Opinion
1309 KA 14–01614
12-20-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrance LAWHORN, Defendant–Appellant.
KATHRYN FRIEDMAN, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
KATHRYN FRIEDMAN, BUFFALO, FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, TROUTMAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted on counts one and two of the indictment in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, robbery in the first degree ( Penal Law § 160.15 [4] ). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence inasmuch as his motion for a trial order of dismissal was not " ‘specifically directed’ " at the alleged errors asserted on appeal ( People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995] ; see People v. Cahoon, 176 A.D.3d 1610, 1611, 110 N.Y.S.3d 179 [4th Dept. 2019] ; People v. Boyd, 153 A.D.3d 1608, 1609, 61 N.Y.S.3d 431 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1103, 77 N.Y.S.3d 2, 101 N.E.3d 388 [2018] ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we conclude there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt (see generally People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, Supreme Court properly refused to suppress evidence recovered during a search of defendant's vehicle (see People v. Arroyo, 167 A.D.3d 1537, 1538, 90 N.Y.S.3d 446 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 945, 123 N.E.3d 819 [2019] ; see generally People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317, 322–323, 959 N.Y.S.2d 464, 983 N.E.2d 259 [2012] ; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 222–223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ).
However, as the People correctly concede, the court committed reversible error when it "negotiated and entered into a [plea] agreement with a codefendant[,] requiring that individual to testify against defendant in exchange for a more favorable sentence" ( People v. Towns, 33 N.Y.3d 326, 328, 102 N.Y.S.3d 151, 125 N.E.3d 816 [2019] ). Here, "by assuming the function of an interested party and deviating from its own role as a neutral arbiter, the trial court denied defendant his due process right to ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal’ " ( id. at 333, 102 N.Y.S.3d 151, 125 N.E.3d 816 ). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial before a different justice on counts one and two of the indictment (see id. ; see also People v. Warren, 100 A.D.3d 1399, 1401, 954 N.Y.S.2d 289 [4th Dept. 2012] ; People v. Koberstein, 216 A.D.2d 868, 868, 629 N.Y.S.2d 363 [4th Dept. 1995] ).