Opinion
E070772
04-28-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN MARTINEZ, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. INF1600326) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Anthony R. Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed. Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Juan Martinez, Jr., of a number of counts arising from an incident in which he drove his pickup truck into an occupied home while in a heavily intoxicated state and caused serious injury to multiple victims in the house.
In his opening brief, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial and claimed that imposition of a restitution fine, a court facilities fee, and court operations fee violated his due process rights as articulated in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. After the opening brief was filed, the trial court struck the fees and stayed the restitution fine pending a showing of defendant's ability to pay it. The only issue now before us is the court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, which we affirm.
BACKGROUND
One Sunday in March 2016, defendant and his girlfriend got into an argument and she locked him out of the house. A friend, who had invited defendant to lunch, picked him up and together they ate with the friend's family. During lunch, he drank about three or four chavelas (beer mixed with tomato juice and spices), which is served in large glasses. While in the restaurant, he greeted a police corporal with whom he worked in connection with charitable toy drives. The corporal observed that defendant was heavily intoxicated.
Defendant and his girlfriend resumed arguing upon his return home. She threw a brick at him but missed; he responded by breaking the windshield of her vehicle. He got into his pickup truck, turned on the engine to run the air conditioning, and intended to call his father for a ride. The girlfriend's son threw a brick through the open truck window and hit defendant on the side of his face.
Defendant does not recall that, after being hit with the brick, he drove his truck down the street and crashed through the front of the home of his neighbor, Arturo, coming to a stop in the middle of the living room.
Arturo's son and his sister's two daughters were in the living room when the truck came in. The two girls were able to get out of the room, but Arturo's son, Christian, was stuck under a couch that was under the truck. Defendant repeatedly backed the truck up and then moved forward, with Christian still caught underneath the vehicle. Arturo and his brother-in-law Francisco yelled at defendant to get him to stop and, when they did not get a response, the two men tried to get in the truck. Defendant finally backed up enough that Arturo's other son was able to free Christian and drag him to safety. Defendant again went forward, pinning Francisco against a wall. He kept Francisco pinned for about a minute with his foot still on the gas before releasing him and going backward.
Eventually, defendant backed his truck out of the house and hit two other cars along the way. When he finally stopped the truck and got out, he approached Arturo and asked him not to call the police. He tried to run away but was apprehended and beaten by neighbors before emergency personnel responded.
Defendant was taken to the hospital. His blood was drawn while there and, when tested, showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.17 percent, which meant the level was likely between 0.19 and 0.21 percent when he drove into Arturo's home.
The tibia and fibula of Christian's left leg were broken. The 10-year-old was taken from the scene by helicopter to a hospital where two surgeries were performed over a few months to repair the injuries. Since then, he walks with a limp.
One of Arturo's nieces, 10-year-old Daniela, suffered a cut on her leg as a result of the incident, which left a scar.
Francisco sustained a number of injuries, including multiple rib and pelvic fractures. In the course of treating the pelvic fractures, blood clots formed and then dislodged and traveled to Francisco's lungs, causing pulmonary disfunction. That pulmonary disfunction caused three heart attacks. It also caused interruption of oxygen to his brain, causing him to lose his ability to think and to control the motions of his body. The damage is most likely irreversible.
Defendant was arrested and charged with five counts related to his driving under the influence and the resulting crash into Arturo's occupied home, causing injuries to the occupants. A jury found him guilty of four of the counts: assault with a deadly weapon (count 1, Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); causing bodily injury while driving under the influence (count 3, Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)); driving with a blood-alcohol count of at least 0.08 percent and causing great bodily injury (count 4, Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)); and causing vandalism of $400 or more (count 5, Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)). The assault with a deadly weapon count (count 1) included an enhancement for great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (b).) The two Vehicle Code section 23153 violations (counts 3 & 4) included two multiple victim and two great bodily injury enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subds, (a) & (b); Veh. Code, § 23558).
Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 12 years eight months. It also imposed court operation and facilities fees and a restitution fine, but subsequently struck the fees and stayed the fine pending an ability-to-pay hearing.
Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court failed to make an independent evaluation of the evidence when considering his new trial motion.
Section 1181 permits the trial court to grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to the evidence. In deciding the motion, the court examines the evidence independently to determine if it is sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1002 (Clark).) In making its independent assessment, the trial court is guided by a presumption that the jury's verdict is correct, that is, the verdict is not disregarded but rather the trial court determines the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and decides if there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 729.)
It is well settled that a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the decision of that court will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that it abused its discretion. (People v. McGarry (1954) 42 Cal.2nd 429, 432-433; Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) A trial court will be found to abuse its discretion if it misconceives its duty, applies an incorrect legal standard, or fails to independently consider the weight of the evidence. (People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 328, citing People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 634 (Robarge).)
Here, the record demonstrates that the court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's new trial motion. The court expressly acknowledged that it was not bound by the jury's verdict, recognized its duty to independently review the evidence, and stated that it had done so. It asked questions and formed conclusions in a manner demonstrating thoughtful consideration of the facts and defendant's specific claims that some of the testimony was not credible. It concluded that, looking at all of the evidence independently as a judge or a 13th juror, there was enough evidence provided in the case to support the guilty verdicts as to counts 1, 3, 4 and 5, that is, the counts upon which the jury found defendant guilty.
Defendant argues the trial court necessarily could not have considered the weight of the evidence independently because it did not consider the issue in the same order as the trial courts in People v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Price) and People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 (Davis). In those cases, the trial courts expressed their conclusions before discussing the sufficiency of the jury's evidentiary finding. (Price, at p. 1275; Davis, at p. 524.) Defendant claims the trial court's failure to adhere to that pattern demonstrates that it did not independently evaluate the evidence. The order of consideration is a distinction without a difference.
In Davis, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial motion, not because the trial court's reasoning followed a particular order, but because the trial court expressly articulated the correct standard of review and the record as a whole demonstrated that the trial court did not consider itself bound by the jury's findings. (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.) In Price, the reviewing court did specify the order in which the trial court made its comments, but the determinative fact calling for affirmance was the trial court's statement that it thought the evidence was sufficient. (Price, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275-1276.) Here, as discussed ante, the trial court recited the correct standard of review, explained that it was not bound by the jury's findings, and specifically stated its own belief that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions as found by the jury.
Defendant also argues this case is akin to Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d 628, a case in which the Supreme Court vacated the denial of a defendant's new trial motion. There, the trial court's remarks made clear that it did not believe the testimony supporting the jury's decision to convict the defendant but nevertheless denied defendant's motion, indicating at least three times that it was bound by the contrary conclusion reached by the jury. (Id. at pp. 634-635.) Here, the court was well aware that it was not hamstrung by the jury's findings. We find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P.J. We concur: SLOUGH
J. MENETREZ
J.