Opinion
A156707
04-21-2020
In re L.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.V., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1800676)
L.V. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring her a ward of the court and placing her on probation after finding true the allegation that she committed one count of misdemeanor battery. She argues that evidence of her interview with a police officer regarding the incident should not have been admitted because she was not given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that she understood the wrongfulness of her conduct, and that the electronic search condition imposed as a condition of probation is overbroad under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We will strike the electronic search condition, but otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of May 11, 2018, then 12-year-old L.V. attacked her classmate H.F.C. outside an apartment building near their middle school in San Pablo. L.V. grabbed H.F.C. by her hair and pulled her to the ground, then repeatedly punched and kicked her. A video of the incident was subsequently posted on social media.
H.F.C. testified that the video was uploaded to L.V.'s Instagram account.
On June 1, San Pablo Police Officer David Hoff went to L.V.'s home to speak with her about the incident. Officer Hoff knew L.V. from having previously spoken to her at school. Officer Hoff knocked on the door and was let in by an unidentified man. The man directed Officer Hoff to the kitchen, where he spoke with L.V. for approximately 13 minutes while she sat at the dining table. L.V.'s father was present for much of the interview. Officer Hoff's entire visit to the home was captured on his body camera.
During the interview, Officer Hoff explained to L.V. and her father that "the other family made a police report" and that he was "not here to arrest anybody or get anybody in trouble, but just want to get [L.V.]'s side as to what happened." L.V. told Officer Hoff that the fight happened because she had heard that H.F.C. had been talking about her mother.
Toward the end of the interview, Officer Hoff asked L.V. her age and she responded that she was 12. Officer Hoff asked L.V. whether she knew the difference between right and wrong, and L.V. nodded. Officer Hoff then asked, "Is it wrong to steal?" while documents he was holding obscured L.V.'s face from the camera. He followed up with "It's not wrong to steal?" to which L.V. responded "Yeah." Officer Hoff then asked "Do you know it's wrong to fight somebody—unless it's self-defense" while documents in his hands again obscured L.V.'s face. Officer Hoff later testified that L.V. nodded in response to the question.
On July 31, the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleging that L.V. had committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (a)).
On January 10, 2019, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held, at which H.F.C. and Officer Hoff were the only witnesses. The video of the incident was admitted into evidence.
When the prosecution sought to introduce the video from Officer Hoff's body camera, L.V.'s counsel objected on the ground that L.V. was not given a Miranda warning before the interview began. After reviewing the video, the juvenile court overruled the objection and admitted the video into evidence.
We have reviewed both the video of the incident and the video from Officer Hoff's body camera.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true.
At the dispositional hearing held February 14, the juvenile court declared L.V. a ward of the court with no termination date and placed her on home supervision for 45 days. The court also imposed various probation conditions, including a condition permitting her probation officer to search her electronic devices.
L.V. timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. L.V. Was Not in Custody Under Miranda
"[A]n officer's obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only when there has been such a restriction of freedom of movement as to render the suspect 'in custody.' (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.) This determination is based on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. (Ibid.) Two inquiries are essential to this determination: first, what are the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112.)" (In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 530-531.)
"Although no one factor is controlling, the following circumstances should be considered: '(1) [W]hether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.' (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the suspect's freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were 'aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,' whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview. ([People v.] Aguilera [(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151,] 1162.)" (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404.)
"In juvenile cases, the same factors still apply, but with an added consideration. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261 (J.D.B.), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a child's age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, 'so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.' (Id. at p. 277.) The court recognized that, 'a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.' (Id. at p. 272; see also Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 599 [in the context of police interrogation, events '[t]hat would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens'].) Although age may not be a significant factor in every case, the court observed, common sense dictates that 'children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.' (J.D.B., supra, at pp. 262 & 274.) Accordingly, the court concluded that 'a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.' (Id. at p. 265.)" (In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 760.)
"On review of a trial court's decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court's determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586.)" (In re Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.)
Before hearing argument on the Miranda issue, the juvenile court described the video from Officer Hoff's body camera as follows:
"I have watched the body cam footage. I pretty much watched the entirety of the footage, which I felt was appropriate to do to get the full context of the nature of the discussion that the Officer had with [L.V.], and sort of also with the father, who was present for basically 90 percent of the discussion that they had.
"So I'm going to give my input of my review of what the video showed, and then, of course, I'm going to leave room for argument for Counsel.
"Officer Hoff approached the home and spoke to someone through the screen. It's not clear who it was. I think it was a brother. He did enter the home in a very calm manner. In fact, when he entered the home there were several people that looked like in what I will call the entertainment-room area. They were watching some type of a game. Looked like maybe a basketball game.
"He asked where [L.V.] is. He inquired what the score is. He could not have been more pleasant with the residence [sic] of the apartment. I never got the impression that he barged in and had any aggressive comments. There were none.
"He does see [L.V.], who is in the kitchen. It looks like she may be at the sink. I don't know if she is washing dishes or what. He talks in a very calm demeanor and in very normal speech pattern addresses [L.V.] and indicates to her that—well, he actually asks her, you know, if she has any idea why he might be there. She says, Yes, because of the fight. Then almost very shortly after that the father comes in and he engages the father, that is Officer Hoff, and the father says—Oh, and at the time I should say Officer Hoff says something to the extent of, um, I would like to get the full side of the story, or, your side of the story. He does say he's not there to get anyone in trouble and indicates that a report was made of something that occurred, but the father actually expresses that he's happy to be able to have the second or their side of the story presented.
"[L.V.] pretty shortly after the encounter or shortly after Officer Hoff starts talking does sit at the kitchen table. She looks comfortable. They chat. He indicates, you know, that he again, wants to get her side of the story.
"The father is present throughout the rest of the interview, and at some point a gentleman whom I don't know who it is but another adult male is in the kitchen. He comes towards the end.
"[L.V.] seems to be at ease and comfortable and even towards the end asks a question on her own and asks if he can assist her in changing schools.
"The father never seems to have any issue with Officer Hoff being, well, talking to them. And again, it's clear he is supportive of her giving her side of the story. And in fact, when she starts to do it the father brings up further information about a potential previous fight.
"There is to me nothing custodial about this interview or interrogation at all. It seems, honestly, like a relatively free-flowing conversation, and I do believe that the Officer, having been an officer for twenty years, shows that he's experienced, and not just that but that's [sic] he's comfortable and very good at talking to kids. I have to say, his demeanor was impeccable. He comments to her about maybe having some anger control issues. He gets from the dad that she's been talking to a therapist. He talks to her about her grades, suggests that her friends may have set her up for this. Um, I'm just giving examples of how he is truly engaging with her at her level and is even giving her advice.
"He talks about the Parent Project program. Again, the father is fully engaged and I was impressed by his ability in speaking to not just [L.V.] but the other family members in a way that was respectful and calm.
"At one point one gentleman asked if he—I can't hear exactly what he's offering him, but the father offers something as well and the Officer says, No, someone, you know, just offered that to me. The whole tenor of this interaction is, it's very—I would just say it's very peaceful and calm and honestly somewhat congenial. Maybe a little bit too far, because it's obviously a discussion about something that happened, but the total tenor is one that leaves you thinking that this was not an intrusion into the home and a welcome ability to discuss all that occurred.
"So that was how I viewed the video. I don't think there will be much dispute about sort of what it presents as far as the entirety of the video, but I have to say that the Officer's demeanor was stellar.
"So those are—I just wanted to give the information that I saw. I took a couple of notes. I think I stated everything. But other than also giving some referrals, he also gave his card with the resources, and distinctly says, I don't know what's going to come of this. He says something to the effect that it's up to probation to figure if they want to take this any further, but he makes no promises about, or any threats about what might occur. He's just stating it as it is, gives his card, number, and even to the extent of saying he's going to be out of the office a few days and he'll be back I think on that Thursday. That basically summarizes the footage."
After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court concluded that L.V. was not in custody during the interview for the purposes of Miranda.
We agree with the juvenile court that considering the circumstances of the interview, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. (See In re Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.) L.V. was not formally arrested, before or after the interview took place. The interview was conducted by only one officer, with whom L.V. was familiar from previous contacts at school. The interview was brief, lasting less than 15 minutes, and took place in L.V.'s home, with her father present for most of it. And as the trial court found and as L.V. does not dispute, the tone of the interview was calm, peaceful, and "honestly somewhat congenial." (See People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-1404.)
Although Officer Hoff did not inform L.V. that she was a suspect, such a warning would have been unnecessary given that the incident was on video and posted to social media. In addition, the interview began with Officer Hoff asking "So, do you know why I'm here?" L.V. then nodded in response, Officer Hoff asked "Why?", and L.V. responded—"Because I fought."
In arguing that the circumstances amounted to a custodial interrogation, L.V. notes that her age, race, and gender were relevant. She also asserts that Officer Hoff "directed" her to sit at the kitchen table at the beginning of the interview—an assertion not borne out by the video of the interview. And she points out that she avoided eye contact with Officer Hoff at certain points in the interview, "suggest[ing] her deference and/or discomfort." While some of these factors arguably suggest a custodial interrogation, they do not outweigh the totality of the circumstances tending in the other direction as just discussed.
L.V. also suggests that the presence of her father during the interview may have "combin[ed] with police authority to produce a coercive atmosphere," citing In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th 735. But In re I.F. explained that when a parent has a "conflict of interest" (e.g., is the victim of the crime, or is himself or herself a suspect), this is one factor to be considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an interrogation was custodial. (Id. at pp. 760-766.) There is no evidence that L.V.'s father had any such conflict here, and as detailed above, considering the totality of the circumstances establishes that there was no custodial interrogation. II. The Juvenile Court's Finding That L.V. Understood the Wrongfulness of her Conduct Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
In a single paragraph in her opening brief, L.V. also argues that her statements were involuntary "[f]or the reasons cited earlier in the Miranda argument." For all the reasons just given, we reject this argument as well. (See In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 208-209 ["In deciding if a defendant's will was overborne, courts examine 'all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.' [Citations.]"].) --------
Under Penal Code section 26, there is a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime, "in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." To overcome the presumption, the prosecution must prove by "clear and convincing evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed." (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232.)
"On appeal, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the trial court's findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by 'substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.]' [Citations.] The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor's guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.) This standard of review applies with equal force to claims that the evidence does not support the determination that a minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. (In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 52.)
"In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence such as the minor's age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense, including its method of commission and concealment. [Citations.] Generally, the older a child gets and the closer he approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the wrongfulness of his acts. [Citations.]" (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872-873.)
In finding that L.V. appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct, the juvenile court relied on the body camera video in which L.V. told Officer Hoff that stealing is wrong and fighting is wrong, and Officer Hoff's testimony about that exchange.
In particular, Officer Hoff testified that:
"Q. When you asked about, do you think it's wrong to get into a fight, or—I don't want to put words into how. What did you actually say to her about fighting?
"A. Do you think it's wrong or do you know it's wrong to fight?
"Q. And did she verbally answer out loud?
"A. I don't recall that she verbally or just a nod.
"Q. And you started talking about self-defense at that point, right?
"A. I think I said unless it's in self-defense, or something to that effect.
"Q. So was there any hesitation on her part or why did you bring up the whole self-defense?
"A. I guess there could be a justification to fight at some point.
"Q. But do you know what she had said that caused you to bring up the self-defense part? Did she say anything?
"A. I don't think she did.
"Q. You think she nodded, though?
"A. Yes."
In her brief, L.V. concedes that "there was evidence that [she] generally knew fighting was wrong," but hypothesizes that she may have "broadly construed self-defense to include defending the integrity of her mother." But there is no support for this theory in the record. And the body camera footage together with Officer Hoff's testimony is substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court's conclusion that L.V. understood the wrongfulness of her conduct.
III. The Electronic Search Condition Must Be Stricken
At the dispositional hearing, as one of the conditions of L.V.'s probation the juvenile court imposed the following condition:
"I am ordering that you submit your cellphone and any other electronic device under your control to a search of any medium of communication, reasonably likely to reveal whether you are complying with the terms of your probation, with or without a search warrant at any time of the day or night.
"Such medium of communication includes text messages, voice-mail messages, call logs, photographs, email accounts and other social media accounts and applications such as Snapchat, Instagram, Facebook and Kik. You shall provide access codes to the probation officer or any other peace officer upon request to effectuate such search."
L.V.'s counsel objected to the electronic search condition, arguing it had no relationship to the offense. The juvenile court rejected this argument, finding that the condition was necessary to ensure that L.V. was complying with the terms of her probation.
L.V. argues that this condition is invalid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, because it is not "reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality" (id. at p. 486), under our Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). In Ricardo P., the minor admitted allegations that he had committed two burglaries, and the juvenile court imposed an electronic search condition very similar to the one at issue here, for the purpose of determining whether the minor was complying with various drug-related conditions of his probation. (Id. at pp. 1116-1117.) Because the record contained no indication that the minor had used or would use electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity, our Supreme Court held that that the electronic search condition was invalid under Lent, concluding that the burden it imposed on his privacy was "substantially disproportionate to the condition's goal of monitoring and deterring drug use." (Ricardo P., at p. 1120.)
L.V. argues that the electronic search condition should be modified under Ricardo P. so that searches are for the limited purpose of enabling probation to "deter and detect further fighting with her peers." The Attorney General concedes that narrowing of the electronic search condition is appropriate.
We agree that the electronic search condition is overbroad under In re Ricardo P. Indeed, we recently struck an identical condition in a similar case involving an assault, a video of which was posted to social media. (See In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 565-567 [finding identical electronic search condition invalid under Lent where minor committed assault that was filmed by fellow students and posted to Snapchat but minor's only use of social media related to the assault was posting about it after it took place].) Accordingly, we will strike the electronic search condition and remand for the juvenile court to consider whether to impose a narrowed condition. (See In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168.)
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed, except that the electronic search condition is stricken. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether to impose a revised condition consistent with this opinion.
/s/_________
Richman, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.