Opinion
B320542
09-27-2023
In re MALIK H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. MALIK H., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Goldstein Law Office and Elana Goldstein for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ40760, Nancy L. Newman, Judge.
Goldstein Law Office and Elana Goldstein for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FEUER, J.
The juvenile court declared Malik H. a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after finding Malik committed second degree murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)) as a direct aider and abettor in the fatal shooting of Alton Goss.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition order, Malik contends substantial evidence does not support the finding he aided and abetted implied malice murder because there was insufficient evidence he understood his conduct posed a danger to human life or that he affirmatively assisted the shooter. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Petition
On March 4, 2021 the People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that on February 16, 2021 Malik (then 14 years old) committed murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The petition alleged, in relevant part, that Malik had physical and verbal altercations with 13-year-old Jordan G., and Malik threatened Jordan with retaliation. On February 13, 2021 a bullet was fired into Jordan's home. On February 16 Malik and his 13-year-old cousin Tyler B. approached Jordan's home, and Tyler fatally shot Jordan's father, Goss, who was standing on the front porch. Malik and Tyler fled together.
B. The Evidence at the Jurisdiction Hearing
A nine-day jurisdiction hearing commenced on February 15, 2022. The prosecution called seven witnesses, including five law enforcement officers and two percipient witnesses. Malik did not call any witnesses. Tyler was not involved in Malik's adjudication.
The parties stipulated Tyler was unavailable because the delinquency proceedings against him had been suspended due to a competency proceeding.
1. The February 13, 2021 shooting at the Cimarron Street house
Jordan's mother, Mericca Garner, lived with Jordan and his older brother Jayden on Cimarron Street near West 88th Street in the Morningside Park area of Los Angeles. Garner testified that Jordan and Malik met over the internet and became friends. At some point the two had a falling out, and in September 2020 Malik came to the Cimarron Street house and got into a physical altercation with Jordan. As Malik was leaving after the fight, he said angrily, "'I'll be back.'"
Garner identified Malik in the courtroom. She testified she did not know Tyler, and Tyler had never been to the Cimarron Street house.
At around 10:00 pm on February 13, 2021, while Garner was at home with one of her sons and his friend, she heard a loud noise through the large bay window in the living room overlooking Cimarron Street. Garner saw there was a hole in the window, and, believing it was caused by a bullet, she called the police. Los Angeles Police Sergeant Jeffrey Pelczar, who responded to the scene that night, found glass shards and a torn blind, and he determined a bullet had been fired into the house (although no bullet was recovered after a search). Sergeant Pelczar testified a teenage boy was sitting on the couch in the living room at the time of the shooting.
2. The February 16, 2021 shooting of Goss
On February 16, 2021 Goss came to the Cimarron Street house to visit his sons and to discuss what to do about the dispute between Jordan and Malik. Garner testified that shortly before midnight she and Goss were talking on the front porch. As Goss was getting ready to leave, he saw something on the street (outside of Garner's sightline) and exclaimed, "'Hey, who's that?'" As soon as Goss spoke, a gunshot rang out. Goss grabbed his heart and fell face-forward. Other shots were fired. As Garner ran into the house to get her sons, she saw Goss reach for the safety on a gun he was carrying at his hip.
Los Angeles Police Officer Omar Lopez responded to a call of a shooting at the Cimarron Street house shortly before midnight. He found Goss on the porch steps, unconscious and not breathing, with a semiautomatic firearm in his hands. Paramedics pronounced Goss dead at the scene at 12:34 a.m. on February 17.
The parties stipulated the cause of Goss's death was a gunshot wound to the chest and it was a homicide.
Los Angeles Police Homicide Detective Armando Mendoza, the investigating officer assigned to the case, testified that early on February 17 police recovered bullets from the living room of the Cimarron Street house and a flower bed under the bay window. The bullets were consistent with bullets that would be fired from a .357 Magnum or .38 Special revolver. Another bullet was found in Goss's body. Detective Mendoza opined based on the bullets' locations that they were fired from the street. He believed they were fired from a revolver because no matching shell casings were found at the scene. Police recovered two nine-millimeter shell casings on the front porch of the house, which Detective Mendoza believed to have been ejected from Goss's semiautomatic firearm. A spent bullet fired from Goss's gun was found behind the seat of Goss's car, which was parked on the street.
Detective Mendoza explained that semiautomatic firearms, unlike revolvers, eject shell casings after each bullet is fired.
3. Malik's and Tyler's movements on February 16 and 17
Police collected surveillance videos from five locations in the vicinity of the shooting. Excerpts were played at the jurisdiction hearing, and Detective Mendoza testified as to their contents. Video from an alleyway south of Manchester Boulevard, between Gramercy Place and Wilton Place, showed two individuals, both of whom were wearing dark clothing, hoodies, and "some sort of facial mask" walking west at approximately 11:45 p.m. on February 16. Other videos showed the same individuals subsequently walking slowly south on Wilton Place to 88th Street, continuing west on 88th Street toward Cimarron Street, and then turning north on Cimarron Street. One of the individuals wore black and white tennis shoes, dark pants, and his hoodie had a large emblem on the front; the other individual wore dark pants and shoes, his hoodie had a logo at the top left, and he had a shiny belt buckle. Based on his investigation, including matching clothing in photographs posted on social media around the time of the shooting, Detective Mendoza concluded the individuals were Malik and Tyler, respectively.
Surveillance cameras on the house directly across the street from the Cimarron Street house captured the front porch at 11:54 p.m., the time of the shooting. The video showed Tyler walking slightly ahead of Malik on the sidewalk in the direction of the house. A parked vehicle obscured Tyler and Malik at the moment of the shooting, and no gun was visible, but the audio and visible muzzle flashes indicated that one of the two raised his arm and fired a gun three times. After the three gunshots, Goss yelled, "'Who's that?'" from the front porch and screamed in pain. Goss then fired three gunshots from the porch. Following the initial volley of gunshots, Malik ran away from the house, followed by Tyler. Detective Mendoza testified, "You see those two individuals, after the one individual fires the three shots, then run southbound on the east side. They maintained themselves."
Audio from nearby surveillance cameras picked up the sound of six gunshots.
During cross-examination, Detective Mendoza testified that it was a "fair assessment" that Malik ran almost immediately after the first shot, and by the time Tyler started running, Malik was 20 to 30 feet ahead of him. Detective Mendoza acknowledged that because Malik and Tyler were obscured at the time of the shooting, it was possible that Malik could have started running after the first shot was fired or as soon as Goss exclaimed, "'Who's that?'" But Detective Mendoza added, "It's possible, but it's not what I observed. I couldn't see it."
Multiple surveillance videos taken after the shooting captured Malik and Tyler running together west on 88th Street and then south on Wilton Place, at which point they entered the rear passenger door of a Toyota Prius. At the same time, the video shows a police car traveling toward the scene of the shooting, and helicopters can be heard in the background. Jeffrey Valdes, who on February 16 was working as a rideshare driver in a Toyota Prius, testified that just before midnight he received a ride request from the name "Tyler," but the request was immediately cancelled. A few minutes later he received and accepted another ride request from "Tyler" for a pickup on Wilton Place. At the pickup location, two young, thin Black males wearing hoodies got into the vehicle. Valdes could hear helicopters, and he noticed the passengers were breathing fast, "kind of like in a rush," and one of the passengers kept looking out the window at the helicopters and passing cars. Valdes dropped the passengers off on West 97th Street, where Tyler lived. After the passengers exited the vehicle, they hugged, and one seemed excited. Valdes called 911 because he was under the impression they were running away from something.
Documents obtained pursuant to a search warrant showed that Valdes's Prius responded to a request for a ride from an account in Tyler's full name that was linked to Tyler's cell phone number.
Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent Michael Easter testified as an expert on historical cell-site analysis. Agent Easter examined Malik's cell phone data and determined the phone's activity between 11:48 and 11:59 p.m. on February 16 was consistent with Malik's phone being at or near the scene of the shooting.
Agent Easter also testified that on February 13, 2021 between 10:57 and 11:53 p.m. (about an hour after the February 13 shooting) activity on Malik's phone placed it near Western Avenue and West 78th Place, near the Cimarron Street house.
4. Electronic communications evidence
Detective Mendoza obtained through a search warrant the records of Malik's and Tyler's social media accounts, which included photographs, videos, and messages transmitted through the service. In the months leading up to the shootings, Malik and Tyler were in frequent contact with each other, exchanging messages and having video calls. Detective Mendoza also obtained access to Jordan's social media account. Numerous communications were admitted at the jurisdiction hearing.
In one, Malik messaged an unidentified social media account, stating, "Jordan Jr. and his big brother jumped me. It's finna get bad." In December 2020 Malik messaged Tyler, "We gotta hit any licks so we can buy a blower and end this shxt." Detective Mendoza, who worked in the gang enforcement detail for almost four years and was familiar with gang and street vernacular in Los Angeles, testified that "blower" is street vernacular for a firearm.
Later in December 2020 Malik messaged Tyler, "Give me a blower bro. Fucc squabel. I'm tired of this shii. I'm finna just end it."
On February 2, 2021 Malik messaged Tyler, "Fuck all this talcn. Come to the hk500d. Or we shoot it out." Detective Mendoza testified the use of the letters "hk" signified "Hoover killer," a demonstration of general animus to a rival gang.
Around 6:30 p.m. on February 13 Tyler sent a 14-second video to Jordan's social media account. Malik and Tyler appeared together in the video. In the video, Tyler stated they wanted "fades" and used the term "dead homies." Detective Mendez testified the term "fades" means a challenge to a fight, and the invocation of "dead homies" conveys seriousness. Around the same time, Malik sent Jordan a photograph in which Malik was wearing the same clothing as in the video, including a beanie, hoodie, and surgical mask.
On the evening of February 13 Tyler also sent several messages to a social account with the username Yobae_Jeri. Tyler indicated he was looking to reach Malik and, addressing Malik by his nickname "Leek," Tyler wrote, "I gotta tell you something." Tyler later wrote, "Answer Leek," and he received the response: "We finna get dressed." Tyler then initiated at least four video calls. After the final call, Tyler wrote, "Like R N Type," which Detective Mendez understood to mean "right now."
At 11:16 p.m. on February 13, approximately one hour after the shooting at the Cimarron Street house, Tyler posted a series of photographs on social media in which he was holding a silver revolver. Tyler also commented on the photograph, "I'm juss 2 K muchk pressure."
On February 15, shortly after 8:00 p.m., Malik messaged Tyler, "Pull off. My mom won't let me come out." Malik then asked Tyler, "Why did you give cuh blower bitchk." Tyler responded, "I have type blower dumb nigga."
On February 16 Tyler exchanged a series of social media messages with the username "laylaydajointt," whom he addressed as "little mama." Tyler wrote to laylaydajointt that he was "going to pick up Malik." Laylaydajointt asked where he and Malik were going, and Tyler responded, "Finna do this quick mission" followed by an emoji for a blast or spark. Laylaydajointt again asked where they were going, and Tyler responded, "enemigos." Laylaydajointt wrote, "Be careful fool. I . . . want none to happen to you," and "both yal be careful." At 9:15 p.m. laylaydajointt asked Tyler if he was okay and "did everything go okay?" Tyler responded, "I didn't go yet," "I'm waiting till when it's real late," and "when the police not out." At about 1:00 a.m. on February 17, 2021, Tyler messaged laylaydajointt that he just got home, and "I might have to leave LA cause the police looking for me."
Detective Mendoza testified that prior to their disagreement, Jordan and Malik also communicated through social media, and at one point Jordan gave Malik his address on Cimarron Street. In contrast, Jordan and Tyler never communicated on social media before February 13, 2021, when Tyler sent Jordan the video threatening "fades." Detective Mendez found no earlier reference to Jordan in Tyler's social media records. 5. Tyler's and Malik's Arrests
Tyler was arrested at Malik's house on March 1, 2021. Malik's mother was present and agreed to have Malik turn himself in to the police station, which Malik did the same day. Malik and Tyler were interviewed together. Tyler admitted he shot Goss on February 16, and he said that Malik did not fire the gun. Tyler said he threw the gun away before getting into the rideshare car after the shooting. The gun was never recovered.
C. The Juvenile Court's Jurisdiction Findings and Disposition Order
Following closing arguments by counsel, on March 2, 2022 the juvenile court sustained the petition as to count one for second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and dismissed the count for conspiracy to commit murder.
The juvenile court found based on the hearing evidence that there was not "any true dispute that the two individuals present at the Cimarron home on February 16th were Malik and Tyler. This fact has been proved sufficiently by the investigation results, including clothing descriptions, surveillance videos, cell phone records, social media records, and the testimony of [Valdes]." The principal disputed issue, the court found, was whether Malik had the requisite intent to be guilty of implied malice murder on an aiding and abetting theory.
After detailing the Instagram communications involving Malik, Jordan, and Tyler, the juvenile court made the following findings: "It is clear to this court that Tyler and Malik were together on the night of this shooting on February 16th. The court also believes that Malik was involved in the shooting on February 13th, three days before the homicide. Malik had a[n] ongoing feud with Jordan and the messaging indicates that the purpose of their venture out onto the streets of February 16th was to complete a mission. It is true that they probably did not know Mr. Goss was present and that he may have startled them. The court believes that the intent of the two minors may have been to shoot again into the home where Jordan lives." Nonetheless, "shooting into a residence where people live demonstrates a conscious disregard for human life," satisfying the malice requirement for second degree murder. Moreover, Malik was liable on an aiding and abetting theory because "the requisite intent for committing the intentional act of shooting was known by Malik....[T]his was Malik's fight with Jordan. Malik was present at the scene to aid Tyler in the commission of the act and supported Tyler in completing this mission. Shooting at the home was not a surprise to Malik. This was the plan. And although Malik ran first, they both joined up with each other . . . and rode in the [rideshare car] together."
At the May 5, 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Malik a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court ordered Malik to camp community placement for a term of seven to nine months, and the court retained jurisdiction to make further orders based on Malik's progress. The court found that a camp community placement setting was the best disposition based on the evidence, Malik's age at the time of the offense, his level of involvement in the shooting, and his lack of criminal history. The court further set a maximum term of confinement of 15 years to life and awarded 430 days of custody credit. The court imposed a number of conditions of probation. Malik timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Law of Implied Malice Murder and Aiding and Abetting
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) "The primary difference between express malice and implied malice is that the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not." (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653.) "Murder is committed with implied malice when 'the killing is proximately caused by "'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.'"'" (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes); accord, Gonzalez, at p. 653.) "In short, implied malice requires a defendant's awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another-no more, and no less." (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143; accord, People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) However, "[t]o suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant's act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must '"involve[] a high degree of probability that it will result in death."'" (Reyes, at p. 989; accord, Knoller, at p. 152.) A person who unlawfully kills with implied malice is guilty of second degree murder. (Gonzalez, at p. 653.)
On a theory of direct aiding and abetting, "an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with 'knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.'" (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) "[A]n aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life." (Id. at p. 850, accord, Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990.) This theory of culpability remains valid "notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437's elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder." (Gentile, at p. 850; accord, Reyes, at p. 990; see People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 499 [statutory changes prohibiting aiding and abetting liability under a natural and probable consequences theory do not preclude a conviction for direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder because "direct aiding and abetting of an implied malice murder is based on 'the aider and abettor's own mens rea'"].)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843, 847-848.) In his opening brief, Malik argued that aiding and abetting implied malice murder is no longer a valid theory of murder following the statutory amendments under Senate Bill No. 1437. On July 24, 2023 Malik withdrew this contention in light of the Supreme Court's clarification in Reyes that aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid theory. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990 ["Case law has recognized and applied this theory, and we see no basis to abrogate it."].)
"In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life[-]endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life." (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713 (Powell); accord, Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) "The prosecution cannot 'impute[ ] [malice] to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.'" (People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 846, quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 ["'[O]nce it is proved that "the principal has caused an actus reus, the liability of each of the secondary parties should be assessed according to his own mens rea."'"]; People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 514 [an aider and abettor may harbor a less culpable mental state than the direct perpetrator].) "'Neither presence at the scene of a crime nor knowledge of, but failure to prevent it, is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting its commission. [Citations.] However, '[a]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.'" (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.)
B. Standard of Review
"'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court "must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court."'" (In re Gary F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1080; accord, In re J.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 805, 814; see People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845, fn. 7 [same standard of proof applies in a juvenile proceeding as in an adult criminal trial].) Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we "'"must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'" (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277; see People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.) We apply the same standard of review in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. (Ghobrial, at p. 278; Vargas, at p. 820.) "If the finder of fact's determination is supported, whether the prosecutor relied upon direct or circumstantial evidence, we have held that reversal is not warranted, even where '"the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding."'" (Vargas, at p. 820.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Finding Malik Directly Aided and Abetted Implied Malice Murder
Malik contends that although the prosecution "proved a strong case against Tyler," there was not substantial evidence Malik took any affirmative action to assist Tyler in the shooting or that Malik was aware prior to the shooting of the possible danger Tyler's conduct posed to human life. Malik posits that the evidence "only proved that [Malik] had the intent to go to the incident scene, and that he knew about the gun Tyler brought with him." Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings both that Malik aided Tyler in the commission of the shooting and that Malik acted with conscious disregard for human life.
As to the actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting liability, the prosecution needed to prove that Malik, by words or conduct, aided in the commission of the life endangering act (shooting at an occupied home), and not its consequence (the killing of Goss). (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.) There was substantial direct and circumstantial evidence Malik actively aided Tyler in planning and executing the shootings at the Cimarron Street house on February 13 and 16, 2021. Malik, not Tyler, had a prior relationship with Jordan and knew Jordan's home address. And it was Malik who had a feud with Jordan. Malik had a physical altercation with Jordan at the Cimarron Street home in September 2020 and threatened that he would be back. Tyler's first involvement in the feud with Jordan was in December 2020, when Malik told Tyler they needed money "so we can buy a blower and end this shxt." Malik later asked Tyler to "give me a blower bro" because he was "tired of this shii" and "finna just end it." About three and a half hours before the February 13, 2021 shooting, Malik appeared in the video that Tyler sent to Jordan in which Tyler said they wanted "fades," and referenced "dead homies," indicating he was making a serious challenge to a fight. Around the same time, Malik sent Jordan a photograph of himself wearing the same clothing he wore in the video. The trial court further found, with evidentiary support from the social media messages and the historical cell-site analysis, that Malik perpetrated the February 13 shooting (whether as the actual shooter or as an accomplice). On February 15, the day before Goss's murder, Malik angrily asked Tyler in a social media message why Tyler gave away his gun. Tyler responded that he still had the gun.
On the night of the shooting, surveillance video showed Malik and Tyler walking together for at least 10 minutes before the shooting. They walked up to the Cimarron Street house together and Tyler (by his own admission) fired his gun three times before Goss spoke out and returned fire. As Detective Mendoza described it, "You see those two individuals, after the one individual fires the three shots, then run southbound on the east side." They then left the scene together in a rideshare car to Tyler's home, and they hugged when they got out of the car.
With respect to Malik's mens rea, the prosecution was required to prove Malik knew Tyler intended to commit the shooting, Malik intended to aid Tyler in the commission of the shooting, Malik knew the shooting was dangerous to human life, and he acted in conscious disregard for human life. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.) There was substantial evidence Malik knew Tyler intended to commit a shooting on February 16, and he intended to aid Tyler in the shooting. Malik took part in the threatening video Tyler sent to Jordan challenging him to a fight, and they discussed on social media the need to obtain a gun. With respect to Malik's awareness of the danger to human life, there was evidence Malik participated in the February 13 shooting at the Cimarron Street house (in which a teenage boy was sitting in the living room by the bay window when the shot was fired); the day before the shooting Malik confirmed Tyler had a gun; and the two returned to the house on February 16 as part of a "mission" and challenge to Jordan-all showing Malik's knowledge of the danger (of bringing a gun to a house they had recently fired at as part of a challenge to a rival) and conscious disregard of the danger that shooting at the house would have on the lives of the occupants.
The juvenile court considered that Malik and Tyler "probably did not know Mr. Goss was present and that he may have startled them," but emphasized, "this was not a vacant home but a home of where people lived." And, as the court found, shooting into an occupied home (twice) satisfied the mens rea requirement for implied malice murder. (See People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1205 [where defendant fired a gun into an occupied car at close range, despite assertion he intended only to scare the occupants, "no juror could have found that defendant participated in this shooting, either as a shooter or as an aider and abettor, without also finding that defendant committed an act that is dangerous to life and did so knowing of the danger and with conscious disregard for life-which is a valid theory of malice"]; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317 [observing as to implied malice murder that "a person who fires a bullet through a window, not knowing or caring whether anyone is behind it, may be liable for homicide regardless of any intent to kill"].)
Malik argues the evidence showed merely an intent that he and Tyler would go "to the incident scene to confront or threaten Jordan," not to shoot anyone. On this theory, "[t]hey were completely caught off guard by Goss's presence," and "the evidence therefore plausibly suggested Tyler reacted in a state of frenzy and surprise by shooting the gun at Goss." The plausibility of this scenario is undermined by the fact Malik and Tyler fired a gun into the living room three nights earlier and had fired in the direction of the house and Goss before Goss spoke out or drew his gun. And even if it were a plausible scenario, our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings, not evaluating whether another scenario was possible. (See People v. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 822 ["'"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding."'"].)
Malik also argues his total surprise a shooting occurred on February 16 is shown by the fact he started to run from the shooting "either just before Tyler fired the gun or just as Tyler fired the gun," and Detective Mendoza admitted it was "possible" that Malik began to run before Tyler fired the first shot. This misstates the record. Detective Mendoza testified that both Tyler and Malik fled after Tyler fired three shots at Goss. During cross-examination, Detective Mendoza admitted it was possible Malik could have started running after the first shot was fired or as soon as Goss shouted out, although "it's not what [he] observed." There was no testimony that Malik fled before Tyler fired the gun, and we defer to the juvenile court's findings crediting Detective Mendoza's direct testimony. (See People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 ["'"Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence."'"]; accord, People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 703.) Moreover, Malik's motive and planning to carry out a shooting, his involvement in the February 13 shooting, and his and Tyler's excited and coordinated behavior after the shooting all contradict the notion that Malik was surprised their "mission" concluded with a shooting.
Finally, Malik argues his youth should be taken into consideration in deciding whether he harbored the requisite mens rea, relying on People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970. In Ramirez, we reversed the denial of a 15-year-old defendant's petition for resentencing on his conviction for first degree murder in light of the narrowed scope of the felony-murder doctrine under Senate Bill No. 1437, concluding "'a defendant's youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (Ramirez, at p. 987.) We explained, "This is because '"[c]hildren 'generally are less mature and responsible than adults'" and "'often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them' ...."'" (Ibid.; see In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 [vacating robbery-murder specialcircumstance finding, explaining that even if the resentencing factors supported a finding of reckless indifference for an adult, the 16-year-old petitioner "lacked '"the experience, perspective, and judgment"' to adequately appreciate the risk of death posed by his criminal activities"]; People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 [reversing summary denial of petition for resentencing and remanding for evidentiary hearing, observing that "given [petitioner's] youth at the time of the crime, particularly in light of subsequent case law's recognition of the science relating to adolescent brain development [citations], it is far from clear that [petitioner] was actually aware 'of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants'"].) We concluded in Ramirez that "'"'the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant [must] be duly considered' in assessing his culpability."'" (Ramirez, at p. 987.)
Although the juvenile court did not make an express finding as to the impact of Malik's age on his culpability for implied malice murder, the court was well aware of Malik's age and maturity (which the court considered in crafting the disposition order), and we recognize an implied finding by the court that Malik harbored a conscious disregard for life notwithstanding that he was 14 years old at the time of the shooting. Malik's trial attorney raised the "immaturity of children" and cited Ramirez in his closing argument, although he focused on 13-year-old Tyler's immaturity and unpredictability. Further, other than the fact of his age, there is no evidence in the record that Malik's involvement in the shooting was affected by his immaturity or a particular vulnerability due to age. This stands in contrast to Ramirez, in which the evidence supported a finding Omar Ramirez-who was tried as an adult based on his role as an aider and abettor in a gang-related carjacking-was influenced by peer pressure and feared reprisal if he did not participate. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Moreover, although Ramirez knew there was going to be a carjacking and his older confederate was going to use a gun, Ramirez's age "may well have affected his calculation of the risk of death posed by using the firearm in the carjacking, as well as his willingness to abandon the crime." (Ibid.)
On appeal, Malik points to his and Tyler's "naivete," as shown by the fact they hailed a rideshare car using an account associated with Tyler's real name to flee the scene after the shooting, as well as the fact Tyler voluntarily provided his cell phone password to detectives during his and Malik's interview. But making poor decisions with respect to evasion of the police is not a hallmark of youth, and it does not show a failure to appreciate the dangers of shooting into an occupied home to exact vengeance against a rival. As discussed, there was substantial evidence Malik over a period of months schemed to get "back" at Jordan, enlisted Tyler's help to obtain a gun to "end this shxt," threatened violence against Jordan, was involved in the February 13 shooting into Jordan's house, and returned with a gun on February 16. This was substantial evidence Malik, at age 14, appreciated the dangers and acted with implied malice.
Malik's attorney argued at trial that Tyler's immaturity "is relevant in this case because what we are doing is imputing behavior by Tyler [B.] onto Malik during a superseding event." But that is not the theory on which Malik was found guilty. The actus reus was Tyler's shooting into the Cimarron Street home while occupied, an act that Malik encouraged and joined, and the mens rea was Malik's conscious disregard for life. Tyler's immaturity and unpredictability do not exculpate Malik.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition order are affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., SEGAL, J.