Opinion
January 16, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Rothwax, J.).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, defendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine under the statutory presumption of Penal Law § 220.25 (2). The charge on reasonable doubt, constructive possession, and the statutory presumption of possession gave the jury the proper standard with which to evaluate the evidence. Failure to provide a "moral certainty" charge was not reversible error (People v. Gonzalez, 54 N.Y.2d 729; People v. Pratt, 153 A.D.2d 867 [2d Dept 1989]). Defendant's challenge to cross-examination of himself was not preserved, as a matter of law, by specific objection (CPL 470.05). We decline to review in the interest of justice. Police expert testimony which established the element of intent to sell (Penal Law § 220.25) was not error, and it cannot be said that the court abused its discretionary control over cross-examination as a matter of law (see, People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 80, cert denied 442 U.S. 910). Finally, defendant was not, on the record before us, so deprived of meaningful representation as to have been denied effective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v. De La Hoz, 131 A.D.2d 154 [1st Dept 1987]). It would be more appropriate for the defendant to pursue the relief afforded by CPL 440.10, if he be so advised.
Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Ross, Milonas, Rosenberger and Ellerin, JJ.