Opinion
C084076
07-03-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FREDERICK MARK MENDIOLA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CRF164048)
Defendant Frederick Mark Mendiola appeals his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the warrantless search of his vehicle, because the People did not meet their burden in showing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. We shall affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2016, Deputy Sheriff Nick Morford and his partner Deputy Larmena conducted a traffic stop on a black Lexus because of an inoperable taillight, a Vehicle Code violation. Defendant, the driver of the Lexus, pulled the car into a parking lot and quickly got out of the vehicle. In Morford's experience, this is unusual behavior in a traffic stop. He approached defendant and asked why he had gotten out of the car and defendant answered he had a knife collection in the car. Morford told defendant to get back in the car and get his driver's license. Morford asked if defendant was on probation, parole, or postrelease community supervision (PRCS). Defendant stated he had recently been discharged from parole and was not on PRCS.
Morford ran a computer check through dispatch, and the dispatch clerk reported, "clear all system PRCS." Morford interpreted that to mean defendant was clear in all systems for any warrants, but was on PRCS. Although the dispatcher never said defendant was "on PRCS," in Morford's experience, dispatch would not mention PRCS if the person was not on PRCS. Morford also called a Yolo County records clerk and they ran a criminal report, which "showed [defendant] was currently still on PRCS." He did not know if the records clerk relied on the same information as the dispatcher or not, but believed she had different information. He believed the records clerk would know the parameters of defendant's PRCS status. Morford noted with respect to PRCS, the records frequently do not show the primary offense or discharge date, but rather a series of 9's.
Morford also received information to his in-car computer regarding defendant's PRCS status; however, he did not look at the information from the computer prior to conducting the search. Morford does not typically look at the log when dispatch and records have confirmed the person is on PRCS. The first time Morford saw the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) log was during the suppression hearing. He typically does not ask records for the discharge date, but rather just verifies the PRCS status. The CAD log states defendant began PRCS on January 27, 2012, has a series of 9's in lieu of a discharge date and then states, "PRCS subject-disregard begin and discharge parole dates-contact county probation to verify current status-subject no longer under CDCR jurisdiction-subject will not be returned to CDCR custody for violations of PRCS conditions-CDCR warr unit cannot place hold on subject." The log also states, "clr all and PRCS." Morford testified he understood "clr all and PRCS" to mean the person was clear on all systems and on PRCS. He acknowledged the CAD log also indicated PRCS needed to be verified through the county probation office.
In Morford's experience, when both dispatch and records show a subject is on probation, parole, or supervision, that information is accurate "[u]sually all the time." Accordingly, he believed defendant was on active PRCS and was therefore searchable. Morford saw a small ax-type hatchet and camouflage backpack in defendant's car. The deputies conducted a search of defendant's vehicle. Among the items in the car was a loaded handgun in the camouflage backpack. After his arrest, defendant admitted the backpack was his and that he had packed it, but claimed he did not know how the gun got in the bag or whose it was.
Defendant was not, in fact, on PRCS at the time of the search.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) arguing he was not on PRCS at the time of the search, it was not objectively reasonable for Morford to believe defendant was on PRCS, and therefore the warrantless search was unlawful. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the search came within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
Defendant pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted having a prior serious felony conviction. The parties agreed to a negotiated sentence of 32 months in state prison, and the trial court granted the People's request to dismiss the remaining charges and enhancement allegations. The parties also stipulated defendant was deemed to have renewed his motion to suppress the evidence. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea to the lower term of 16 months, doubled to 32 months pursuant to the serious felony enhancement. The trial court ordered defendant to pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), imposed and stayed an identical parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), imposed a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and imposed a $30 conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). The trial court also awarded defendant 64 days of presentence custody credit and 64 days of conduct credit.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that the People did not meet their burden of proof that Morford's reliance on the information provided by the dispatch and records clerks was reasonable, and did not establish the source of the error.
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the 'right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .' (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is unreasonable per se unless it falls within one of the 'specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citation.]" (People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156-1157.)
We may exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if exclusion is mandated by the federal Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24; People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119 (Robinson).) The United States Supreme Court has made clear that exclusion is not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation; rather, it "applies only where it ' "result[s] in appreciable deterrence." ' [Citation.]" (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 141 (Herring).) "Indeed, exclusion 'has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,' [citation] and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule." (Id. at p. 140, quoting Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 .)
"To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 144.) The exclusionary rule may apply to deter misconduct by either a parole officer or a data entry clerk, as they are adjuncts of law enforcement. (See People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 38; see also People v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367, 374.) However, "when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its way.' [Citation.] In such a case, the criminal should not 'go free because the constable has blundered.' [Citation.]" (Herring, at pp. 147-148.) "Where . . . the prosecution invokes the good faith exception, the government has 'the burden . . . to prove that exclusion of the evidence is not necessary because of [that] exception.' [Citation.] Thus, 'the government has the burden of establishing "objectively reasonable" reliance' . . . [Citation.] Establishing that the source of the error acted objectively reasonably is part of that burden." (Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 36-37.)
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) We will uphold the trial court's factual findings as to recklessness or systemic error where supported by substantial evidence. (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 147, fn. 5; Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) But we independently determine, on the facts found, whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Tully, at p. 979.)
The error in this case appears to be a communication error rather than a records error. The dispatch clerk indicated, "clear all system PRCS." The records clerk also indicated defendant was on PRCS. The CAD log indicates defendant had been on PRCS, that the beginning and discharge dates indicated should be disregarded, and county probation should be called to confirm defendant's status. The log also states, "clr all and PRCS." Morford interpreted the statements of the clerks as meaning defendant was clear for warrants in all the systems and was on PRCS. Nothing in the CAD log was inconsistent with this understanding. In Morford's experience, when both dispatch and records show a subject is on PRCS, the information is "[u]sually all the time" accurate. It was not unreasonable for Morford to rely on the statements of two separate clerks performing records checks and conclude from their statements defendant was on PRCS.
In this case, the source of the error was not in the records, but in Morford's understanding of what the clerks were telling him. There is nothing that indicates there were errors in the records themselves. The statements by dispatch and the records clerks are entirely consistent with the CAD log, "clear all and PRCS." The problem in this case is not an error in the records, but a misunderstanding by Morford about what that statement meant.
Nothing in the record suggests Morford made a conscious or deliberate effort to avoid checking with the county probation office before conducting the search. Rather, the record indicates he was not aware of that directive until the suppression hearing when he first looked at the CAD log. There is nothing in the record that suggests Morford's conduct was deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent, or a function of recurring or systemic negligence. " 'Gross negligence' long has been defined . . . as either a ' " 'want of even scant care' " ' or ' " 'an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.' " ' " (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754.) Morford may well have been negligent in failing to review the CAD log and checking with county probation, but this is not enough to warrant exclusion. (Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 140 [negligent error "is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of exclusion' "].) Nothing in the record permits an inference that this misunderstanding by one officer is widespread or systemic. (See Id. at pp. 146-147.) Rather, the evidence permits a reasonable inference Morford did not act in reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, and relied in good faith on the information he received from two separate clerks. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the errors here were the result of negligence, " 'rather than systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,' that the [error in communication] was not 'sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it,' and that the law enforcement personnel were not sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. (Citation.)" (Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Morford acted in good faith.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RAYE, P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. HOCH, J.