Opinion
A147173
01-31-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN PABLO MENDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR115810)
Juan Pablo Mendez appeals from an order recommitting him to the State Department of State Hospitals as a mentally disordered offender. He argues (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his recommitment, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to decide whether he should be released for outpatient treatment. We reject these arguments and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
In or around 1991, Mendez was charged with intent to commit rape and false imprisonment. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), and committed to the Napa State Hospital. The charges were brought after Mendez attempted to grab an eight-year-old girl in a public library restroom. The girl was able to get away. Mendez fled in a vehicle, later grabbed an adult female with two small children, and touched the woman's breasts in a nearby park. Mendez was psychotic at the time, and he was not taking his prescribed medications.
In 2003, while Mendez was committed as an NGI patient, he stabbed another patient three times with a homemade weapon. There is evidence Mendez was psychotic at the time, and was responding to auditory hallucinations. He later stated the devil caused him to stab the victim. Mendez was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and committed as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) in 2007 pursuant to section 2962.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In October 2015, the prosecution filed a petition to extend defendant's MDO commitment pursuant to sections 2962 and 2970. Mendez waived his right to a jury trial. A bench trial was held on December 16 and 17, 2015. Drs. Robert Wayner and Joyce Brown testified at the hearing.
The trial court found defendant, by reason of a severe mental disorder not in remission, represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others within the meaning of section 2972, subdivision (c), and ordered Mendez be committed to the Department of State Hospitals from January 1, 2016 to January 1, 2017.
At the conclusion of the December 17 hearing, Mendez requested to be placed in an outpatient program pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (d), urging the court to make a decision on the matter. The court instead referred the matter to the Conditional Release Program (CONREP) for a report. On January 22, 2016, CONREP filed a placement report stating Mendez was not appropriate for outpatient treatment at that time. B. Testimony at the Hearing
Dr. Wayner conducted a forensic evaluation of Mendez and met with him in person a few weeks before the hearing. He testified Mendez had a long history of mental illness going back to ninth grade, and diagnosed Mendez with schizophrenia and depression. According to Wayner, Mendez suffered from hallucinations and delusions, and he had exhibited hypersexuality in the past. As to the delusions, Mendez said spirits talked to him, described seeing the devil, and once told Wayner he believed himself to be Jesus Christ. Wayner was also concerned Mendez was in denial about his mental illness.
Wayner opined Mendez was not in remission, in part because he did not acknowledge how his mental illness influenced his behavior and past actions. Wayner explained persons with schizophrenia could "learn to ignore the voices," but Mendez was still conversing with spirits. Additionally, when Wayner discussed the 1991 incident with him, Mendez said he still believed he was telepathically communicating with the victim, though Mendez did admit his actions were wrong. Wayner acknowledged Mendez had not recently damaged property, made violent threats, or hurt anyone else. Additionally, he was willingly participating in a sex offender treatment program. Nevertheless, Mendez was not voluntarily following his treatment plan. Mendez was under an involuntary medication order, and said he did not believe his medications helped and did not intend to continue taking them if released.
Wayner evaluated defendant's dangerousness. He stated Mendez had not been physically violent since the 2003 stabbing incident. Wayner also conceded a person's tendency towards violence tends to decrease with age, and Mendez was 62 years old. However, Wayner again expressed concerns about defendant's lack of insight into his illness and his unwillingness to take his medication, as well as the circumstances of the 1991 and 2003 offenses. Wayner recommended Mendez be returned to the state hospital as soon as possible, because the last time he was away he refused all medication and returned "decompensated," meaning he was actively hallucinating and refusing to eat.
Dr. Brown is a contract psychiatrist at Coalinga State Hospital, and Mendez is one of her patients. Like Dr. Wayner, Brown said Mendez suffered from hallucinations and delusions. Brown opined that defendant's schizophrenia was not in remission because he had active residual symptoms. She had seen Mendez exhibit symptoms of his schizophrenia a few weeks before trial. Mendez said he believed Brown also had those same symptoms but she refused to admit it, and said he believed the medications may have caused his symptoms. According to Brown, Mendez attends all the recommended treatment programs. He also works as a janitor, he has taken landscape training, drumming, and art classes, and he has participated in social activities on his floor. Brown testified Mendez had not been violent or lewd in the last year. Nevertheless, Brown was concerned because Mendez has refused to acknowledge he has a mental illness.
Brown prescribed Mendez Risperdal, which was administered via a long-acting injection every two weeks. Brown said Mendez could also take the medication orally, but she opted for the injection because Mendez was "adamant" that he would not take medication unless he was made to. On at least two recent occasions, Mendez resisted administration of the medication, requiring a show of force. Because of his unwillingness to take his prescribed medication, Brown believed he would commit a crime if released. According to Brown, the medication had significantly resolved defendant's symptoms. There was a time when Mendez did not take his medication for four months in 2014, and during this period his symptoms worsened. For example, he exposed himself, touched staff members, and asked them to marry him. While Mendez has not assaulted anyone recently, he required constant monitoring in order to function.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Order Extending Commitment
As an initial matter, Mendez asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to extend his commitment. We disagree.
The Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act), enacted in 1985, "requires that offenders who have been convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue to pose a danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after the termination of their parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission." (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 9.) "[A]n MDO is committed for a one-year period and thereafter has the right to be released unless the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she should be recommitted for another year." (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202.) A recommitment under the MDO Act requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the patient has a severe mental disorder; (2) the disorder 'is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment'; and (3) by reason of that disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (People v. Burroughs (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1404.)
A recommitment order must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.) " ' "In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court." [Citation.] "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ' "[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate]." ' " ' " (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) In certain circumstances, a single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a mental disorder may constitute substantial evidence to support an extension of the defendant's commitment. (See People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879 [§ 1026.5 commitment].)
Mendez argues the evidence does not support a finding he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by virtue of his mental disorder. We cannot agree. While there is no indication Mendez has engaged in violent behavior since the stabbing incident in 2003, the only two doctors to testify at the hearing, Wayner and Brown, were concerned Mendez could pose a danger to others if released. They explained Mendez was unwilling to take his medications unless he was forced to, and he could become unstable and violent without his medications. Because of his unwillingness to follow his treatment plan, Mendez was under an involuntary medication order. Mendez disputed whether that order was necessary, but there was evidence Mendez did not believe his medications helped and did not intend to continue taking them if released. Brown also testified defendant's medication was administered through a long-acting injection because Mendez was adamant about not taking medication, and she said a show of force was necessary to induce Mendez to take his medication on a few occasions.
Mendez asserts his record at the state hospital shows he did not pose a danger. He points out he has not been violent since 2003, and did not display sexually inappropriate behavior in the year prior to his commitment hearing. Rather, Mendez argues, he was an active member of the community, and participated in sexual offender treatment, drumming classes, art therapy classes, and a variety of other groups and activities. The facts cited by Mendez tend to weigh against a finding of dangerousness. But there were other facts which supported a contrary finding, and on substantial evidence review we do not reweigh the evidence. As discussed, there is a likelihood Mendez would go off his medication if released, especially considering his vocal opposition to the administration of that medication. Given defendant's psychiatric condition and history of violence, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find Mendez would represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others if released.
Mendez further contends the mere fact there was a risk he would become violent if he were released and then went off his medication does not establish he is dangerous. In support he cites several cases which stand for the uncontroversial proposition that a finding cannot be affirmed on substantial evidence review if it is based only on speculation or conjecture. (In re Anthony C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1508-1509 [reversing order extending commitment of juvenile sex offender since, "in the absence of a good measure of speculation and conjecture," the evidence failed to support a finding the offender had a serious difficulty controlling his sexually deviant behavior]; In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 685, 691 [on substantial evidence review, " 'inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding' "]; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 ["Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence."].) But the trial court did not need to speculate here. Mendez himself indicated he did not intend to take his medication unless he was forced to do so, and there was also evidence Mendez would become unstable if unmedicated.
Finally, Mendez argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and, in doing so, lessened the People's burden. At the commitment hearing, the court made the following finding: "Based upon [defendant's] history, based upon what has happened and based upon the facts I have to find . . . that there is a substantial—here is a risk of substantial danger of physical harm if he's released." Mendez asserts the question is whether he " 'represent[ed] a substantial danger of physical harm to others,' " not whether he posed a risk of doing so. We find no error. A review of the record shows the trial court was aware of and applied the proper standard. Earlier in the hearing, the trial court indicated it was using CALCRIM No. 3457, which sets forth the proper legal standard for commitment in this context. At the hearing, the court also stated the pertinent question was "whether [defendant] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others if he was on the outside." And the court's explanation of its decision makes clear the proper standard was applied. Specifically, the court said "there is no question that [defendant] would immediately . . . stop taking any of the medications . . . [and] we would start to see the deterioration that took place [once before]." The court also considered the dangerous nature of defendant's earlier crimes and found defendant's conduct "is consistent with his present hallucinations."
For these reasons, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court's recommitment order. B. Outpatient Treatment
Pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (d), "[a] person shall be released on outpatient status if the committing court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the committed person can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis." Mendez argues the matter must be remanded because the trial court did not understand it had the authority to order outpatient placement without conducting an additional hearing and receiving additional reports from CONREP. We disagree.
Mendez primarily relies on People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350 (May), which also involved an MDO recommitment hearing. In that case, the only witness at the hearing, May's treating psychiatrist, testified that even though May still qualified as an MDO, he had earned an opportunity for community placement rather than continued treatment in the state hospital. (Id. at pp. 355-356.) The prosecutor objected, arguing whether or not May was a proper candidate for outpatient treatment was irrelevant to the issues to be decided at the recommitment hearing. (Id. at p. 356.) The trial court sustained the objection, and refused to allow questions from May's counsel about conclusions in a CONREP report. (Ibid.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered May be recommitted to the state hospital. (Ibid.) May sought reconsideration of that ruling, arguing that the trial court had the authority to address at the recommitment hearing whether May should be placed in an outpatient treatment program. (Id. at pp. 356-357.) After the court denied reconsideration, May filed an appeal. (Id. at p. 357.)
Our colleagues in Division Three held the trial court had the authority, upon sustaining a recommitment petition, to determine whether an MDO was suitable for outpatient treatment under section 2972, subdivision (d). (May, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 359.) Further, the court held that, in considering outpatient treatment, the trial court need not follow the procedures set forth in sections 1603 and 1604, which governed outpatient treatment for other types of MDO's and required, among other things, supporting recommendations from both the inpatient treatment facility and the proposed community program. (May, at pp. 359-361.) Instead, "[u]nder the plain language of the statute, when the trial court sustains a section 2970 . . . petition for continued treatment of an MDO, the court has authority to release the MDO for outpatient treatment so long as it finds 'there is reasonable cause to believe that the committed person can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis.' (§ 2972, subd. (d).)" (Id. at p. 359.) It was apparent the trial court in May "failed to appreciate it had the authority to order outpatient treatment" because "despite May's request that it do so, the court failed to make a finding under section 2972, subdivision (d) regarding May's suitability for outpatient placement." (Id. at p. 363.) The matter therefore was remanded to the trial court to make findings pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (d) as to whether May could be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis. (May, at p. 364.)
Mendez argues that, just as in May, the trial court here failed to recognize it had the authority to order outpatient placement. We cannot agree. After the trial court sustained the recommitment petition, May requested the court release him to outpatient treatment pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (d). The prosecutor argued, wrongly, that a separate proceeding was required. May's counsel disagreed, asserting the court could order placement if there was reasonable cause an MDO could be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis. Counsel conceded the court could request a report from CONREP, but that was not required by statute. The court responded: "Well, I'd like to see them." The court went on to explain it wanted CONREP's input given the concerns about Mendez taking his medication.
After some further discussion about Mendez's suitability for placement, the prosecutor once again argued the court could not legally reach the issue: "But I don't think we can reach this issue today. This was an extension trial. This wasn't a question of release on outpatient. There are different procedures for release on outpatient." The court replied: "That was my understanding." After the prosecutor suggested Mendez failed to give notice, the court stated: "No, I agree. I would not do it without getting a report from [CONREP]. I don't have to agree with the report, but I would want them to at least [have] independently reviewed it and see what's available." The court ultimately set a hearing on the matter for January 28, 2016. Our record does not reflect whether that hearing was held or how it was resolved.
There are a few critical distinctions between this case and May. As an initial matter, unlike in May, there is no indication the trial court here prevented Mendez from presenting evidence concerning his suitability for outpatient placement. Moreover, the trial court did not hold Mendez needed to follow the procedures set forth in sections 1603 and 1604 or initiate a separately noticed proceeding in order to obtain outpatient status. Rather, the court stated it wanted more information from CONREP before making a determination concerning outpatient placement in light of Mendez's resistance to taking his prescribed medications. As Mendez's counsel conceded below, nothing barred the court from requesting such information. It is true the prosecutor wrongly argued outpatient placement could only be determined through a separately noticed proceeding, and at the times the trial court appeared to express agreement with the prosecutor. However, the record shows the court's denial of immediate outpatient placement was based on its desire for more information. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion merely because it wanted to review additional information before making a determination.
It is also unclear what relief we could grant to Mendez regarding his request for outpatient placement. Even if we were to agree with his position, we could only remand the matter to allow the trial court to consider his suitability for placement. Yet the record indicates, the court already held that hearing on January 28, 2016, over a year ago.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.