Opinion
No. 1-15-3588
04-05-2019
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONTE MAURY, Also Known as Duante Maury, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 01 CR 20113 Honorable Arthur F. Hill, Judge presiding. JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman and Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: This court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition; defendant satisfied the cause and prejudice test. ¶ 2 Defendant Dionte Maury appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court's determination that he failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test regarding his claims of constitutional violations was erroneous. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The 16-year-old defendant and codefendant Samuel Williams were charged by indictment with multiple counts of first degree murder, attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm in connection with the death of Jason Harvey and the wounding of Dawn Mitchell. In light of the issues raised on appeal, a recounting of the evidence presented at defendant's jury trial is unnecessary. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years for first degree murder, a consecutive sentence of 25 years for personally discharging a firearm proximately causing death during the commission of a murder, and 25 years for aggravated battery with a firearm to be served concurrent to his other sentences. ¶ 5 On appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded the case. We agreed with the State that defendant's sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm must run consecutive to his other sentences. On remand, the trial court re-sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 20 years, 25 years, and 6 years, respectively, on those same charges. In short, defendant was sentenced to a total of 51 years' imprisonment. ¶ 6 In 2006, defendant filed a postconviction petition, which the circuit court dismissed summarily as frivolous and without merit. In 2008, the summary dismissal was affirmed by this court. ¶ 7 In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life sentences for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; U.S. Const. amend. VIII. ¶ 8 In 2015, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. In the motion, defendant maintained he could not have raised his claim, that his 51-year sentence violated the constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishment, in a prior proceeding because the decision in Miller was announced in 2012, after he filed his 2006 postconviction petition. The circuit court denied the motion for leave to file the successive petition. While the court determined that defendant had shown cause for failure to raise the claim earlier, there was no prejudice since the Court in Miller invalidated only mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles, whereas, the trial court had imposed a discretionary term-of-years sentence in defendant's case. The court did not address defendant's claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). ¶ 9 Defendant timely appeals.
Codefendant Samuel Williams is not a party to this appeal.
People v. Maury, No. 1-03-0962 (Ill. 2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
People v. Maury, No. 1-06-2553 (Ill. 2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). --------
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)) provides a process by which a convicted defendant may assert a substantial denial of his or her constitutional rights in the proceedings leading to the conviction. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. The Act contemplates the filing of only one petition without leave of court (725 ILCA 5/122-1(f) (West 2014)). Thus, any claim not raised in an original or amended petition is waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014)). The bar against successive postconviction petitions is relaxed where a defendant can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 329 (2009). Cause is defined as an objective factor external to the defense that prevented counsel from raising the claim in an earlier proceeding, and prejudice is shown where the claimed constitutional violation so infected the entire trial that the conviction or sentence violates due process. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 329. A defendant must establish both cause and prejudice to proceed on a successive postconviction petition. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14.
¶ 12 I. Standard of Review
¶ 13 Review of the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st), 153266, ¶ 13, pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 123511 (September 2018 term).
¶ 14 II. Discussion
¶ 15 A. Cause and Prejudice Test
¶ 16 In Davis, our supreme court held that Miller stated a new substantive rule of law applicable retroactively to cases on collateral review. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st), 153266, ¶ 16 (citing Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 34-42). Defendant's postconviction petition was filed in 2006 and summarily dismissed in 2008. Since a constitutional claim based on the new substantive rule could not be raised until 2012 when Miller was decided, the circuit court correctly found that defendant had satisfied the "cause" prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42. ¶ 17 We turn our attention to whether defendant established the prejudice prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. The prejudice prong of the test required defendant to establish that the 51- year sentence he received for a crime he committed when he was 15-years-of-age was such cruel and unusual punishment that it denied him due process. The circuit court found that defendant failed to establish prejudice since he did not receive a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole as did the 15-year-old defendant in Miller. Since Miller did not apply, there was no prejudice to defendant in sentencing him to 51 years. However, in ruling on defendant's petition, the circuit court did not have the benefit of the supreme court's decision in People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, decided after the denial of defendant's petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 18 In Reyes, the offenses committed by the 16-year-old defendant subjected him to a legislatively mandated sentence of 97 years. He was required to serve 89 years before he could be released at which time he would be 105 years old. The court determined that the rationale of Miller applied to sentences that amounted to de facto life sentences for juvenile defendants. The court explained:
"A mandatory term of years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant's life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation." Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9.The court in Reyes concluded that "sentencing a juvenile offender to a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment." Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. ¶ 19 We note that the circuit court held that Miller did not apply because defendant received a discretionary term-of-years sentence. We disagree. Defendant's sentences were the mandatory minimum sentences for the offenses of which he was convicted and were mandated to be served consecutively. Like the defendant in Reyes, defendant received a mandatory term-of-years sentence. Compare Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 2. ¶ 20 In this case, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court erred in denying defendant's petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for failing to establish the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test. Taking the supreme court's view in Reyes that the sentence must be survivable and able to be served in one lifetime, we find guidance in People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, appeal allowed, No. 122327 (Ill. Nov. 22, 2017). In that case, the third division of this court held that a 50-year sentence imposed on a 16-year-old defendant, convicted of first degree murder, was a de facto life sentence without parole. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 62. The court in Buffer cited to statistical data from a United States Sentencing Commission report set forth in People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B, a decision from the second division of this court. The report indicated that "a person held in a general prison population has a life expectancy of 64 years." Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B, ¶ 26.The reviewing courts in Buffer and Sanders concluded that the defendants, who would reach ages 69 and 66 respectively prior to eligibility for release, received de facto life sentences. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 62; Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B, ¶ 27. The parties agree that defendant here will not be eligible for release until age 67. ¶ 21 Nonetheless, to show prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have achieved a better result if the trial court had correctly applied the eighth amendment as interpreted in the decisions in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller. Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B, ¶ 20. In Sanders, the trial court had imposed sentences of 40 years for murder and 30 years for each of two attempted murders. In an exercise of its discretion, the court ordered the sentences served consecutively for a total of 100 years. See People v. Sanders, 168 Ill. App. 3d 295, 212 (1988) (direct appeal). In determining that the denial of his petition to file a second consecutive postconviction petition was error, this court found that "Sanders has shown a reasonable probability that he would have received a shorter sentence if the trial court correctly understood the eighth amendment as it applies to juvenile offenders." Sanders, 2016 IL App (1st) 121732-B, ¶ 27. ¶ 22 Unlike the defendant in Sanders, defendant here already received the minimum sentences for murder, aggravated battery with a firearm and the mandatory sentencing enhancement for use of the firearm. Nonetheless, we conclude that defendant sufficiently demonstrated prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that he would have received a shorter sentence had the trial court correctly applied the sentencing considerations required by Miller and pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)) could have exercised its discretion as to whether to impose firearm sentencing enhancements. See Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12 (where the defendant's sentence is vacated on appeal and the matter remanded for resentencing, under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)), the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the law in effect at the time of the new sentencing hearing, in which case, instead of 97 years, Mr. Reyes' mandatory minimum aggregate sentence would be 32 years, "a term which is not a de facto life sentence"). ¶ 23 Since defendant satisfied both prongs of the cause and prejudice test, the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 24 B. Proportionate Penalties
¶ 25 Defendant contends that his 51-year sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, providing that " '[a]ll penalties shall be determined both in according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.' " Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st), 153266, ¶ 27 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant did not raise this claim until he sought leave to file his successive postconviction petition. ¶ 26 The State contends that defendant cannot show cause for failing to raise this claim either on direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition. In People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), our supreme court ruled favorably on a minor's proportionate penalties claim. The court held that the penalty, life imprisonment without parole, mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute, as applied to the 15-year-old defendant was particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. Since Leon Miller was decided in 2002, defendant could have raised his proportionate penalties claim in his direct appeal filed in 2003 and decided in 2004, or in his postconviction petition filed in 2006 and decided in 2008. By waiting until 2015, when he sought leave to file a succession postconviction petition, he failed to establish cause, i.e., that he was prevented by an objective factor external to the defense from raising the claim in an earlier proceeding. See Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st), 153266, ¶ 27 (the defendant lacked the requisite cause for failing to raise his proportionate penalties claim on direct appeal from his 2004 conviction or in his first postconviction petition). ¶ 27 Defendant points out that the Illinois proportionate penalties clause provides broader protections than the eighth amendment provides, and therefore, he has established the prejudice prong of the test. We need not consider this argument because in the absence of cause, defendant cannot proceed on his proportionate penalties issue. See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14 (defendant must establish both cause and prejudice to file a successive postconviction petition).
¶ 28 CONCLUSION
¶ 29 Defendant's failure to satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test bars his claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. But defendant satisfied both prongs of the cause-and-prejudice test on his claim that his 51-year sentence was a de facto life sentence and violated the eight amendment of the United States Constitution. We reverse the circuit court's order dismissing defendant's request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, and we remand for further proceedings on defendant's petition. ¶ 30 Reversed and remanded.