Opinion
August 25, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Meyerson, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the hearing court should have suppressed a videotaped statement made by him to an Assistant District Attorney. The record reveals that on the morning after the homicide, at approximately 8:30 A.M., the defendant surrendered to police and received, acknowledged, and waived his Miranda rights before giving his account of the crime to the arresting officer. At 11:23 A.M. on the same day, the defendant gave a second lengthy statement concerning his role in the killing to an Assistant District Attorney. This second statement was videotaped and was preceded by a reading of the Miranda warnings, after which the defendant again expressly acknowledged and waived his rights. The taped interview ended at 11:49 A.M. Thereafter, the defendant was again questioned by the same Assistant District Attorney in another taped interview which commenced at 1:28 P.M. While the defendant was not fully apprised of the Miranda warnings prior to this third period of questioning, he acknowledged that he understood his rights from previous admonitions, and he agreed to answer the questions put to him.
Under these circumstances, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the third statement. It is a firmly established principle that a suspect who is in custody need not be given the full litany of rights prior to questioning if he has previously been informed of those rights within a short time interval (see, People v Johnson, 49 A.D.2d 663, affd 40 N.Y.2d 882; People v Glinsman, 107 A.D.2d 710, lv denied 64 N.Y.2d 889, cert denied 472 U.S. 1021; People v Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20). The instant defendant received and acknowledged his rights on two previous occasions (the most recent being approximately two hours prior to the taking of the challenged statement), remained in continuous police custody, and stated that he remembered and understood those rights. Hence, no further warnings were necessary (see, People v Glinsman, supra).
Furthermore, we reject the defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the alleged hostility of the Trial Justice. The record reveals that the trial was conducted in an unbiased and impartial manner and that the Justice properly participated in the questioning of some witnesses in order to aid the jury in exploring and narrowing the factual issues (see, e.g., People v Jamison, 47 N.Y.2d 882; People v Moulton, 43 N.Y.2d 944; People v Riddick, 117 A.D.2d 632). Additionally, we note that any potential prejudice which might have resulted from the comments of the Trial Justice was minimized by his instruction that the jurors were to disregard his remarks to the attorneys and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence adduced at trial (see, People v Gonzalez, 38 N.Y.2d 208; People v Keppler, 92 A.D.2d 1032).
Finally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Malizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, cert denied 469 U.S. 932; People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we conclude that the People adduced sufficient evidence, in the form of testimony by an eyewitness, a ballistics expert and a medical expert, to disprove the defendant's justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see, generally, People v Reyes, 116 A.D.2d 602). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.