Opinion
2018–01195 Ind. No. 2805/15
11-25-2020
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Eden MAPP, appellant.
Ronald S. Nir, Kew Gardens, NY, for appellant. Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Johnnette Traill, Sharon Y. Brodt, and Russell Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.
Ronald S. Nir, Kew Gardens, NY, for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Johnnette Traill, Sharon Y. Brodt, and Russell Shapiro of counsel), for respondent.
ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., JOSEPH J. MALTESE, HECTOR D. LASALLE, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Deborah Stevens Modica, J.), rendered January 9, 2018, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and falsely reporting an incident in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
At trial, the defendant asserted the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as justification for his act of stabbing the victim multiple times. By doing so, the defendant necessarily placed his state of mind at the time of the incident in issue (see People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 561, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918 ). "[W]here a defendant puts an affirmative fact—such as a claim regarding his/her state of mind—in issue, evidence of other uncharged crimes or prior bad acts may be admitted to rebut such fact" ( People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 561, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918 ). Thus, it was not error for the court to admit evidence of the defendant's prior violence toward the victim, as it was "highly probative" and "directly relevant to defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense in that it ha[d] a logical and natural tendency to disprove his specific claim that he was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance" at the time of the instant crimes ( People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d at 563, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918 ).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of a letter into evidence which had been provided by prior defense counsel to the court, was purportedly written by a friend of the defendant, and was contained within the court file. During cross-examination, the defendant denied knowing the author of the letter. Thus, the letter was properly admitted during cross examination of the defendant's expert as relevant and probative to the issue of the defendant's truthfulness, since the expert admitted that he relied primarily upon the defendant's statements in determining that he had suffered an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes (see People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d 728 ). Moreover, any prejudicial effect the evidence in question may have had on the defendant was substantially outweighed by its probative value (see People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d 728 ; People v. Louis, 192 A.D.2d 558, 596 N.Y.S.2d 104 ). In any event, any error in the admission of the letter was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crimes of which he was convicted, and no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ; People v. Beer, 146 A.D.3d 895, 896–897, 47 N.Y.S.3d 38 ).
The defendant's contention that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by certain statements made by the prosecutor during her summation is without merit, since the majority of the comments were fair comment on the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, or fair response to defense counsel's summation (see People v. Lindsey, 172 A.D.3d 1233, 1234, 98 N.Y.S.3d 882 ; People v. Hogue, 166 A.D.3d 1009, 1011, 88 N.Y.S.3d 465 ). To the extent the comments were improper, they were not so flagrant or pervasive as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial (see People v. Nelson, 186 A.D.3d 1404, 129 N.Y.S.3d 18 ; People v. Wilkinson, 185 A.D.3d 734, 737, 127 N.Y.S.3d 496 ), and were otherwise harmless (see People v. McClinton, 180 A.D.3d 712, 714, 119 N.Y.S.3d 132 ; People v. McNeil, 176 A.D.3d 1105, 108 N.Y.S.3d 874 ).
Finally, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MALTESE, LASALLE and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.