Opinion
A141759
04-21-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER MANCINAS, Defendant and Appellant.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 21, 2017, be modified as follows: 1. On page 4, following the citation "(See People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 487-489 (Vega).)," add as footnote 5 the following footnote, which will require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
5We cite Vega in lieu of a detailed recitation of background facts regarding the two rival subsets of the Sureños in Santa Rosa, the inter-gang hostilities that led up to Tucker's murder, the letter received by the police on January 12, 2010, identification of the participants in Tucker's murder, the location of the murder, and the manner in which he was killed. We do not rely upon it as evidence of Mancinas's role in the events.2. On page 4, delete the sentence "We need not repeat those facts here." and the next sentence, beginning with "We will, however, note both," and replace those two sentences with the following three sentences:
We need not give a more detailed recitation of the murder here. Of course, for purposes of this appeal, we rely exclusively on the evidence presented at Mancinas's trial, which differed significantly from the evidence presented at Vega's trial. We therefore will discuss: (1) the evidence presented by the district attorney in this case that we find to be sufficient to support Mancinas's conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a), and (2) the evidence Mancinas presented in his defense.3. On page 4, in the sentence beginning "First, as explained in Vega," delete the words "as explained in Vega," delete all of the quotation marks in the sentence, and delete the citation to Vega at the end of the sentence, so that the revised sentence reads:
First, there are two rival factions of the Sureños (a street gang controlled by the Mexican Mafia) in Santa Rosa, known as Varrio Sureño Loco (VSL) and Angelino Heights (AH).4. On page 4, in the first full paragraph in the sentence beginning "For instance, '[o]n January 12, 2010," delete all the quotation marks in the sentence, delete the brackets around the letter "o", and delete the citation to Vega at the end of the sentence so that the revised sentence reads:
For instance, on January 12, 2010, the police came into possession of a letter written by an imprisoned VSL member calling for the assassination of three senior members of AH, as well as Mancinas.There is no change in the judgment. Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. Dated: __________ /s/_________, Acting P.J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos. SCR498868, SCR590577, SCR595589)
In these three consolidated criminal appeals, defendant Christopher Mancinas raises no issues in the first case, No. SCR498868; asks us to reduce his conviction on one count of cocaine possession from a felony to a misdemeanor and remand for resentencing under Proposition 47 in the second case, No. SCR590577; and in the third case, No. SCR595589, seeks reversal of his conviction for actively participating in a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 182.66, subdivision (a) for lack of sufficient evidence. We conclude Mancinas's appeals in Nos. SCR498868 and SCR590577 are procedurally barred and affirm those convictions. We further conclude there is substantial evidence to support the conviction in No. SCR595589 and affirm in that case as well.
We refer to these cases by their trial court docket numbers.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Charges
1. No. SCR498868: Robbery, Assault, and Firearm and Ammunition Possession Offenses
On October 21, 2008, the district attorney filed an information charging Mancinas with committing the following crimes on October 15, 2006: robbery (§ 211) (count I); assault with a deadly weapon, a vehicle (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count II); possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count III); and possession of ammunition as a convicted felon (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)) (count IV). The information further alleged Mancinas had a prior serious felony conviction and a strike (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (a)(1), 1170.12), as well as two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On December 4, 2013, Mancinas pled no contest to count II, and admitted the prior strike conviction, and the balance of the information was dismissed.
2. No. SCR590577: Drug and Firearm Possession Offenses
On February 5, 2013, the district attorney filed a third amended information charging Mancinas with committing the following crimes on October 3, 2010: possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) (count I), transportation of methamphetamine (id., § 11379, subd. (a)) (count II), possession of cocaine (id., § 11350, subd. (a)) (count III), and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count IV), with an allegation appended to each count that he was out on bail when he committed the offense (§ 12022.1). The information further alleged Mancinas had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On September 13, 2013, Mancinas pled no contest to the charges and admitted the allegations of the prior strike and prison terms.
3. No. SCR595589: The Killing of Dewey Tucker and Gang Participation Offenses
On January 18, 2012, the district attorney filed a second amended information charging Mancinas with committing the following crimes on January 12, 2010: conspiracy to commit murder of Dewey Tucker (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) (count I), murder of Tucker (§ 187, subd. (a)) (count II), discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) (count III), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count IV). The information further alleged the first three counts were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)); a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53); and Mancinas had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On April 16, 2012, the jury acquitted Mancinas on the first three counts, and returned a guilty verdict as to count IV, the violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a). On April 24, 2012, after a bifurcated bench trial the court found true all of the prior convictions as alleged.
Section 186.22, subdivision (a) provides: "Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years."
B. Sentencing and Notices of Appeal
The trial court imposed one sentence for all three cases. On April 9, 2014, the court denied Mancinas's Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction and sentenced him to a total of 22 years in prison. (Romero v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) Mancinas filed a timely notice of appeal in No. SCR498868 on May 23, in No. SCR590577 on May 27, and in No. SCR595589 on May 5. He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court before filing his notice of appeal in either No. SCR498868 or No. SCR590577, nor did he note any exception to that requirement in his notices of appeal, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).
Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
C. No. SCR595589: The January 12, 2010 Killing of Dewey Tucker
No. SCR595589 involves the murder of Tucker, which was described in detail in a published opinion from this court, where we upheld in part and reversed in part the convictions of Raul Vega, a co-defendant of Mancinas who was tried separately. (See People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 487-489 (Vega).) We need not repeat those facts here. We will, however, note both (1) the evidence presented by the district attorney in this case that we find to be sufficient to support Mancinas's conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a), and (2) the evidence Mancinas presented in his defense. Before doing so, we note three uncontroverted facts. First, as explained in Vega, there are "two rival factions of the Sureños" ("a street gang controlled by the Mexican Mafia") "in Santa Rosa, known as Varrio Sureño Loco (VSL) and Angelino Heights (AH)." (Vega at p. 487.) Second, Mancinas was a well-respected and active high-ranking member of the Sureños gang at the time of Tucker's murder, and although he claimed not to be a member of either AH or VSL, he had influence with both. And third, Mancinas was an FBI informant for about two years until June 2010, although Mancinas was not informed of his termination as an informant until October of that year.
1. The District Attorney's Case
In early 2010, both gangs and the police were aware some feud or war was mounting between AH and VSL. For instance, "[o]n January 12, 2010, the police came into possession of a letter written by an imprisoned VSL member calling for the assassination of three senior members of AH," as well as Mancinas. (Vega, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 487-488.) This letter appeared to set the rest of the events into motion.
Based on circumstantial evidence and impeachment of Mancinas's self-serving testimony, the district attorney argued Mancinas drove to Vallejo on January 12 with other AH members to have Vega kill Ramon Ochoa or Vicente Tapia, both high-ranking VSL members, in retaliation for the murder of Alejandro Ortega, a member of the AH gang, a few weeks earlier. That evening, Mancinas borrowed his girlfriend Nicole Allen's car; when he returned later that night, he told her to not talk to the police about it. The AH gang members thought Ochoa would be at Vicente Tapia's apartment complex on January 12. Once in Vallejo, Mancinas helped Vega and another AH member obtain a stolen vehicle to take to Tapia's apartment complex. Vega and his companion followed a white car leaving Tapia's apartment complex, believing Ochoa was the driver; Mancinas followed close behind. After following the white car onto the freeway, Vega ended up shooting Tucker, who was the actual driver and is not affiliated with any gang. Among other evidence, the district attorney used Mancinas's cell phone records and expert witness testimony to place Mancinas at or near the scene of the crime.
For the next day or so following the murder, Mancinas spoke with another high-ranking Sureños member and close friend, Gerardo Hernandez, over a dozen times. In May 2010, police recovered a handgun from Hernandez's residence that was later believed to be the weapon used in Tucker's murder. The gun had been stolen from Arizona at or around a time when Mancinas and, later, Hernandez lived there, although there was no direct evidence tying either to the theft. Mancinas also knew where the stolen vehicle had been dumped. Expert witnesses testified that gang members generally know which other members have weapons, and believe the existence and handling of stolen cars are important.
2. Mancinas's Defense
In his defense, Mancinas testified that on January 12 he was not aware of what Vega and the others were planning to do when they traveled together to Vallejo, nor when they chased after the white car (which turned out to be Tucker's) that left Tapia's apartment complex. Rather, Mancinas claimed he traveled to Vallejo to help broker a peace deal between the warring factions of the Sureños gang. Indeed, Mancinas testified that he and Ochoa (Vega's intended target) were "extremely close friends," so he would not have participated in trying to kill Ochoa. There was also evidence that Mancinas had given Ochoa's name to the FBI as a possible suspect in the killing of Ortega, which had started the AH-VSL feud. Mancinas denied helping steal the car Vega drove to kill Tucker, instead insisting another gang member had already stolen the car and offered it to Vega. In addition, Mancinas testified he was not at the scene when Vega shot at the white car, but did drive up to see the aftermath a few minutes later.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Nos. SCR498868 and SCR590577
Generally, section 1237.5 provides that "[n]o appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of . . . nolo contendere . . . except where" the defendant has first both (1) filed a statement with the trial court stating the "grounds going to the legality of the proceedings" (id., subd. (a)), and (2) obtained "a certificate of probable cause for such appeal" from that court (id., subd. (b)). The Supreme Court has commanded this rule is to be applied strictly. (See People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1097-1098 (Mendez).) Nevertheless, there are two exceptions that allow a defendant to appeal a no contest plea without first obtaining a certificate of probable cause, first created by the courts and now listed in rule 8.304(b)(4)(A)-(B): (1) "[t]he denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5," or (2) "[g]rounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea's validity." (See, e.g., Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) To benefit from either exception, the defendant must state which one is being invoked on the notice of appeal. (Ibid.; rule 8.304(b)(5).)
Mancinas pled no contest in Nos. SCR498868 and SCR590577. When he filed the notices of appeal in those cases, Mancinas had not obtained a certificate of probable cause. In the absence of a certificate of probable cause, we focus on whether either appeal meets one of the two exceptions to this requirement. In neither notice of appeal did Mancinas state he was invoking either exception to the requirement of first obtaining a certificate of probable cause. (Rule 8.304(b)(5).) No. SCR498868 plainly does not meet either exception, as Mancinas did not raise any issue on appeal with regard to that conviction, arguing only that the matter should be remanded for resentencing in light of errors in the other dockets. While No. SCR590577 may meet one exception ("[g]rounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea's validity" (rule 8.304(b)(4)(B))—which Mancinas would not have been able to list on his notice of appeal anyway, by virtue of the fact that Proposition 47 was enacted months after his no contest plea was entered and after he filed his notice of appeal—the procedure for obtaining the relief Mancinas seeks (resentencing) is established by the very statute he invokes (see § 1170.18, subd. (a), added by Prop. 47, § 14, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014), eff. Nov. 5, 2014, as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 767, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2017). Without deciding whether Proposition 47 can apply retroactively, and assuming arguendo it does, section 1170.18 nevertheless requires Mancinas first to petition the trial court for resentencing on his conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) (possession of cocaine). (See, e.g., People v. Bush (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 992, 1000-1001.) This Mancinas has not done, and we are not persuaded it would be proper for this court to consider any such issue on appeal, or to treat it as a petition under section 1170.18, without the trial court having first addressed the issue. Requiring the petition for resentencing to be first heard by the trial court serves "the obvious purpose of having the petitions decided by the judge with a presumed knowledge of the underlying circumstances." (People v. Curry (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1080-1081, review granted Nov. 9, 2016, S237037, fn. omitted.) "Just as a defendant cannot get resentencing from an appellate court [citations], relief under Proposition 47 must be sought in the correct trial court."] (Id. at p. 1081.) Thus, we conclude that Mancinas's appeals from his no contest pleas in Nos. SCR498868 and SCR590577 are procedurally barred.
Section 1170.18, subdivision (a) provides: "(a) A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section ('this act') had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or added by this act." By the plain terms of the statute, Mancinas cannot petition the court for resentencing on his other convictions in No. SCR590577, and has not requested such on appeal.
B. No. SCR595589
In No. SCR595589, Mancinas contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a). We reject this argument and affirm.
1. Standard of Review
We review the jury's conviction for substantial evidence. "The test of whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] In making this assessment, the court looks to the whole record, not just the evidence favorable to the respondent to determine if the evidence supporting the verdict is substantial in light of other facts." (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667 (Holt), ; accord, People v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1508 (Garcia).) Even if the evidence is mainly (or only) circumstantial, we apply the same standard. (See Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 668 [" ' " 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' " ' "].)
2. There Is Sufficient Evidence for Mancinas's Conviction Under Section 186.22, Subdivision (a)
Section 186.22, subdivision (a) provides that "[a]ny person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years." The Supreme Court has divided this provision into three elements: "First, active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive; second, knowledge that the gang's members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and third, the willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang." (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (Rodriguez).)
The third element is at issue here. Willful promotion, furtherance, or assistance, as the jury was instructed, means essentially the same thing as aiding and abetting. (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749-751.) "Because there rarely is direct evidence of a defendant's intent, '[s]uch intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant's actions.' " (People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1025.) "Evidentiary considerations which are probative of whether one is an aider and abettor include presence at the scene of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt to prevent the commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct before and after the crime." (People v. Jones (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 9, 15 (Jones); see also People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 407-408 (Miranda); People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 921, 924 (Medina).) A rational factfinder may infer the defendant's complicity in committing the crime by "failing to immediately disassociate [one]self from the perpetrator of the crime." (Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15.) Furthermore, " '[a] person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime . . . but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits . . . that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable." (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.)
Mancinas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the third element. Specifically, Mancinas argues that "[t]he prosecution presented no evidence to controvert [his] testimony that on January 12, 2010 he journeyed to Vallejo as a peace emissary, enlisted to facilitate settlement of hostilities between AH and VSL." (Italics added.) We disagree.
The district attorney provided ample (even if circumstantial) evidence for a rational factfinder to conclude Mancinas had engaged in criminal street gang activity in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) on January 12, 2010. To begin, Mancinas was a well-respected and active high-ranking member of the Sureños gang at the time of Tucker's murder. Further, the surrounding circumstances of January 12 show some sort of feud or war was building between AH and LVS, including the letter a VSL member had written calling for the killing of three AH members and Mancinas. A rational factfinder could have disbelieved Mancinas's stated motive for traveling to Vallejo with Vega and the other AH members; it could have concluded he wanted to help kill Ochoa, or could have reasonably foreseen such an act occurring. (See Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.) Indeed, Mancinas's motive is suspicious in light of his borrowing Allen's car and telling her to not talk to the police about it. Mancinas's purported reason also conflicts with the fact that the AH members obtained a stolen car while in Vallejo, the car in which Vega was traveling when he killed Tucker.
Moreover, the district attorney presented cell phone records and expert witness testimony to place Mancinas at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, not after. Clearly, if a rational factfinder believed this evidence, it could have been enough to prove Mancinas's "presence at the scene of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt to prevent the commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct before and after the crime." (See Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15.) Or, put another way, a rational factfinder could believe " 'a reasonable person in [Mancinas's] position would have or should have known that the charged offense[s] w[ere] a reasonable foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.' " (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.)
In addition, for the next day or so following the incident, Mancinas spoke with a high-ranking AH member, Hernandez, over a dozen times, later casting suspicion onto them both, given their affiliations and the evidence ultimately found at Hernandez's home. Specifically, a couple months later police recovered Tucker's murder weapon, a handgun, from Hernandez's complex. The gun had been stolen from Arizona at a time when Mancinas and Hernandez lived there; although there was no direct evidence tying either to the theft, the circumstances are suspicious. A rational factfinder could infer Mancinas had either personally transferred the gun to Hernandez, or at least had known which of the other co-defendants had done so. Mancinas also knew where the stolen vehicle had been dumped, from which a rational factfinder could infer he had helped dump the vehicle or ordered someone else to do so. The district attorney presented expert witnesses who testified that gang members generally know which other members have weapons, and believe the existence and handling of stolen cars are important.
In total, we find all of the evidence the district attorney presented to be more than sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude Mancinas had furthered, promoted or assisted at least one other AH member in committing the felonious criminal activity of killing Tucker. His role in procuring and disposing of the gun, and procuring and potentially disposing of the stolen car, could easily lead the jury to conclude these activities furthered, promoted or assisted in the Tucker murder. (Cf. Garcia, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 [holding that defendant's "current, comprehensive knowledge of what active gang members were doing, coupled with expert testimony, and in conjunction with defendant's commission of weapons offenses, supports the conviction for his active participation in a gang [under section 186.22, subdivision (a)]."]; see also Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15.) Thus, there was more than substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict convicting Mancinas under section 186.22, subdivision (a).
Although Mancinas initially stated in his opening brief that the district attorney had presented "no evidence" for his conviction, in his reply brief he instead downplays the People's evidence and points to other evidence in his favor. "This contention essentially invites us to reweigh the evidence," which we are not in a position to do. (People v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005; accord, Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 667-668; Garcia, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508; People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1347 [" 'Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.' "].) Substantial evidence supports the conviction.
3. Inconsistent Verdicts Do Not Signify Insufficient Evidence
Mancinas further argues "that in this case, the court and prosecutor designated the three specific acts charged in counts 1, 2, and 3 as the felonious conduct as the basis for finding the active gang participation charged in count 4 [(§ 186.22, subd. (a))]. Whereas the jury acquitted appellant of his participation in the acts charged in counts 1, 2, and 3, there ipso facto was insufficient evidence to prove him guilty of actively participating in a criminal street gang on January 12, 2012." We disagree.
First, we note the plain language of section 186.22, subdivision (a) does not require a conviction of an underlying felony before a defendant may be found guilty of an active gang participation offense. (See People v. Valenzuela (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 449, 451, review granted Mar. 1, 2017, S239122.) And we decline to read into the statute such a requirement, regardless of any dictum in Rodriguez that Mancinas contends compels us to do so. (Cf. People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176 ["[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered."].)
Second, we reject Mancinas's contention that the jury's acquittals on the first three counts somehow imply he did not commit "felonious criminal conduct" sufficient for a conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a). This line of argument runs contrary to the inconsistent verdicts doctrine—assuming arguendo the verdicts are indeed inconsistent.
Inconsistent verdicts are explicitly allowed by law. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656 (Lewis) ["It is well settled that, as a general rule, inherently inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand."]; accord, People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 512-513 (Abilez).) Under section 954, we are not permitted to view "[a]n acquittal of one or more counts" as "an acquittal of any other count." (Italics added.) Indeed, "[a] judgment of conviction establishes the necessarily adjudicated elements of the crime involved in the conviction . . . ." (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 771.) Contrary to Mancinas's arguments, "the existence of inconsistent verdicts [does not] imply that the jury must have been confused" (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 656), nor that it acted unlawfully (Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 513). "An inconsistency may show no more than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict." (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 656; cf. Dunn v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 390, 393-394 [" 'The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We [could choose to] interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.' "], italics added.)
Recently, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that "inconsistent verdicts shroud in mystery what the jury necessarily decided." (Bravo-Fernandez v. United States (2016) 580 U.S. ___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 352, 366].) That certainly captures our view of the record here. For instance, the jury may have acquitted Mancinas on the first three counts, but not the fourth (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), because it may have reached some sort of compromise among the jurors; or believed the prosecution had overreached in charging him with all four offenses, or had failed to prove some distinctive element in each count compared to the three elements of the fourth one. But the fact that the jury's reasoning may be obscure does not mean that the verdict it reached on each count, alone, is without support in the record. To the contrary, "as more fully discussed above, [we] have determined there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction[ ] and findings rendered in this case. Thus, even if we assume for argument's sake that the jury verdicts were inconsistent, that conclusion does not, of itself, warrant reversal." (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 656; see also § 954.) Even if a gang participation conviction is "logically inconsistent" with an acquittal on other counts, "the inconsistency is not grounds for reversal [so long as] substantial evidence supported the verdict." (Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 407, italics added.) Whatever "mystery" may surround the jury's precise rationale for its verdicts, we find no reason to reverse Mancinas's conviction.
III. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, Mancinas's convictions in all three cases being appealed here, No. SCR498868, No. SCR590577, and No. SCR595589, are affirmed.
/s/_________
Streeter, J. We concur: /s/_________
Ruvolo, P.J. /s/_________
Reardon, J.