Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR527182
Siggins, J.
Appellant Obadiah Dartagnan Lomalynda was convicted of battery on a custodial officer. Lomalynda timely appeals and contends there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the victim was a custodial officer within the meaning of Penal Code sections 243.1 and 831. Because there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to so find beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In light of our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the judgment, we do not consider whether Lomalynda through his conduct at trial conceded that the victim was a custodial officer. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504-505.)
BACKGROUND
Lomalynda was being held on a parole violation at the Sonoma County jail when he was involved in an altercation with Officer Jason Esquibel who was on duty at the time. Officer Esquibel ordered Lomalynda to place his hands through the food port of his cell so Esquibel could handcuff him. Lomalynda pulled away and Officer Esquibel’s hand became trapped in the chain of the handcuffs and pinched against the lock of the food port. Officer Esquibel was injured.
Lomalynda was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (aggravated assault) upon a custodial officer pursuant to section 245.3 and with use of force and violence (battery) upon a custodial officer pursuant to section 243.1. Each count was enhanced by an allegation that Lomalynda inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). It was also alleged that Lomalynda committed the offenses while on parole from state prison within the meaning of section 1203.085, subdivision (b). He waived a jury and the case was tried to the court.
The trial court convicted Lomalynda of battery on a custodial officer and acquitted him of the aggravated assault charge. The court found that Lomalynda inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and that he was on parole at the time of the incident within the meaning of section 1203.085, subdivision (b). Lomalynda timely appeals. He contends that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Officer Esquibel was a custodial officer within the meaning of sections 243.1 and 831.
DISCUSSION
I. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
Under the due process clause of both the United States and California Constitutions, in a criminal trial, the government carries the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged crime. (People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 479-480; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 19.) This is so even if the defendant does not challenge an element. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 69-70; People v. Flood, supra, at pp. 482, fn. 7, 515 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Therefore, it is the prosecution’s burden to produce substantial evidence for each element of its case-in-chief and to persuade the trier of fact that it has proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Olmstead (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 270, 277; People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 139.)
We review the whole record for substantial evidence in support of the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) Substantial evidence is evidence that reasonably inspires confidence, and is of solid value. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 756.) We do not reweigh conflicting evidence or pass judgment on credibility. (People v. Maury, supra, at p. 403.) We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and make every factual inference supported by the evidence in favor of the judgment. (Ibid.) Therefore, we will uphold the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have reached the same result beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 576; People v. Maury, supra, at p. 403.) We will reverse if no rational trier of fact could have reached the verdict from the available evidence.
II. There Was sufficient Evidence to Find that Lomalynda Committed Battery on a Custodial Officer
The elements of an offense under section 243.1 are: (1) a battery; (2) committed against the person of a custodial officer as defined in section 831; (3) where the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know such a victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance of his duties; and (4) such custodial officer is engaged in the performance of his duties. (People v. Garcia (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 887, 894.)
The only issue Lomalynda raises in this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to have found that Officer Esquibel was a custodial officer within the meaning of section 831. Under section 831, subdivision (a): “A custodial officer is a public officer, not a peace officer, employed by a law enforcement agency of a city or county who has the authority and responsibility for maintaining custody of prisoners and performs tasks related to the operation of a local detention facility used for the detention of persons usually pending arraignment or upon court order either for their own safekeeping or for the specific purpose of serving a sentence therein.”
Lomalynda argues that only speculation could support the trial court’s finding that Officer Esquibel was a custodial officer under section 831. We shall therefore examine the evidence of each element of section 831 that could support the trial court’s finding.
At trial, Officer Esquibel testified that he was employed by Sonoma County as a correctional deputy at the main adult detention facility. His responsibilities were primarily to provide for the care, custody, and control of inmates to ensure their safety and the safety of staff. He was working as a corrections officer on the date of the altercation. Officer Esquibel testified that he wore the same dark green uniform and cloth badge as other officers in the unit, and the badge on his uniform indicated that he was a corrections officer. Other deputies working with Officer Esquibel identified their employer as the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department and the Sonoma County jail. Officer Esquibel was working in the administrative segregation, or “male special unit,” of the jail on the day of the incident involving Lomalynda.
Based on Officer Esquibel’s testimony, the trial court properly found that he was a “public officer” within the meaning of section 831. (People v. Garcia, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 894-895.) He was employed by Sonoma County as a correctional deputy. His testimony, when considered along with the testimony of the other officers, also supports an inference that Officer Esquibel worked for the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department, a local law enforcement agency. (Id. at p. 896.) Further, Government Code section 26605 provides that the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department must be “the sole and exclusive authority to keep the county jails and the prisoners in it.” Thus, the court could readily conclude that Officer Esquibel was employed as a public officer by the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department.
Lomalynda concedes that Officer Esquibel was either a peace officer or a custodial officer. He says the fatal error in this case is the absence of evidence indicating which of the two was Esquibel’s proper status.
Section 830 et seq. lay out the duties and functions of “peace officers” and exclusively defines them. “[N]o person other than those designated in this chapter is a peace officer.” (§ 830; People v. Garcia, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 894-895.) Section 830.55 provides that a correctional officer may be a “peace officer” if the local government authority for which he works is under contract to the state pursuant to section 2910.5 to detain parole violators and other state inmates in a detention facility that is specially designed and built for the incarceration of parole violators and other specified state prison inmates.
Lomalynda argues that since he was a parole violator and Officer Esquibel had authority over him, Officer Esquibel could have been a peace officer under section 830.55 and thus not a custodial officer. But there is no evidence that Officer Esquibel was working, or that Lomalynda was detained, in a specialized facility designed and constructed for parole violators and other state prison inmates and run by the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department under contract to the state as required under sections 830.55 and 2910.5. We will not require the prosecutor, especially in the absence of a challenge by the defendant, to establish that a county jail is not such a specialized facility. The prosecutor was required to prove what the facility was, and not what it was not. The testimony that established the altercation occurred in part of the Sonoma County jail was sufficient. There is no factual basis in the record from which the court could conclude that Officer Esquibel was a peace officer because he was working in a specialized facility described in section 830.55, rather than a custodial officer.
Officer Esquibel testified that Sonoma County employed him as a correctional deputy at the main adult detention facility. Another officer testified that he was a deputy corrections officer with the Sonoma County jail, and that he was working in the “male special unit” when the incident occurred. Lomalynda contends that there was no proof that the main adult detention facility is the type of facility described in section 831. But the trial court had ample basis to infer that the main adult detention facility was part of the Sonoma County jail. The trial court could also have inferred that the Sonoma County jail was like any ordinary county jail and in the usual course of business, it detained persons awaiting arraignment or detained persons sentenced by a court. (See, e.g., People v. Garcia, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 890, 894-896.)
Lomalynda also seems to assert that to work for a local law enforcement agency, Officer Esquibel must have had the power to arrest pursuant to a warrant and that there was no evidence that he had such a power. In making this argument, Lomalynda misreads Garcia. In Garcia, the court upheld a trial court’s finding that a public officer who had some power to arrest pursuant to a warrant worked for a local law enforcement agency and was a custodial officer. (People v. Garcia, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 894-898.) But the defendants in Garcia brought the challenge specifically because the officer did not work for a sheriff’s office but instead worked for a county department of corrections answerable directly to the county board of supervisors. (People v. Garcia, supra, at p. 893.) If the officer had worked for the county sheriff, he undoubtedly would have worked for a local law enforcement agency. (Id. at pp. 895-896.) The Garcia court held that the officer worked for a local law enforcement agency because the county department of corrections that employed him had the same authority as a county sheriff. (Id. at p. 896.) As we have discussed, there is substantial evidence that Officer Esquibel worked for the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department.
The defendants in Garcia argued that a public officer, in order to be deemed a custodial officer, needed greater powers to arrest and investigate crime than those powers incidental to supervising prisoners. (People v. Garcia, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 895.) The court rejected the argument because it conflicted with the language in section 831, subdivision (f).
Officer Esquibel testified that his responsibilities were primarily to provide for the care, custody, and control of inmates to ensure their safety and the safety of staff. He thus had the authority and responsibility for maintaining the custody of prisoners and performed tasks related to the operation of the Sonoma County jail.
There was substantial evidence to support each element of section 831 defining a custodial officer, and the trial court could permissibly find beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Esquibel was a custodial officer within the meaning of sections 243.1 and 831.
DISPOSITION
We find no error. The judgment is affirmed.
We concur, McGuiness, P.J., Jenkins, J.