Opinion
No. 2013NY012953.
02-05-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Christopher LOUIS, Defendant.
Victoria Meyer, Esq., District Attorney's Office, New York. Jess M. Berkowitz, Esq., New York.
Victoria Meyer, Esq., District Attorney's Office, New York.
Jess M. Berkowitz, Esq., New York.
Opinion
LISA A. SOKOLOFF, J.
On May 15, 2013, the defendant, Christopher Louis, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law [PL] § 120.00 [1 ] ), a Class A misdemeanor, reduced from a Class D felony, in return for a non-incarceratory sentence of three years' probation and completion of a batterer's program and an alcohol treatment program.
Defendant now moves pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 220.60(3) to withdraw his plea on the grounds that he felt pressured to take what was offered to him and was induced to enter the guilty plea even though he had no consciousness of guilt. He further contends that he had minimal communication with his assigned counsel, who did not explain the terms and consequences of the plea offer or other available options.
The People assert that their offer was communicated not only to defendant's attorney, but to defendant's friend and colleague as well as to defendant's brother, who is also an attorney; that the offer did not change over several months and that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pleaded guilty to a reduced charge in exchange for a lenient sentence as evidenced by the transcript of the plea allocution.
For the following reasons, defendant's motion is denied.
CPL § 220.60(3) authorizes the Court, in its discretion, to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty prior to sentencing and provides that the entire indictment, as it existed at the time of the plea, be restored (see People v. Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d 445 [2001] ).
Although CPL 220.60 applies to indictments, CPL 340.20, which governs pleas in local criminal courts, expressly renders the provisions of Article 220 applicable to pleas to informations. Consequently, this Court in its discretion may allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, as a sentence has not yet been imposed.
As a procedural matter, defendant's application is brought solely by affirmation of his motion counsel who does not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the plea agreement, as he did not represent defendant at the time. As such, the affirmation is unavailing as any factual assertion not based upon personal knowledge is without evidentiary value (see James v. Hoffman, 158 A.D.2d 398, 551 N.Y.S.2d 519 [1st Dept 1990] ; Johannsen v. Rudolph, 34 A.D.3d 338, 824 N.Y.S.2d 276 [1st Dept 2006] ; People v. Williams, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op 52437[U] [Justice Ct, Dutchess County 2012] ; CPL 60.21).
Yet even if the motion had been brought upon defendant's affidavit, it is otherwise fatally deficient. The defendant merely offered generalized, conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations to the effect that his plea counsel had coerced him into accepting the plea agreement without properly advising him of the consequences. The submission included neither an affidavit from plea counsel nor an explanation for its omission.
Most people would readily recognize that any defendant entering into a negotiated plea is under emotional pressure (see People v. Collazo, 11 Misc.3d 1052(A) [County Court, Suffolk County 2006 ] ). However, there must be more than bare unsubstantiated protestations of innocence or conclusory or self-serving allegations of “pressure” or coercion to justify withdrawal of the plea (People v. Torrence, 7 A.D.3d 444, 776 N.Y.S.2d 799 [1st Dept 2004] ; People v. Gaskin, 2 A.D.3d 347, 768 N.Y.S.2d 817 [1st Dept 2003] ; People v. Telfair, 299 A.D.2d 429, 749 N.Y.S.2d 436 [2nd Dept 2002] ). Indeed, the court has no reason to believe that the allegedly coercive conduct amounted to anything more than sound advice to accept the favorable plea offer (Torrence at 444, 776 N.Y.S.2d 799 ).
The Supreme Court has specifically enumerated that among the rights waived by a defendant who pleads guilty are the constitutional rights to a jury trial, confrontation by his accusors, and the privilege against self-incrimination (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969] ).
In Boykin, the Court stated that a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant “since a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction” (Boykin at 242).
In moving to withdraw a plea, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his plea of guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered (People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536 [1993] ; People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9 [1983] ). In deciding a CPL § 220.60(3) motion, it is well settled that trial judges are vested with discretion because they are best able to determine whether a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently (People v. Alexander 97 N.Y.2d 482 [2002] ). A motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be granted merely for the asking, for ... a guilty plea generally “marks the end of a criminal case [and is] not a gateway to further litigation” (Alexander at 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 ), citing People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5 [1985] ). The interest of finality requires no less (People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520 [1978] ).
This Court must now determine, consistent with Boykin, whether there was an affirmative showing that defendant voluntarily entered a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty. Having reviewed defense counsel's motion, the People's response and the official stenographic transcript of the minutes of the plea proceeding, the Court finds that nothing in the record before this court supports defendant's claim of coercion or innocence.
In the colloquy on the plea, the defendant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, that no one was forcing him to take the plea and that he was waiving his right to trial by jury, to remain silent, to have his attorney call witnesses on his behalf, to cross-examine witnesses called against him and to have the prosecution prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's explicit waiver of his constitutional rights requisite to taking the plea was sufficient to ensure that the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (People v. Caruso, 88 A.D.3d 809, 930 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2nd Dept 2011) ; People v. Fiallo, 6 A.D.3d 176, 777 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dept 2004) ; People v. Garcia, 216 A.D.2d 36, 627 N.Y.S.2d 666 [1st Dept 1995] ).
Moreover, the defendant's self-serving claims of innocence are belied by the record. The plea colloquy revealed that defendant knowingly and voluntarily admitted the factual allegations of the crime, including that he struck the complainant in the face with a closed fist. The Court is entitled to rely on the plea colloquy in determining the sufficiency of defendant's waiver (People v. Martinez, 289 A.D.2d 70, 733 N.Y.S.2d 867 [1st Dept 2001], lv. denied 97 N.Y.2d 757, 742 N.Y.S.2d 618, 769 N.E.2d 364 (2002] ).
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the defendant's application is without merit. Defendant made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights when he agreed to the plea agreement in exchange for a lenient sentence to a reduced charge. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.?