Opinion
1999-05500.
Decided March 1, 2004.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (D'Emic, J.), rendered June 2, 1999, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Laura R. Johnson, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell J. Briskey of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Anne C. Feigus of counsel), for respondent.
Before: NANCY E. SMITH, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO and THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting testimony concerning a prior uncharged crime is without merit ( see People v. Corella, 281 A.D.2d 428; People v. Wheeler, 257 A.D.2d 673). Since the defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense, the issue of his motive and intent was significant. The proffered evidence "was highly probative in showing that the stabbing was intentional" ( People v. Corella, supra at 429; see People v. Hawker, 215 A.D.2d 499). Further, any prejudice was minimized by the trial court's limiting instructions to the jury ( People v. Carver, 183 A.D.2d 907, 908; see People v. Lunsford, 244 A.D.2d 507).
The defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel at the sentencing proceeding. A defendant's right to counsel is adversely affected when defense counsel "either voluntarily or at the court's urging" acts as a witness against the defendant ( People v. Santana, 156 A.D.2d 736, 737; see People v. Shadney, 81 A.D.2d 842). However, in the instant case, the trial court considered the defendant's pro se motion pursuant to CPL 330.30 to set aside the verdict on various grounds, including that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel, before defense counsel made any statements, and stated on the record that it did not "see any grounds to set aside this verdict." The defense counsel's subsequent statements related to matters that were evident from the record before the trial court and could not have affected the trial court's determination denying the defendant's pro se motion. Accordingly, it was not necessary to assign the defendant new counsel ( see People v. Braelfort, 256 A.D.2d 351, 352; People v. Maragh, 208 A.D.2d 563; People v. Rodriguez, 189 A.D.2d 684).
Contrary to the defendant's contention raised in his supplemental pro se brief, he received effective assistance of counsel ( see People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563; People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708; People v. Groonell, 256 A.D.2d 356, 357).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are without merit.
SMITH, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, LUCIANO and ADAMS, JJ., concur.