Summary
holding that a "defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when . . . he is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's witnesses or as evidence during his case"
Summary of this case from State v. WingateOpinion
1998-10168
Submitted December 17, 2001.
January 22, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kohm, J.), rendered October 23, 1998, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (four counts), and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (four counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Robert DiDio, Kew Gardens, N.Y., for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Vered Adoni of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., NANCY E. SMITH, STEPHEN G. CRANE, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant further contends that the People failed to disclose Brady material, such as evidence of promises of leniency given to a prosecution witness in an unrelated pending matter in exchange for favorable testimony, which impeaches the credibility of the witness whose testimony may be determinative of guilt or innocence (see, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83). Even assuming that the promise of leniency constituted Brady material, the defendant's claim is without merit. Significantly, the defendant had the opportunity during the trial to cross-examine the witness using the allegedly exculpatory evidence. A defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when, as here, he is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People's witnesses or as evidence during his case (see, People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868; People v. Brown, 67 N.Y.2d 555, 559, cert denied 479 U.S. 1093; People v. Barnes, 200 A.D.2d 751, 752), or "when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature" (People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 499, 506).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., SMITH, CRANE and COZIER, JJ., concur.