in such certification. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2020). A certification made by someone other than the head of the hospital must be accompanied by a photocopy of a delegation of authority signed by both the head of the hospital and by the other employee. Id.
¶ 44 Here, the Oak Park Counseling Center and Weiss Hospital records demonstrate compliance with the certification requirements of section 2-18(4)(a). The clinical director of the Oak Park Counseling Center signed a certification of records certifying that the counseling records were full and complete and made in the regular course of business. The clinical director also signed a delegation of authority stating that the clinical director was the head of the Oak Park Counseling Center. Weiss Hospital's director of health information management and privacy officer signed a certification of records certifying that the hospital records were full and complete and made in the regular course of business. The chief executive officer of Weiss Hospital signed a delegation authorizing the director to execute the certification of records, and the director signed the delegation accepting the delegation of authority.
¶ 45 Respondent claims that the certifications were not made under oath subject to penalty of perjury in accordance with Rule 902(11). Rule 902(11) defines "certification" as "a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury." Ill. R. Evid. 902(11) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018). We reject respondent's argument that compliance with section 2-18(4)(a) requires a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury. Rule 902(11) expressly provides that it governs certified records admitted under Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6). Furthermore, no provision in section 2-18 adopts Rule 902(11)'s definition of certification. See Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill.2d 391, 408 (2010) ("[a] court may not add provisions that are not found in a statute, nor may it depart from a statute's plain language by reading into the law exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express").
¶ 46 Indeed, when construing ambiguous language like the term "certification" in section 2-18, courts "are to give the statutory language the fullest, rather than narrowest, possible meaning to which it is susceptible." People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264, 279 (2003). The term "certification" encompasses several meanings. For instance, the Black's Law Dictionary defines certification as "[t]he acting of attesting; esp., the process of giving someone or something an official document stating that a specified standard has been satisfied." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This definition makes no mention of an oath subject to the penalty of perjury. Restricting the provisions of section 2-18 to Rule 902(11)'s narrower interpretation of a certification also would be contrary to the purpose of the Act, which "shall be liberally construed to carry out the foregoing purpose and policy." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(4) (West 2020).
¶ 47 Furthermore, respondent relies on Mashni Corp. ex rel. Mashni v. Laski, 351 Ill.App.3d 727 (2004), in arguing that the illegible signatures on the certifications constitute noncompliance with section 2-18(4)(a). In Laski, the appellate court reviewed whether circulators' verification signatures complied with the notarization requirements of section 9-4 of the Liquor Control Act and section 28-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 731, 735. The court found, among other things, the verifications did not include circulators' names and addresses and their signatures were illegible. As a result, "the verifications were essentially anonymous" and were not a substitute for the notarization requirements of section 9-4. Id. Laski is inapposite to this case where section 2-18(4)(a) was not at issue in Laski and respondent does not explain how section 2-18(4)(a) relates to statutes at issue in Laski.
¶ 48 The plain language of section 2-18(4)(a) merely requires a certification by the head or a responsible person of the hospital and a declaration of authority signed by the head of the hospital if the certification was made by someone other than the head. The certifications attached to the Oak Park Counseling Center and Weiss Hospital records meet these requirements. Therefore, we find that trial counsel rendered effective assistance. See In re Charles W., 2014 IL App (1st) 131281, ¶ 42 ("[c]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue"). Because we find no deficient performance, we need not address prejudice. People v. Givens, 237 Ill.2d 311, 331 (2010) (to prevail under the Strickland test, a defendant must show both that his counsel was deficient and that his deficiency prejudiced the defendant). Though we need not address prejudice, we note that the results of the hearing would not have been different had counsel objected to the admission of the records for the same reasons stated above. Accordingly, we find respondent failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 49 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 50 We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text messages into evidence at the adjudication hearing. Furthermore, we find that trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 51 Affirmed.