Opinion
C082992
07-11-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC MARTIN MINCHAK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 62085191)
When a defendant pleads not guilty to a crime by reason of insanity, the issues of guilt and sanity are tried separately. (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 520.) "Penal Code section 1026, subdivision (a), provides that in such circumstances, 'the defendant shall first be tried as if only such other plea or pleas had been entered, and in that trial the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty . . . then the question whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time the offense was committed shall be promptly tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury in the discretion of the court. In that trial, the jury shall return a verdict either that the defendant was sane at the time the offense was committed or was insane at the time the offense was committed.' " (Id. at pp. 520-521.) This case arises out of a sanity phase trial.
Defendant Eric Minchak appeals a jury's finding that he was sane when he committed a murder and robbery. His sole argument on appeal is that the court's insanity instruction erroneously prevented the jury from considering evidence of his personality disorder in conjunction with his schizophrenia in deciding whether he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
The Murder And Robbery
Tammy Texiera stopped for gas on her way to church. Defendant drove into the gas station "really fast" and had a "weird" and "angry" look on his face. He got out of his car, walked to Texiera, and stabbed her to death. Defendant then dumped the contents of her purse onto the ground. A witness drove into the gas station as defendant was attacking Texiera, heard her screaming, saw defendant striking her, honked his horn, and drove off calling 911.
The gas station attendant also saw the altercation and approached defendant. He asked defendant what he was doing, to which defendant responded, "I'm getting gas." The attendant ran into the store and locked the door, but defendant entered the store through a different door. Defendant went up to the register, threw money he took from Texiera's purse on the counter, and asked the attendant to activate the gas pump. When the attendant responded he would, defendant left. The attendant locked the door behind defendant and called 911. He did not activate the gas pump.
When defendant realized the gas pump had not been activated, he pulled a hammer out of his car and returned to the store. He repeatedly hit the window until it shattered, repeatedly saying "[g]ive me my gas." The attendant told defendant to move his car and he would give him gas. As defendant returned to his car, the police arrived. Defendant was taken into custody.
An investigation revealed defendant's fuel gauge was on empty and he did not have any money in his wallet. His bank account was also overdrawn.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and second degree robbery, found true a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation and allegations defendant personally used a deadly weapon.
II
The Sanity Phase
Following the trial in the sanity phase, a jury found defendant sane at the time of the murder and robbery.
A
Defense Case
Defendant called his mother, his brother, and two expert witnesses to testify regarding his mental illness. Defendant's mother and brother detailed his history of mental illness, including episodes of delusions and various hospital visits. Defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2002 and prescribed medication. He did "fairly well" between 2002 and 2005. In early 2006, however, defendant left his home in Pennsylvania abruptly for Sacramento. His family attempted to convince him to return, but he refused.
Forensic psychiatrists Charles Scott and John Chamberlain testified defendant met the requirements for insanity. Both experts testified that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect -- schizophrenia. Specifically, Scott and Chamberlain testified that defendant had schizophrenia at the time of the murder and robbery. They further testified that, although defendant knew and understood the nature and quality of his acts at the time of the crimes, he was unable to distinguish right from wrong.
With regard to defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong, Scott testified: "It's my opinion that because of his mental disease of schizophrenia, it made him unable to distinguish right from wrong on the day of the offense. So, again, in his mind he believed, as he had for years, that the mob was after him, his life was in danger, he was and had been fleeing from them. When he pulled into the gas station on that day and he saw Ms. Texiera, it was his delusional belief she was associated, or affiliated, or in the mob, and, therefore, this was a person who had been following him. It was the first time he actually confronted his perceived person, seen this person, so he felt it was either he was going to be killed or she had to be killed, and he believed delusionally that he was acting in self-defense."
Scott explained a personality disorder is "a chronic maladaptive way of interacting with the world. Usually begins since late adolescence or early adulthood, and typically, if they have schizophrenia or major mental illness accounting for their behaviors, you don't attribute those to a personality disorder because you clearly have a more serious mental illness driving that behavior."
Following the conclusion of his testimony, the judge presented the following question to Scott on behalf of the jury: "Can you explain the difference between a behavioral disorder, a mental disorder, and if there are other potential mental illnesses that might be less than the ones you have described that might relate to the defendant?" Scott explained a personality disorder is "someone who does not respect the rules of society, and [is] willing to break laws." He rejected the suggestion that defendant had an antisocial personality disorder or borderline personality disorder.
Chamberlain echoed Scott's testimony regarding defendant's inability to distinguish right from wrong, stating, "it's my opinion that he was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at [the time of the murder] based on his schizophrenia." He explained his opinion was based on the nature and sequence of the events: the murder and robbery occurred in daylight in an area where traffic and people were expected; defendant did not conceal his identity or attempt to avoid detection; defendant continued the attack when another person drove up and while making eye contact with that witness; defendant responded, "I'm just getting gas," to the attendant's question about what he was doing when the attendant clearly saw defendant had attacked Texiera; defendant attempted to pay for gas after the attendant had seen the attack; defendant broke the store's glass when the pump was not activated and did not attempt to flee; and defendant told the attendant: "Go ahead and call the police. Call the FBI. My sister's in the FBI."
Following the conclusion of his testimony, the judge presented the following question to Chamberlain on behalf of the jury: "Were there other doctors [who] made different diagnoses than schizophrenia? And what were those other diagnoses?" Chamberlain responded other diagnoses in the records included anxiety disorder, substance use disorder, and mention of defendant possessing a schizotypal personality trait. He explained a schizotypal personality trait is generally ascribed to people with "magical thinking" who are "very superstitious," but they usually are "not having hallucinations" and are "not obviously delusional." Further, "[t]hey don't have the level of impairment that someone with schizophrenia has."
Similar to Scott, Chamberlain had concerns with the "personality diagnoses": "But I think when you have -- part of the problem with personality diagnoses is when you have someone who has a severe mental illness like schizophrenia, and especially schizophrenia starts so young, personality disorders can't be diagnosed until the person is 18. And when you have something like this where at -- in his early twenties, he is starting to have symptoms of a very severe mental illness, I don't think you can really reliably, in most cases, go back and diagnose a personality disorder because you have to sort of consider what effects on personality this severe chronic mental illness is going to have." It was Chamberlain's opinion that, although there was mention of "psychopathic personality traits" in the records, he did not believe the testing "supported any conclusion that [defendant] really had significant traits of psychopathy."
B
Prosecution Case
The prosecution called various witnesses and one clinical and forensic psychologist, Bruce Ebert, as an expert. Ebert testified "[t]here's no question" defendant "suffers from a diagnosable mental disorder that would qualify under the insanity law" and "a very serious mental illness" -- schizophrenia. He was of the opinion, however, that defendant "was capable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his acts" and that "defendant was capable of distinguishing right versus wrong." In this regard, when asked, "[i]n your opinion, what role did the defendant's schizophrenia play" on the day of the murder and robbery, Ebert responded, "[n]one." In his opinion, schizophrenia had nothing to do with whether defendant knew the wrongfulness of his behavior.
Ebert explained he based his opinion on the store's video of the crime and the timeline he developed based on the video, which indicated there was no evidence that there was an imminent threat to defendant at the time of the murder and robbery. More specifically, he found no evidence that Texiera presented an imminent threat of harm to defendant. Ebert explained there were two explanations for defendant's actions: "Either he was desperate and he did what he had to do to get money and acted in a manner consistent in the past when he was desperate, or, secondly, he was operating under a delusion that somehow, Ms. Texiera was a member of the Mafia and was going to kill him. And yet when you look at the time line [sic], umm, I can't find any point in time where there is any imminent threat of harm to [defendant]. Even if you accept the delusion theory there's no imminent harm."
The sequence of events pointed to an act of desperation motivated by money, Ebert said, because after defendant immobilized Texiera, he reached for her purse and took the money to buy gas. Ebert believed this was consistent with defendant's "continuing pattern" that "if he gets feeling desperate, if he doesn't get what he wants, then he's going to act out violently." Ebert explained he did not believe defendant had a delusion regarding the mob because he found no evidence that the delusion was consistent and fixed over time, as one would expect. Thus, Ebert said defendant's acts were "in relationship to the dire circumstance he was in at the time, and not any fancy mental illness theory . . . yeah, he was mentally ill, but, no, his mental illness didn't -- didn't cause him to do this. Many other things did."
The prosecution asked Ebert about the various tests he performed on defendant. Ebert testified defendant has "some antisocial tendencies," and is narcissistic and self-focused. Defendant also scored high on the schizoid scale (meaning he generally operates in his own world mentally, which leads to peculiar types of thoughts and behavior), avoidant scale (he avoids any kind of important or long-term relationship with another human being), schizotypal scale (a personality disorder directly connected to schizophrenia leading to unusual ideas and beliefs), and paranoid personality scale (the paranoia is built into his personality structure in addition to being a component of his schizophrenia, leading him to chronically distrust everyone). He also showed elevations on the alcohol dependence scale, had "a significant score on the scale measuring a delusional disorder" (which is part of his schizophrenia), and had a "slight elevation in the antisocial scale."
Ebert said the personality traits are "fixed patterns" and when "you add a mental illness on top of that, and then couple that with antisocial attitudes, antisocial features, and, um, it just doesn't bode well for -- for [defendant] to have any pleasure in his life, and it doesn't bode well for anyone around him because they could be the object of his -- of his wrath or his desire." While he did not believe defendant's conduct was driven by psychopathy, he explained defendant does have tendencies of "a person who is manipulative, who has grandiose ideas, chronic interpersonal problems, and -- and just the overall tendency that -- that they're going to get their needs met no matter whatever adverse effect it has on others."
The judge presented several questions to Ebert on the jury's behalf. The jury asked whether defendant has a personality disorder, to which Ebert responded, "[y]es." The jury further asked: "Regarding the concept of narcissism, does narcissism cause him to consciously do what he wants, or is it an instinctive or an uncontrollable impulse?" Ebert responded: "So narcissism, just like other personality traits, are not instinctive. I mean, they may be instinctive, but they certainly do not go beyond the control of the individual. Ultimately, the individual has control for -- all of us individuals, all of us, have control of our behavior."
Following the jury's questions, the prosecution asked what effect narcissism had on defendant. Ebert explained, "it's coupled with his mental illness. So the fact that he is narcissistic means he essentially operates in his own world and what is important to him are his needs, his desires, his goals, and essentially what he wants to accomplish in any given situation, regardless of what the needs of others are in those situations." The prosecution further asked Ebert to identify defendant's potential personality disorders. Ebert responded: "So I believe that he has a combination of a schizoid personality disorder and a schizotypal personality disorder. Those are typically the personality disorders that often lead to schizophrenia." When asked whether it was the same as schizophrenia, he responded: "No. It's different because it does not -- the personality disorder is part of the character structure of the personality, and it does not have the more serious symptoms that go along with schizophrenia, such as does not have auditory or visual or gustatory hallucinations. No delusions of that sort." Ebert explained personality disorders "remain steady over a person's lifetime."
The defense also responded to the jury's questions, asking: "And at this time, you are not denying that although [defendant] has personality disorders, that he has a serious mental illness, are you?" Ebert responded, "[n]ot at all" and confirmed defendant suffers from schizophrenia.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the CALCRIM No. 3450 instruction, as given, did not accurately reflect the law set forth in Penal Code section 29.8, violating his constitutional rights to due process and resulting in prejudicial error.
Penal Code section 29.8 provides, in pertinent part: "In any criminal proceeding in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall not be found by the trier of fact solely on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder, a seizure disorder, or an addiction to, or abuse of, intoxicating substances." (Italics added.) The pertinent part of the CALCRIM No. 3450 instruction given at trial read: "The defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that he was legally insane when he committed the crime. [¶] The defendant is legally insane if: [¶] 1. When he committed the crime, he had a mental disease or defect; [¶] AND [¶] 2. Because of that disease or defect, he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or was incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was morally or legally wrong. [¶] None of the following qualify as a mental disease or defect for purposes of an insanity defense: personality disorder, adjustment disorder, seizure disorder, or an abnormality of personality or character made apparent only by a series of criminal or antisocial acts." (Italics added.)
Defendant argues the instruction should have included the word "solely" as in Penal Code section 29.8 because, as framed, the instruction precluded the jury from considering "whether [defendant's] paranoid schizophrenia, coupled with his antisocial personality disorder, rendered him unable to distinguish right from wrong." The People argue defendant forfeited his claim of error by failing to object to the instruction at trial, the instruction did not misstate the law or mislead the jury, and any error was harmless. Because we find no error, we do not consider the forfeiture claim.
"An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law." (People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) We consider this, however, against the backdrop that a trial court need only instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866.) "The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case." (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531.) "It has long been the law that it is error to charge the jury on abstract principles of law not pertinent to the issues in the case. [Citation.] The reason for the rule is obvious. Such an instruction tends to confuse and mislead the jury by injecting into the case matters which the undisputed evidence shows are not involved." (People v. Jackson (1954) 42 Cal.2d 540, 546-547.)
Here, defendant did not present any evidence showing his alleged insanity arose out of the combination of his antisocial personality disorder and his schizophrenia, as he now claims. Rather, both his experts expressed the opinion defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong on the day of the crimes because of his mental disease of schizophrenia, and any diagnoses of personality disorders were unreliable.
The prosecution's expert expressed the opinion that defendant's mental disease of schizophrenia played no role in the crimes and that defendant knew right from wrong when he took those actions. While a jury may have inferred from Ebert's testimony that defendant's personality traits and characteristics played a role in the murders and robbery, that inference does not aid defendant. Ebert said that defendant had schizophrenia but knew right from wrong when he committed the crimes while defendant's experts said he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong as a result of his schizophrenia. This presented a classic credibility question for the jury on which expert to believe and the jury rejected the theory advanced by defendant's experts.
Defendant argues Ebert opined the crimes were "the result of [defendant's] personality disorder" and "[i]n closing argument, the prosecutor relied heavily on Dr. Ebert's testimony and the results of psychological tests that Dr. Ebert administered to argue that [defendant's] crimes were the result of his antisocial personality, not his paranoid delusions." We find no support for these claims from either defendant's record citations or our independent review of the record. --------
There were no facts or evidence before the court supporting defendant's claim that the instruction should have been clarified to allow the jury to consider his schizophrenia in combination with a personality disorder when deciding whether he was insane at the time of the murder and robbery. Indeed, both sides elicited evidence and argued the sanity issue based on schizophrenia, not defendant's personality disorder. The court had no duty to instruct on points of law not relied upon by either the prosecution or the defense and which, when placed in the context of the developments at trial, were inconsequential to a proper resolution of defendant's sanity.
Even assuming there was instructional error, however, defendant was not prejudiced because there was no reasonable probability that, absent the alleged error, the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to the defendant. (People v. Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 429.) None of the experts said that defendant's personality disorder(s) made him incapable of knowing or understanding his acts were morally or legally wrong. Thus, there was no evidence from which the jury could draw such an inference.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Raye, P. J. /s/_________
Hull, J.