Opinion
C089071
06-03-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RYAN CHARLES LEE MATLOCK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. MAN-STK-CR-FECOD-2015-0013988)
Defendant Ryan Charles Lee Matlock appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, arguing the trial court erred when it ruled that his voluntary manslaughter conviction is ineligible for relief under the statute. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and four others conspired to commit residential robbery in 2015. During the robbery, one of defendant's accomplices fatally shot a victim inside the residence.
In an information, defendant was charged with: murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); residential burglary (§ 459); attempted residential robbery in concert (§§ 664/213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); and two counts of child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)). The murder count contained multiple special circumstances allegations, including that the crime was committed during the commissions of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).
The charging document lists this as a section 664 offense, but makes no mention of the word "attempted." Appellant's brief describes it as "residential robbery (§§ 664/213, subd. (a)(1)(A))"; respondent's brief lists it as "attempted first degree residential robbery in concert (§§ 664/213, subd. (a)(1)(A))."
Defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and other charges contained in an amended information.
In 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 25 years, which included a term of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
"In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for felony murder and abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as applied to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) . . . [The law added section 1170.95,] a procedure permitting qualified persons with murder convictions to petition to vacate their convictions and obtain resentencing if they were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id., § 4.)" (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 989 (Flores).)
In February 2019, defendant filed a section 1170.95 petition seeking resentencing, claiming that he was convicted of murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court summarily denied defendant's petition, ruling defendant, having been convicted of manslaughter, was "not eligible for resentencing under SB1437."
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1.0 The Plain Language of Section 1170.95
Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding he is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief because his conviction was for manslaughter. He contends "[t]he plain language of section 1170.95 makes eligible [for relief] defendants . . . who pled to manslaughter in lieu of trial for felony murder." Defendant further contends that "[a]ny ambiguity" in section 1170.95 due to "incongru[ities]" in the statute "can be harmonized" by reading the statute expansively to include in the pool of offenders who are eligible for relief those, like defendant, who were convicted of manslaughter after a plea in lieu of a trial for felony murder.
The People argue the trial court did not err, because section 1170.95 applies only to those convicted of murder and does not apply to those convicted of other crimes pursuant to plea deals.
We conclude the trial court did not err in ruling defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.
" 'If the language [of a statute] is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.' [Citation.]" (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)
"[S]ection 1170.95 authorizes only a person who was 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated . . . .' (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the sentencing court must 'hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts . . . .' (Id., subd. (d)(1), italics added.) In lieu of a resentencing hearing, the parties may stipulate that 'the petitioner is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated' and to be resentenced. (Id., subd. (d)(2), italics added.)" (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992-993.)
"Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder." (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993, italics added; see People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 ["The plain language of [section 1170.95] is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions"] (Cervantes).)
"Section 1170.95 does not mention, and thus does not provide relief to, persons convicted of manslaughter, which, 'while a lesser included offense of murder, is clearly a separate offense . . . .' [Citation.] Had the Legislature intended to make section 1170.95 available to defendants convicted of manslaughter, it easily could have done so." (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 993; see Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 887 ["there is no reference [in section 1170.95] to the crime of voluntary manslaughter"].)
Because the plain language of section 1170.95 is clear, and does not lead to an absurd result, we will follow its plain meaning -- as did the Fourth Appellate District, Division One (Flores), and the Second Appellate District, Division Six (Cervantes) -- and conclude that convictions for voluntary manslaughter are ineligible for section 1170.95 relief. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying defendant's petition.
Defendant contends that "the ordinary and commonsense meaning of" section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2), "indicate[s] that those who pled to any offense in lieu of trial on charges that could have resulted in a murder conviction qualify for relief under the statute." The provision, which states one of the three threshold (and conjunctive) conditions that a successful petitioner must satisfy, reads: "The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)
Defendant's contention is unpersuasive, because it "places outsized importance on a single clause to the exclusion of the provision's other language. . . . [T]he remaining portions of section 1170.95 repeatedly and exclusively refer to murder, not manslaughter." (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 995.)
An apparent ambiguity in subdivision (a)(2), which defendant identifies via a statutory construction argument, is not what it appears to be. Defendant contends that if eligibility for relief under section 1170.95 were limited to murder convictions "then most of subdivision (a)(2) . . . would be meaningless and superfluous, since it would be unnecessary to specify how the person was convicted . . . by trial or by plea."
We disagree, for the reasons provided by the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two in People v. Sanchez (May 7, 2020, E072647) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Sanchez). "Specifying that section 1170.95 applies to murder convictions both by trial and by guilty plea clarifies that it does not matter how the murder conviction was obtained for section 1170.95 to apply. Regardless of whether that clarification was necessary, ' "the Legislature may choose to state all applicable legal principles in a statute rather than leave some to even a predictable judicial decision." ' [Citation.] Express statutory language defining the class of defendants to whom section 1170.95 applies is not surplusage. [Citation.] Such clarification 'may eliminate potential confusion and avoid the need to research extraneous legal sources to understand the statute's full meaning.' " (Id. at p. ___ [2020 Cal.App.Lexis 389, *7].)
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that subdivision (a)(2) is ambiguous, we agree with the analysis in People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, that the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) reflects that the Legislature wanted to provide relief only to those who were convicted of felony murder or of murder on a natural and probable consequences theory. (People v. Turner, at pp. 436-438.)
Our conclusion that defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction is not eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170.95 is not "absurd," as defendant suggests. "The legislative goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the felony murder rule. That goal was properly achieved by the section 1170.95 petition procedure to vacate those murder convictions." (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 889, fn. omitted; see Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997 [rejecting the contention that an interpretation "limit[ing] [section 1170.95's] ameliorative benefits only to defendants convicted of murder" would be absurd, because of judicial economy concerns, and because the Legislature could have reasonably concluded reform in murder cases was more crucial].)
Defendant maintains that our conclusion is absurd in part because, "in a typical robbery/murder case," where one or more defendants plead to murder and one or more defendants plead to voluntary manslaughter, "[o]nly the most culpable defendants," those that pleaded to murder, "would benefit from" section 1170.95, as only they "would be eligible" to have their convictions vacated or reduced.
Defendant's scenario ignores that section 1170.95 precludes relief for "the most culpable defendants" (as determined by the Legislature). A successful section 1170.95 petitioner will have to demonstrate that they "could not be convicted of . . . murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective" by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) In addition to the "actual killer" (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)) and one who with intent to kill assisted the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)), new section 189, subdivision (e)(3) contemplates murder liability for one who "was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life." Thus, defendant's suggestion that "the most culpable defendants" would benefit from section 1170.95 while the "least culpable" would not, is belied by the legislative scheme, which precludes relief for a defendant in a "typical robbery/murder case" who was a "major participant" in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
2.0 Constitutional Claim
Defendant argues that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles require that the remedial procedure under section 1170.95 be extended to include those who pled guilty or no contest to manslaughter as well as those who pled guilty or no contest to murder." Defendant insists "[t]here is no plausible rational basis for treating less culpable criminals (those who pled to manslaughter in lieu of trial for murder) more harshly than more culpable criminals (those who pled to murder in lieu of trial for murder)."
The People argue that defendant "is not similarly situated to defendants convicted of murder, and the Legislature has a rational basis to distinguish between voluntary manslaughter and murder convictions."
We agree with the People.
" 'The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.' " (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)
Because defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a different crime from murder, that carries a different punishment, he is not similarly situated to those convicted of murder. (See Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888 [rejecting an equal protection challenge to section 1170.95 by an offender convicted of voluntary manslaughter].) Thus, defendant's equal protection challenge fails at the first step.
Defendant has not developed a due process claim that is distinct from his equal protection claim. Accordingly, we do not conduct a separate due process inquiry. (See Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226, fn. 10 [declining to consider an argument that was "not sufficiently developed, and [was] unsupported by citation of authority"].) But we agree with the analysis in Cervantes that a substantive due process challenge to section 1170.95 by a defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter would be unpersuasive, because there is a rational relationship between the objectives of section 1170.95 and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives. (See Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.)
Defendant's contention that the relevant similarity is that he and some murder defendants who might be eligible for section 1170.95 relief were both "charged with felony murder and entered a plea before the change in law" ignores Cooley's guidance that, when considering an equal protection challenge, the relevant inquiry is whether the claimant is similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged. Here, as explained above, defendant is not similarly situated to those convicted of felony murder, because section 1170.95's objective is not to provide relief to those charged with felony murder, per se, but to provide relief to a subset of those convicted of felony murder.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
/s/_________
BUTZ, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
DUARTE, J. /s/_________
HOCH, J.