Opinion
No. 2014–1034 S CR.
08-01-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ryan MIKALSEN, Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Karen M. Wilutis, J.), rendered April 2, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while impaired. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order of the same court (Jennifer A. Henry, J.) denying, after a hearing, the branch of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to suppress evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
On August 24, 2012, after defendant was stopped and arrested at a police checkpoint, the People charged defendant with driving while intoxicated (common law) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3] ), failing to wear a seatbelt (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229[d][3] ), and failing to comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1102 ). After a hearing, the District Court (Jennifer A. Henry) denied defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the stop. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1] ). Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted because the People failed to establish the constitutionality of the police checkpoint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
At the hearing, the People met their burden of establishing that the checkpoint had been created and operated in a manner "consistent with the Fourth Amendment and New York Constitution, article I, § 12" (People v. Manahan, 23 Misc.3d 134[A], 2009 N.Y. Slip Op 50802[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009] ). The arresting officer testified that the checkpoint's location and the particulars as to the manner in which the checkpoint had been set up and operated had been determined by a superior officer who had been present during its operation (see Matter of Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d 136, 144 [1999] ["(Proper) checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity.... The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the effective allocation of limited enforcement resources' "], quoting United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 [1976] ). Two marked police vehicles with activated emergency lights occupied a turning lane between single-lane roadways, one facing each direction of travel. The officers wore distinctive reflective clothing (see People v. Pureco–Martinez, 46 Misc.3d 143[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 50182[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015] ) and employed hand signals and high-powered flashlights to alert oncoming motorists of their presence, thereby providing "adequate precautions as to safety, lighting and fair warning of the existence of the checkpoint" (People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 526 [1984] ), and avoiding "the kind of fright or annoyance that invalidates a [checkpoint operation]" (id. at 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 473 N.E.2d 1 ; see also Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 [1990] ). Every vehicle proceeding northbound or southbound was stopped (see e.g. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 [2000] [stop of every vehicle is nondiscriminatory]; Matter of Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 146, 700 N.Y.S.2d 77, 722 N.E.2d 45 ["Suspicionless stops ... of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops' to check driver license and registration are permissible"], quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 [1979] ; see also People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 488 [1982] ; People v. Gavenda, 88 A.D.3d 1295, 1296 [2011] ).
It was also the People's burden "to establish[ ] that the primary programmatic objective (not the subjective intent of the participating officers) for initiating a suspicionless vehicle stop procedure was not merely to further general crime control" (People v. Jackson, 99 N.Y.2d 125, 131–132 [2002] [emphasis in original] ) but to further specific, legitimate law enforcement objectives. Among such permissible objectives is a concern for traffic safety (People v. Edwards, 101 A.D.3d 1643, 1644 [2012] [checkpoint proper where police were looking for "registration, inspection, seat belt and other traffic related infractions"]; People v. Dugan, 57 A.D.3d 300, 300 [2008] [same]; People v. Burton, 8 A.D.3d 187, 188 [2004] [same] ), and there is no reason on this record to doubt that this concern represented the "primary purpose" of the checkpoint here (Jackson, 99 N.Y.2d at 129, 752 N.Y.S.2d 271, 782 N.E.2d 67 ; see also Scott, 63 N.Y.2d at 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 473 N.E.2d 1 ["deterrence" a legitimate enforcement objective]; cf. People v. Velez, 110 A.D.3d 449, 450 [2013] ; People v. Trotter, 28 A.D.3d 165, 169–170 [2006] ). Finally, "there is no authority that expressly mandates the promulgation of [written] guidelines" for the arrangement and use of a checkpoint (Manahan, 23 Misc.3d 134[A], 2009 N.Y. Slip Op 50802[U], *1; see also Michigan Dept. of State Police, 496 U.S. at 453 ; People v. Haskins, 86 A.D.3d 794, 796 [2011] ; People v. Sinzheimer, 15 A.D.3d 732, 734 [2005] ), "the only requirement being that the procedure followed be uniform and not gratuitous or subject to individually discriminatory selection" (People v. Serrano, 233 A.D.2d 170, 171 [1996] ; see Pureco–Martinez, 46 Misc.3d 143[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 50182[U], *2 [same] ).
In view of the foregoing, we find that the police checkpoint satisfied constitutional requirements. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
MARANO, P.J., and GARGUILO, J., concur.