Opinion
2011-11-29
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Margaret E. Knight of counsel), and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York (Amanda B. Bepko of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (John B.F. Martin of counsel), for respondent.
Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Margaret E. Knight of counsel), and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York (Amanda B. Bepko of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (John B.F. Martin of counsel), for respondent.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., ANDRIAS, FRIEDMAN, CATTERSON, FREEDMAN, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. McLaughlin, J.), rendered September 22, 2009, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 10 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court's Sandoval ruling balanced the appropriate factors and was a proper exercise of discretion ( see People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 738 N.Y.S.2d 663, 764 N.E.2d 963 [2002]; People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 458–459, 611 N.Y.S.2d 118, 633 N.E.2d 472 [1994] ). The court precluded any inquiry into more than half of the numerous prior bad acts identified by the People. In those instances where the court permitted inquiry into a conviction, it generally precluded inquiry into the underlying facts. The probative value of defendant's extensive theft-related convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect.
The fact that one of the victims testified through a Cantonese interpreter who revealed that he was acquainted with the victims does not require a new trial under the circumstances of the case. “[I]t has been termed the better practice to avoid appointing a friend or relative of a party or witness as interpreter” ( Matter of James L., 143 A.D.2d 533, 534, 532 N.Y.S.2d 941 [1988] ). However, here the court and defense counsel thoroughly questioned the court interpreter about any possibility of bias, and there is no reason to believe that defendant was prejudiced by the use of this interpreter. Unlike the complainant's son who interpreted for his mother in James L., the interpreter here was not a private citizen appointed as an ad hoc interpreter, but a career court employee who was presumably well aware of his duty to translate testimony verbatim and accurately. Furthermore, the interpreter knew nothing of the facts of this case and there was substantial corroborating evidence through the testimony of another witness and video surveillance films.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.