Opinion
2013-07-5
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tammy L. MARVIN, Defendant–Appellant.
Leanne Lapp, Public Defender, Canandaigua (Robert Tucker of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua (Neal P. McClelland of Counsel), for Respondent.
Leanne Lapp, Public Defender, Canandaigua (Robert Tucker of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua (Neal P. McClelland of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting her, following a guilty plea, of two counts of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [2], [3]; 1193[1][c][ii] ), defendant contends that County Court improperly imposed a three-year conditional discharge in order to impose a one-year ignition interlock period, and that her double jeopardy rights were violated when the court sentenced her to a conditional discharge sentence that extends two years beyond the imposition of the ignition interlock system portion of her sentence. Defendant failed to preserve those contentions for our review ( see People v. Dexter, 104 A.D.3d 1184, 1184–1185, 960 N.Y.S.2d 773). In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit. Penal Law § 65.05(3)(a) requires that the period of the conditional discharge in the case of a felony shall be three years, while Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(1)(c)(iii) requires that the ignition interlock device condition shall be for a period not less than six months but not exceeding the duration of the conditional discharge, and the court complied with those statutes ( see People v. Vidaurrazaga, 100 A.D.3d 664, 665, 953 N.Y.S.2d 290).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.