Opinion
13-221109
02-14-2014
People of the State of New York v. Edward Leisenfelder, Defendant.
P. David Soares, Esq. Matthew A. Toporowski, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Albany County District Attorney Albany City Court - Criminal Part David P. Marinucci, Esq. Attorney for Defendant
P. David Soares, Esq.
Matthew A. Toporowski, Esq.
Assistant District Attorney
Albany County District Attorney
Albany City Court - Criminal Part
David P. Marinucci, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
, J.
Defendant, Edward Leisenfelder, is charged with driving while intoxicated, an unclassified misdemeanor, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(3); driving while intoxicated (per se), an unclassified misdemeanor, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(2); improper signal, a traffic infraction, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1163(d); and no seat belt, a traffic infraction, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1229-c(3). Pursuant to a decision of the court, a Huntley/Dunaway/Mapp hearing was held on January 30, 2014. The matter now comes before the Court for a decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the hearing, Officer Michael Geraci testified for the People. Additionally, the Court viewed a video taken from Officer Geraci's vehicle which showed Officer Geraci's view of defendant's vehicle prior to the stop of defendant's vehicle. The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence presented at the hearing.
On the night of March 24, 2013, Officer Geraci was working the 8pm-4am shift on patrol in the City of Albany. Toward the end of his shift, at around 3:17 am, he noticed a dark SUV exiting a parking lot on Broadway near Pleasant Street in Albany. As the vehicle exited the parking lot, turning slightly left on Broadway, it crossed Broadway at a diagonal and drove onto Pleasant Street. Officer Geraci noted that the driver (the defendant) failed to use his turn signal while exiting the parking lot onto Broadway (while Officer Geraci also stated that defendant failed to signal his turn onto Pleasant Street from Broadway, this Court has determined from viewing the video and examining all evidence that Officer Geraci could not tell from his vantage point whether defendant signaled this right hand turn, and that, in any event, no signal was required of defendant to make such "turn"). Officer Geraci followed the driver a very short distance, as the driver pulled over and parked after driving just a few feet onto Pleasant Street . Officer Geraci then turned on his lights and exited his vehicle, planning to give the driver a ticket for not using his signal as he exited the parking lot. Officer Geraci approached the driver, asking for his license and registration. He noted, as he approached the vehicle to speak with the driver, that the driver was not wearing his seat belt.
Officer Geraci noted an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle and from defendant. Officer Geraci noted that, at the time of the stop, the defendant's eyes were glassy and, when answering questions, defendant's speech was slightly slurred. Defendant stated that he had 4-5 drinks that evening. Officer Geraci asked defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant used the door for support as he exited the vehicle. Officer Geraci then administered three field sobriety tests to defendant. Officer Geraci testified that defendant "failed" all three tests (the HGN, the walk and turn, and the one-legged stand). It was the opinion of Officer Geraci that defendant was intoxicated. Defendant was then arrested by Officer Geraci.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
With respect to the Huntley portion of the hearing, the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965). The involuntariness of an inculpatory statement should be evaluated by looking at the "totality of the circumstances" under which it came about. People v. Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 (1977). In order to determine the issue of suppression, the element of custody must first be established. The test used to determine whether a person is in custody is what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had she been in the defendant's position. People v. Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 (1969); People v. Norton, 135 AD2d 984 (3d Dept, 1987). It is well established that both elements of custody and interrogation must be present before Miranda warnings are constitutionally required. People v. Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 (1976). The People have met their burden with respect to the Huntley portion of the hearing. The motion to suppress statements is hereby denied.
In order to determine the existence of probable cause, the Court must determine whether or not, viewing the facts and circumstances as they appeared at the time of the arrest, a reasonable person in the position of the police officer could have concluded that the motorist operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. People v. Phraner, 151 Misc 2d 961 (Dist Ct Suffolk Co, 1991). Accordingly, in order to establish the legality of an arrest pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192, the officer must have had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192. People v. Hilker, 133 AD2d 986 (3d Dept, 1987). A police officer may effectuate an arrest for an offense without a warrant if he has reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed that offense in his presence. CPL 140.10(1)(a). Reasonable cause means probable cause. People v. Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631,635 (1995), citing People v. Johnson, 66 NY2d 398 (1985).
The People must also establish reasonable cause for the initial stop of the vehicle. However, all that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. People v. Osborne, 158 AD2d 740 (3d Dept, 1990). It is enough if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Id.
Officer Geraci stopped defendant's vehicle because defendant failed to use his turn signal while exiting the parking lot onto Broadway. It is well settled law that VTL §1163 does not (nor does any other NYS law) require that a motorist use his directional signal when exiting a parking lot. VTL §1163; Byer v. Jackson, 241 AD2d 943 (4th Dept 1997); People v. Mazzola, 12 Misc 3d 1165(A) (Suffolk Cnty Dist Ct 2006); See, People v. Miller, 39 Misc 3d 782 (Yates Cnty Ct 2013); People v. Silvers, 195 Misc 2d 739 (Mt Vernon City Ct 2003).When, as in this case, an officer makes a mistake of law when initiating a traffic stop, "any further actions by the police as a direct result of the stop are illegal" (Byer v. Jackson, 241 AD2d at 944), and "suppression is appropriate" (People v. Miller, 39 Misc 3d at 785-786). Accordingly, all evidence herein is suppressed as the People failed to establish reasonable cause for the initial stop of defendant's vehicle [People v. Mazzola, 12 Misc 3d 1165(A)], and the within charges against defendant are dismissed.
All motions not granted herein are hereby denied. This opinion shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.
ENTER.SO ORDERED.
Thisday of February, 2014
Albany, New York
Gary F. Stiglmeier
Albany City Court Judge