Opinion
September 29, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J.
Present — Pine, J.P., Lawton, Callahan, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We conclude that the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). We further conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by its Sandoval ruling that defendant could be cross-examined with respect to his prior sexual abuse, rape and robbery convictions, but not with respect to five prior acts of misconduct, including two uncharged rapes and assaults. The record shows that the court, in making its Sandoval ruling, carefully balanced the probative value of the acts of misconduct against the potential for undue prejudice. The fact that the prior convictions of defendant for sexual abuse and rape are similar to the crimes presently charged does not preclude their use on cross-examination (see, People v Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v Cowell, 170 A.D.2d 343, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 993; People v Cain, 167 A.D.2d 131, 133, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 836).
We reject the contention of defendant that prosecutorial misconduct on summation mandates reversal. Although the prosecutor on summation made inflammatory comments and improperly elicited sympathy for the complainant (see, People v Grice, 100 A.D.2d 419, 422; People v Ivey, 83 A.D.2d 788, 789), reversal is not mandated because those comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial (see, People v Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d 35, 36, affd 65 N.Y.2d 837).
We have reviewed the remaining contentions of defendant and conclude that they are without merit.