Opinion
G062754
10-22-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES EDWARD MOORE, Defendant and Appellant.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the San Bernardino County No. FWV19002560 Superior Court, Ingrid Adamson Uhler, Judge. Affirmed.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
GOODING, J.
Defendant Charles Edward Moore strangled Leanna Marie Alva to death in a vacant home in Rialto, California. He was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 45 years to life under the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12.)Moore contends the court erred when it denied his motion to strike one or both of his prior strike convictions-one for armed robbery and one for residential burglary-brought pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling and affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
ALVA'S MURDER
Moore met Alva on July 31, 2019, and brought her to a vacant home, where her body was discovered the next morning, face down on the floor with her pants down to her knees. She died as a result of strangulation. Moore admitted going with the victim to the home where her body was found, smoking methamphetamine, and having sex with her. Moore admitted to police he and Alva started "wrestling around" and he placed Alva in a headlock a couple of times, like a "'wrestling- choke,'" when they were both lying on the floor. Moore said Alva scratched him. Moore had what the phlebotomist who performed a sexual assault suspect examination on him described as "open sores" on his stomach, ear, and arm. Moore's DNA was found under Alva's fingernails. Moore said when they finished having sex, "'that was the actual time she stopped moving'"; he was on top of her, and she was face down on her stomach. Moore was 6 feet tall, and weighed 250 pounds; Alva was 5 feet, 6 inches tall, and weighed 135 pounds. After getting up and going to another room to wash himself, Moore left the home, with Alva still face down on the floor with her pants down. Moore said he thought she was just asleep and "'didn't know she was dead.'" Moore was seen on a surveillance video from a nearby home exiting the residence that morning. Moore confirmed to police that the position of Alva's body as she was discovered that morning was exactly the way he had left her. Moore testified at his trial; he denied choking Alva.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Moore was charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and a violent felony within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c). The People also alleged Moore suffered two prior serious or violent felonies. The first was a conviction for second degree armed robbery in 1995 committed when Moore was about 19 years old, and the second was a 2014 conviction for first degree residential burglary.
During the armed robbery, Moore had forced two fast food restaurant employees to the floor and pointed a gun directly at them. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.
Moore was convicted of his second strike in 2014, when he broke into a residence and stole a shotgun. He pled guilty and received probation.
In the present case, the jury found Moore guilty of second degree murder. In a bifurcated phase of the trial, the trial court found the two prior strikes true.
At his murder trial, Moore admitted he was convicted in 2014 of the residential burglary.
On January 13, 2023, the court denied Moore's Romero motion, denied probation, and sentenced him to 45 years to life (15 years to life tripled because of the prior strikes). Moore timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Moore contends the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors in denying his Romero motion, including the length of his sentence for the murder, his youth at the time of his first strike, and his substance abuse issues. Moore also contends the court improperly construed his defense that he did not kill Alva as a lack of remorse and considered it as a basis to deny his motion. Moore asks that we grant his Romero motion and strike one or both of his prior strikes or, alternatively, vacate the sentence and order the case remanded for the trial court to consider all the relevant factors.
"The Three Strikes law is designed to increase the prison terms for repeat felons. [Citations.] When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and it is pleaded and proved he had committed prior 'violent' or 'serious' felonies, the Three Strikes law provides for the imposition of increased sentences. [Citations.] A trial court is presumed to have acted properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the Three Strikes law." (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 370.)
"A court's discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in strict compliance with section 1385(a), and is subject to review for abuse." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) "'"[T]he language of [section 1385], 'in furtherance of justice,' requires consideration both of the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, in determining whether there should be a dismissal."'" (Id. at p. 530.)
Pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a), "[t]he judge . . . may . . . in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be stated orally on the record."
When ruling on a Romero motion, "the court . . . must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
A court's refusal to strike a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law is "subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).) "[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not 'aware of its discretion' to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, 'the sentencing norms [established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce[ ] an "arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd" result' under the specific facts of a particular case." (Id. at p. 378.)
"In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, '"[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review."' [Citations.] Second, a '"decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.'"' [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
Here, Moore has failed to meet his burden of showing the trial court's sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, and we therefore must presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) The trial court explained in detail the reasons for its decision not to strike either of the prior strike convictions and to impose a sentence of 45 years to life for Alva's murder. The court considered the nature and circumstances of the murder, reviewed and considered the court files and underlying circumstances in connection with both prior strikes, considered Moore's upbringing and background, and determined he fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Moore contends the trial court should have applied section 1385, subdivision (c), added by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which relates to striking enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Several courts have held that section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law. Moore urges us to reject the holdings of those courts, including People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, and to conclude that section 1385, subdivision (c), does apply to the Three Strikes law. We decline to do so. We find the reasoning of People v. Burke and similar cases persuasive and agree that section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law because the Three Strikes law is an alternate sentencing scheme and not an enhancement as that term has been judicially defined. (People v. Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 244; see People v. Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1338; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 69 [holding § 1385, subd. (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law].)
As to the length of his sentence for Alva's murder, Moore has failed to show 45 years to life is unjust. (See People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1144 ["The length of a sentence is the 'overarching consideration' in deciding whether to strike a prior conviction because the underlying purpose of striking a prior conviction is the avoidance of unjust sentences."].) The trial court characterized the present offense as a brutal murder of a vulnerable woman and found that Moore's conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence of guilt. We agree. Moore strangled a woman to death and then left her face down, not moving, on the floor of a vacant home, with her pants down to her knees. Moore tries to minimize the severity of his murder conviction by arguing the case against him was "troubling" in multiple respects. Specifically, Moore points to his own repeated denials that he killed Alva, the lack of eyewitnesses, the lack of credibility of a jailhouse informant who testified against him at trial, and evidence Alva had toxic levels of methamphetamine in her system, which Moore contends could have contributed to her death. These arguments all go to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Moore's conviction, which is not an issue on appeal.
Even if we were considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we would conclude based on the record before us that substantial evidence supported Moore's murder conviction (even excluding the testimony from the jailhouse informant). Among other things, the jury heard the following evidence: Moore admitted to being at the scene of the crime with the victim, wrestling with her, putting her in a chokehold, and having sex with her. The victim scratched Moore, had Moore's DNA under her fingernails, and Moore had "open sores" on multiple parts of his body. Moore admitted leaving Alva on the floor not moving in the same position in which she was later found dead. Alva had fatal injuries to her neck; the cause of death was strangulation.
Moore also argues the trial court failed to consider and discuss certain factors in reaching its decision, including his youth when he committed the first strike (i.e., armed robbery), his lack of violent offenses since the robbery, and his problems with substance abuse. We find no abuse of discretion.
First, section 1385 does not require a court to "'explain its decision not to exercise its power to dismiss or strike.'" (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376.) That is because there exists a "legislative presumption that a court acts properly whenever it sentences a defendant in accordance with the three strikes law." (Ibid., citing People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337-338 [holding Three Strikes law must be applied unless court concludes the defendant falls outside the spirit of the law].) Unless the record suggests otherwise, "we presume that the trial court considered all of the relevant factors and properly applied the law." (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 638.)
Here, the trial court did explain in detail the basis for its denial of Moore's Romero motion. The court considered the seriousness of the present offense, the parties' briefing, the court files of the past offenses, Moore's involvement in the criminal justice system, including his probation violations and drug use, as well as his personal mitigating circumstances.Although the court noted Moore "did remain law abiding for a lengthy period of time [after his first strike,] before being later convicted of first degree residential burglary in 2014, during which a shotgun was stolen," the court also observed that Moore later violated probation, continued to use drugs, and demonstrated no desire to change and reform.
Moore was abandoned by his biological parents and lost his girlfriend to cancer.
Moore also had convictions for possession of a controlled substance in 2006 and 2007. Moore was arrested for burglary in 2017, but the trial court was unaware of the disposition of that case at the time of sentencing. The petition for revocation of probation indicated Moore had failed to report, refused services, and denied drug use.
Here, "'the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law.'" (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) We, therefore, will not question the trial court's conclusion on appeal.
Finally, Moore contends the trial court abused its discretion by concluding he had not shown remorse for the murder. Moore correctly points out an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court considers impermissible factors in ruling on a Romero motion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) But lack of remorse is not necessarily an impermissible factor. Lack of remorse can be considered an aggravating factor "unless the defendant has denied guilt and the evidence of guilt is conflicting." (People v. Holguin (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1319, italics added.) Here, Moore denied killing the victim at trial, but the evidence of his guilt was not conflicting; indeed, it was overwhelming. Moreover, Moore continued to show lack of remorse after his conviction according to the probation officer's report. Therefore, it was not improper for the court to consider his lack of remorse as one of the many factors it evaluated in reaching its conclusion not to strike either of Moore's prior strikes. Even if it were error for the court to consider Moore's denial that he murdered Alva when ruling on the Romero motion, the error was harmless in light of all the other factors under People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 161,d that were properly considered by the court, including the seriousness of the current offense, Moore's prior strikes and continued involvement in crime and drugs, and the court's conclusion that Moore fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. SANCHEZ, J.