Opinion
2000-9300
Argued September 6, 2002.
September 24, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rotker, J.), rendered September 19, 2000, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts) and robbery in the second degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Denise A. Corsi of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Ellen C. Abbot, and Suzanne H. Middleton of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, SANDRA L. TOWNES, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the People failed to prove his guilt of first and second degree robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because "there was no persuasive evidence that [he] intended" to commit a forcible theft. We disagree.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt under an accomplice theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 20.00, 160.10, 160.15). Intent can be established from an act itself or from the conduct of an accessory and the surrounding circumstances (see People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296; People v. McDonald, 257 A.D.2d 695, 696; People v. Coulter, 240 A.D.2d 756). The defendant was present, observed the robbery in progress, and assisted his cohort in completing the robbery. Therefore, he is liable as an accomplice (see People v. Robinson, 60 N.Y.2d 982, 984; People v. Tucker, 130 A.D.2d 605). Moreover, the weight to be accorded the evidence presented and the resolution of credibility issues are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact which saw and heard the witnesses (see People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15).
Considering the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the representation, the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147; People v. Fernandez, 248 A.D.2d 801, 802).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., SCHMIDT, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.