Opinion
No. 570052/13.
10-07-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rashaan LAMB, Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Judgment of conviction (Abraham L. Clott, J., at plea, Kevin B. McGrath, J., at sentencing), rendered November 29, 2012, affirmed.
In full satisfaction of an accusatory instrument charging defendant with violating New York City Parks and Recreation Department Rules (56 RCNY) § 1–03(a)(1) and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Penal Law § 195.05), defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of second degree obstruction of governmental administration, in return for a promised sentence of two days community service and a youthful offender adjudication “so long as you are found to be eligible.” At the subsequent sentencing proceeding, the court considered and rejected defendant's request for youthful offender treatment, expressly noting that defendant had incurred two prior youthful offender adjudications, was eighteen years of age at the time of the underlying incident, had “warranted” on this case and had been rearrested.
Initially, we find unavailing defendant's present challenge to the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument. Although defendant argues that the obstruction of governmental administration charge was facially insufficient, he does not dispute that the accusatory instrument, which alleged, inter alia, that he was observed inside a public park at 9:20 p.m., in violation of a sign stating that the park closes at dusk, described “facts of an evidentiary character” (CPL 100.153 ) demonstrating reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that he was guilty of violating Parks Department Rule 1–03 (see People v. Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 21, 31–32 2009; see also People v. Allah, 38 Misc.3d 38 [App Term, 1st Dept 2012] ). The court thus had jurisdiction over defendant and was authorized to accept his plea to the charged offense of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see People v. Keizer, 100 N.Y.2d 114, 117–118 2003; CPL 220.10 4 ).
Nor do we find any reason to disturb the sentencing court's discretionary determination, after it properly weighed the relevant factors, to deny defendant youthful offender status (see CPL 7201[a]; People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580 1976, rearg. denied 39 N.Y.2d 1058 1976; People v. Thomason–Rose, 117 AD3d 548 2014, lv denied 23 NY3d 1043 2014 ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur.