Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCN216738, Marguerite L. Wagner, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Alberto Zavala Lopez entered negotiated guilty pleas to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)(1)), making a terrorist threat (§ 422), attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Lopez also admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) with respect to the attempted murder count and personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in connection with the attempted murder, corporal injury to a spouse and making a terrorist threat counts. Under the plea bargain, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the balance of the charges and allegations—including an allegation that the attempted murder was premeditated—stipulate to a 20-year prison term, and not file a residential burglary charge against Lopez.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Subsequently, Lopez filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas alleging his attorney pressured him to plead guilty by threatening to abandon him if he did not do so and by falsely telling him that his mother wanted him to accept the prosecution's offer. The trial court denied Lopez's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
The court sentenced Lopez to a 20-year prison term in accordance with the plea bargain. The court granted Lopez's request for a certificate of probable cause.
Lopez appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
FACTS
Lopez's former wife, Kara, moved to Denver with their two children after their divorce. In the summer of 2006 Kara and the children returned to the San Diego area and were living with Kara's sister in Escondido. On August 23 Lopez and a male friend went to the sister's residence. Lopez, who smelled of alcohol, accused Kara of taking the children and punched her in the face with a closed fist. As Kara ran toward her sister's bedroom she felt herself being struck from behind.
Kara's sister saw Lopez chasing Kara, punching her in the back of the head and holding a metallic object in his fist to stab Kara. The sister tried to protect Kara and Lopez punched her. Lopez told the sister to move out of the way because he did not want to stab her. The sister picked up her cell phone to call for help, but Lopez told her not to call the police, threatening to kill Kara if the police were called. Lopez continued to stab Kara while he said: "I'm going to kill that bitch. She ain't tak[ing] my kids from me. I'll fucking kill her first. Hurry up and fucking die, bitch."
Lopez's friend came inside, grabbed Lopez by the shoulders and directed Lopez to leave the house.
As Lopez and his friend drove away Lopez threw a pair of scissors out of the window. Police arrested Lopez as he was trying to escape on foot; he had exited the vehicle at a stoplight.
Kara sustained several stab wounds to her right arm and right shoulder and light cuts to the back of her neck. At the hospital she received staples to her right hand and lower right arm, staples and stitches to her right arm below her shoulder, and stitches to the back of her neck and head.
DISCUSSION
Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without considering his allegations that his counsel had induced him to plead guilty with misrepresentation and undue pressure. The contention is without merit.
Factual Background
During the initial sentencing hearing, Lopez indicated he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas. In a subsequent letter to the court, Lopez wrote: "My previous attorney led me to believe that I was signing for 20 years with no strike. Now I want to take my plea[] bargain back because I strongly believe I was misrepresented."
On the change of plea form, Lopez initialed the box next to the following statement: "I understand that my conviction in this case will be a serious/violent felony ('strike') resulting in mandatory denial of probation and substantially increased penalties in any future felony case."
The court appointed new counsel for Lopez, who filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Lopez's accompanying declaration stated in pertinent part:
"1. I wanted to know what my family felt I should do regarding a plea to any charges. I have always followed their advice and guidance on serious matters. I was advised by my attorney Mr. [Raymond] Wood that my mother told him to relay to me to take the deal and to plea[d].
"2. My attorney, Mr. Wood, came to me on seven different occasion[s] and threaten that if I didn't take the offer and plea, he would quit the case and leave me to fen[d] for myself.
"Based on the above, I was confused about what to do and although I didn't want to really take the deal and plea, I felt I had no choice. At the time of the sentencing on December 15, 2006 I wanted to talk to Mr. Wood because I realized what happened and didn't want to go forward with the sentencing.
"Instead of listening to me, Mr. Wood told me to pray to God for help."
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw Lopez's guilty pleas, he reiterated the points raised in his declaration and also testified that Attorney Wood told him to sign and initial the change of plea form without explaining what the document meant. Lopez said he did not read the form and did not understand any of the discussion he had with the court when he entered his guilty pleas; his attorney signaled to him to answer yes to the court's questions. Lopez also said that he was confused when Attorney Wood told him that his mother wanted him to accept the prosecution's offer because his mother had told him the previous day that she did not want him to do so.
Francisca Keyes, Lopez's mother, testified that she did not tell Attorney Wood what she felt her son should do with respect to the prosecution's offer. Keyes also testified that she did not tell Lopez to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.
In his testimony, Attorney Wood said he went over the change of plea form line by line with Lopez. Attorney Wood denied telling Lopez what to say during the change of plea colloquy with the court. Attorney Wood denied threatening to quit the case and telling Lopez he would have to fend for himself if he did not accept the prosecution's offer. Attorney Wood also denied telling Lopez: "Only God can help you now." As to Lopez's mother, Attorney Wood testified that he kept her informed and showed her the photographs of the injured victim; it was at that point that the mother said "she thought it was in [her son's] best interest to take the deal."
In denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, the court emphasized that it recalled the change of plea hearing and was convinced at the time that Lopez entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily, noting that although Lopez had limited education, he was streetwise and had a lot of experience in the criminal justice system. The court also emphasized that it questioned Lopez's credibility.
Legal Principles
Section 1018 permits the trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of good cause. To establish good cause, a defendant must show that he or she entered the plea as a result of mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, inadvertence, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his or her free judgment. (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) A plea may not be withdrawn merely because the defendant changed his or her mind. (Ibid.)
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea is the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 146.) An appellant must clearly demonstrate the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or not supported by the facts. (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 796-797.) When assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must adopt the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) When conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, we must adopt the inference supporting the challenged order. (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 104.) Moreover, when guilty pleas result from bargaining, such pleas should not be set aside lightly and finality of court proceedings should be encouraged. (Id. at p. 103.)
Analysis
Credibility is for the trial court to resolve. We defer to the trial court on the issue of witness credibility. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 [" 'it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness' "].) Moreover, the trial court is "not bound to give full credence to the statements in defendant's affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty . . . because of defendant's obvious interest in the outcome of the proceeding." (People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 549, 553.)
Here, the court was not compelled to accept Lopez's testimony that he had not read or understood the change of plea form, had signed the form only because Attorney Wood told him to, had no idea what he was doing when he pled guilty to the various charges, and did not understand any part of the proceedings. The court reasonably could have credited Lopez's statements at the time of the entry of his plea that he had read, reviewed, and discussed the plea form with his attorney, had no questions about the plea form or the pleas, had not been threatened by anyone to plead guilty and was pleading guilty voluntarily for the sole reason that he was guilty. Similarly, the court was not compelled to accept Lopez's testimony that he did not understand what the judge and lawyers were discussing and telling him at the change of plea hearing. Lopez claimed that his lack of understanding stemmed from his limited education, which precluded him from understanding the big words that judges and lawyers use. However, the court, which distinctly remembered taking the guilty pleas in Lopez's case, reasonably could have rejected this testimony because Lopez was streetwise and had ample experience in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Moreover, in determining Lopez's credibility, the court reasonably could have taken into account that Lopez's original reason for wanting to withdraw his guilty pleas—attorney Wood's failure to inform him there would be a prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction on his record—was not mentioned in his withdrawal motion or in his testimony.
After considering all the testimony presented, the trial court found that Attorney Wood did not coerce Lopez to plead guilty by threatening abandonment and did not misrepresent the wishes of Lopez's mother. Attorney Wood's testimony, which the trial court found to be more credible than Lopez's testimony to the contrary, supports this finding. Where two conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, we must adopt the inference supporting the challenged order. (People v. Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 104.) Moreover, when reviewing the record, we cannot reweigh the trial court's credibility determinations. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE, J., AARON, J.