People v. Metropolitan Surety Co.

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v . THE METROPOLITAN…

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Dec 28, 1911

148 App. Div. 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911)

132 N.Y.S. 835

Opinion

December 28, 1911.

Alfred T. Davison, for the appellant.

Edward R. Finch, for the respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The authorities seem to be conclusive that the appellant is not entitled to have his claim allowed by the receiver because the claim did not ripen until he obtained his judgment against the attached debtor, which event did not transpire until after the judgment of dissolution against the respondent surety company was rendered. ( People v. Commercial Alliance Life Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 95; People v. Merchants' Trust Co., 187 id. 293; People v. American Loan Trust Co., 172 id. 371; Fera v. Wickham, 135 id. 223; Attorney-General v. Equitable Accident Insurance Association, 175 Mass. 196; Goding v. Rosenthal, 180 id. 43; Casualty Insurance Company's Case, 82 Md. 535.)

If, however, the Nolan Commission Company, the property of which was attached, deposited the attached money or other collateral security with the surety company to indemnify it on its undertaking, under the principle enunciated in People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. ( 148 App. Div. 503), decided herewith, the present claimant can have such security transferred to himself.

The present order, however, denying him the right to have his claim allowed must be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

All concurred, except KELLOGG, J., dissenting in memorandum.

KELLOGG, J. (dissenting):

Where a defendant is admitted to bail he is supposed to be in the custody of his surety and the responsibility of the surety is gauged in great part by that consideration. In this case the appellant had actually attached $1,920 in cash, which upon the execution of the bond in question the law required to be released. It may fairly be considered to have been turned over to the custody of the surety or at his request upon his promise to refund it if a refund was required. I think it is not such a conditional promise as is referred to in People v. Commercial Alliance Life Ins. Co. ( 154 N.Y. 95), but is a promise to repay the money which has been surrendered on its account when required. I, therefore, a reversal of the order.

Order affirmed, without costs.