Opinion
No. 2021-647 SC
10-20-2022
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for appellant. Justin Montezuma, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
Unpublished Opinion
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for appellant.
Justin Montezuma, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
PRESENT JERRY GARGUILO, P.J., ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, JJ
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (W. Alexander Melbardis, J.H.O.), dated September 16, 2021. The order granted defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a upon a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, and, upon such vacatur, to dismiss the simplified traffic information charging that offense.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, for a new determination, following a hearing, of defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a upon a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, and, upon such vacatur, to dismiss the simplified traffic information charging that offense.
Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant was charged in a simplified traffic information with operating a motor vehicle without insurance (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 319 [1]). Upon defendant's alleged failure to "answer," the court entered a guilty plea on his behalf and "render[ed] a default judgment of a fine" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a). Thereafter, a civil default judgment was entered against defendant. Defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) to vacate the default judgment and, upon such vacatur, to dismiss the simplified traffic information charging that offense. The People opposed the motion and, in an order dated September 7, 2021, the court granted it, vacated the default judgment, and dismissed the simplified traffic information. The People appeal.
A default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a is "civil in nature" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a [1]; see People v Iverson, 37 N.Y.3d 98, 104 [2021]; People v Reyes, 64 Misc.3d 127[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50443[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]). Consequently, a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) is a proper way to obtain relief from such a default judgment (see Keis v Margiotta, 174 A.D.3d 697 [2019]; Reyes, 2022 NY Slip Op 50443[U]). CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 141 [1986]). Here, we find that there is an issue of fact as to whether defendant failed to "answer," i.e., whether he defaulted in this action, given the conflicting claims in the motion and opposition papers regarding whether defendant timely mailed the summons with a not guilty plea to the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency. Should it be determined that defendant did, in fact, timely mail the summons with a not guilty plea to the court, it would have been barred from entering a default judgment against him (see Iverson, 37 N.Y.3d at 101, 103).
We pass upon no other issue.
Accordingly, the order is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, for a new determination, following a hearing, of defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a upon a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, and, upon such vacatur, to dismiss the simplified traffic information charging that offense.
GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.