Opinion
No. 1-15-3504
09-05-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAPHONTE KUYKENDOLL, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Nos. 95 CR 26397 95 CR 26398 Honorable Joseph G. Kazmierski, Jr., Judge Presiding. JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hyman and Pierce concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition because although defendant established cause supporting his request, he failed to establish prejudice given his eligibility for day-for-day credit against his 90-year sentence. ¶ 2 Defendant Saphonte Kuykendoll appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition arguing that his 90-year consecutive sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence and the trial court failed to sufficiently consider mitigating factors based on his youth and likelihood for rehabilitation. Because Kuykendoll is eligible for day-for-day sentencing credit reducing his sentence from 90 to 45 years' imprisonment, we find that the trial court did not impose either a natural life or de facto life sentence and thus properly denied his motion for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Given the number and history of Kuykendoll's appeals, recitation of the facts and evidence leading to his convictions is unnecessary and we instead focus on the pertinent procedural history leading to this appeal. ¶ 5 Kuykendoll, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, was indicted for home invasion and the first-degree murder of Tanaya Carter that occurred on August 11, 1995, and for the first-degree murder of Darontay McKay that occurred the next day on August 12, 1995. The State prosecuted each case separately beginning with the home invasion and Carter murder charge. The jury found Kuykendoll guilty of home invasion, but acquitted him of the murder of Carter. The jury found Kuykendoll guilty of the first degree murder of McKay. ¶ 6 During the sentencing hearing on the home invasion conviction, the defense argued in mitigation Kuykendoll's youth and the lack of prior offenses. The trial court sentenced Kuykendoll to the maximum sentence of 30 years' imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. During the sentencing hearing on the murder conviction, the defense offered testimony from Kuykendoll's mother and grandmother, who both expressed that Kuykendoll was remorseful over the crimes that he committed and they believed Kuykendoll could be rehabilitated. Kuykendoll declined the opportunity to speak in allocution. In sentencing Kuykendoll, the trial court noted that it had presided over both trials, reviewed pre-sentence reports and considered the victim impact statements. The trial court sentenced Kuykendoll to the statutory maximum of 60 years' imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction to be served consecutively with the 30-year sentence for home invasion for a total of 90 years' imprisonment. The trial court explained that a consecutive sentence, which was discretionary, was necessary "to protect the public from further conduct by [Kuykendoll]." ¶ 7 This court affirmed Kuykendoll's convictions for home invasion and first degree murder and the consecutive nature of his sentence on direct appeal. People v. Kuykendoll, 1-98-0882 (1999) (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23) (home invasion); People v. Kuykendoll, No. 1-99-0289 (2001) (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23) (first-degree murder). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Kuykendoll's petition for leave to appeal. Kuykendoll then filed a pro se post-conviction petition and a supplemental petition with the aid of counsel for each conviction asserting, among other claims, ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing and this court affirmed. People v. Kuykendoll, No. 1-05-0415 (2007) (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). The Illinois Supreme Court again denied Kuykendoll's petition for leave to appeal. On August 17, 2015, Kuykendoll moved for leave to file a pro se successive post-conviction petition, which he later supplemented, arguing that his 90-year consecutive sentence was a de facto life sentence and the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factors of his youth, background and potential for rehabilitation in violation of the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The trial court denied Kuykendoll leave to file his successive post-conviction petition finding that although he could establish cause because Miller was decided after Kuykendoll filed his initial post-conviction petition, his claim lacked merit and he could not establish any prejudice. Kuykendoll now appeals.
The home invasion conviction carried a sentence of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1994); People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 536-37 (2005).
The first degree murder conviction carried a sentence of 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1) (West 1994); People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (2002).
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 Kuykendoll challenges the denial of his motion for leave to file his successive post-conviction petition claiming that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating evidence of his youth and likelihood for rehabilitation before imposing a de facto life sentence of 90 years' imprisonment. Kuykendoll contends his sentence violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Kuykendoll claims that recent case law supports the finding of prejudice based on the constitutional violation resulting from the trial court's failure to consider mandatory mitigating factors before imposing a de facto life sentence. ¶ 10 A proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)) is a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction. People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 47. A defendant must obtain leave of court before filing a successive post-conviction petition. Id.; People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 33. The trial court may grant the defendant's motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition under the Act only in the limited circumstances where the defendant demonstrates cause for failing to bring the claim in the initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice resulting from that failure. Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). A defendant establishes cause by identifying an objective factor impeding the ability to raise a specific claim in an initial post-conviction proceeding. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). Prejudice is established by demonstrating that the specific claim not raised earlier so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process. Id. A defendant must satisfy both prongs to prevail. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14. A defendant's pro se motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition that adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice in the motion should be granted. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34. But a trial court should deny leave to file when a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner demonstrates that either defendant's claims fail as a 5 matter of law or the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings. Id. ¶ 35. We review de novo the trial court's denial of a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. People v. Hauad, 2016 IL App (1st) 150583, ¶ 50. ¶ 11 Kuykendoll filed his successive petition asserting cause and prejudice on eighth amendment grounds in light of the sentencing relief pronounced in Miller. The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees a defendant's right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Miller, 567 U.S. at 469, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. The United States Supreme Court addressed the eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" as it applies to juveniles in the landmark cases of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). In Roper, the court declared unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under the age of 18 at the time they committed the crime. 543 U.S. at 575, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. Five years later in Graham, the court prohibited sentencing a juvenile offender convicted of a non-homicide offense to life without parole, which the court likened to the death penalty for a juvenile. 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S. Ct. at 2469. Two years later in Miller, the court held that mandatory life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violates the eighth amendment. 567 U.S. at 478, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Miller articulated that a juvenile's sentence must adhere to a certain process and mandates the consideration of mitigating factors, such as the defendant's youth, before imposing a particular sentence. Id. at 483; 132 S. Ct. at 2471. ¶ 12 Importantly, Miller explained that its holding did not categorically bar the imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders, but instead imposed a requirement that a court take into account how children are different and reserve life imprisonment for " 'the rarest juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.' " Id. at 479-80, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 6 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183). The trilogy of Roper, Graham and Miller recognizes that juveniles have diminished culpability, greater prospects for reform warranting different sentencing considerations from adults and "are less deserving of the most severe punishment." Id. at 471; 132 S. Ct. at 2464. More recently in 2016, the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733, 736 (2016), while reaffirming the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles for sentencing purposes, established that Miller applied retroactively. ¶ 13 After Montgomery, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed juvenile sentencing issues in People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, and held that the defendant's mandatory aggregate sentence of 97 years' imprisonment, with the earliest opportunity for release after 89 years, constituted an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller. Id. ¶ 10. The Reyes court articulated that a mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime was equivalent to an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole because in both scenarios, the juvenile will die in prison, and such a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 9. The court explained that the defendant's legislatively mandated sentence of 97 years' imprisonment was a mandatory, de facto life-without-parole sentence because the defendant would remain in prison until at least the age of 105 and would not live long enough to ever become eligible for release. Id. ¶ 10. Consequently, the court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 12. ¶ 14 Here, the dispositive issue is not whether mitigating factors should be considered in imposing discretionary sentences because recent case law establishes that mitigating factor considerations apply equally to mandatory and discretionary de facto life sentences. People v. Morris, 2017 IL App (1st) 141117, ¶ 30; People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 63-64; People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604, ¶ 49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶ 7 23. Given the now settled recognition of the special characteristics and vulnerabilities of juvenile offenders (People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 98), we see no reason to depart from this court's recent precedent. Instead, the dispositive issue is whether Kuykendoll's consecutive 90-year prison sentence, which includes credit for good behavior, was a de facto life sentence implicating eighth amendment protections. The critical fact in this case is not the imposition of a 90-year sentence, but Kuykendoll's eligibility for day-for-day good behavior credit, which distinguishes this case from Miller and its progeny prohibiting natural life or a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole. People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 14. ¶ 15 A defendant's eligibility for day-for-day good behavior credit and its impact on eighth amendment considerations was recently addressed by this court in People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, which we find directly on point. Both Kuykendoll and the defendant Evans were 17 years old when they committed the offenses leading to their convictions and each defendant received a consecutive sentence totaling 90 years' imprisonment. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 3. Because of the statute in effect at the time of their sentencing (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 1994)), both Kuykendoll and Evans are eligible to receive one day of good behavior credit for each day of their sentence creating the potential reduction of time spent incarcerated from 90 to 45 years. Although it is not certain that Kuykendoll will receive credit for good behavior, in light of his claim that he is capable of rehabilitation, we can rightfully assume that he will, in fact, receive day-for-day credit. We agree with Evans that a 45-year sentence is considerably shorter than the sentences found to be de facto life sentences and is in line with other cases finding sentences of comparable length as not imposing a de facto life sentence. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 16 (and cases cited therein); see Reyes, 2016 IL 8 119271, ¶ 12 (stating an imprisonment sentence of 32 years is not a de facto life sentence); see also Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 110 (an imprisonment sentence of 36 years for a juvenile who committed three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault did not fall within the category of the most severe of all criminal penalties invoking the rationale expressed in Roper, Graham and Miller). Accordingly, we see no reason to depart from Evans' holding that imposition of a 45-year imprisonment sentence is not a de facto life sentence warranting eighth amendment protections under Miller. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 18. ¶ 16 Moreover, we decline Kuykendoll's invitation to adjudicate whether his anticipated release at approximately 65 years old amounts to a de facto life sentence based on his assertion that the average life expectancy of a prisoner is 64 years old. This court is not the proper forum to establish a bright-line test to determine whether a sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence based solely on a defendant's age at the time of his anticipated release and our supreme court thus far has not signaled its intention to implement such a test. Thus, we refrain from using Kuykendoll's anticipated age at release as the sole basis to find that his 90-year sentence with day-for-day good time credit is a de facto life sentence. ¶ 17 Because the trial court did not impose a de facto life sentence, the eighth amendment protections enunciated in Miller are inapplicable. Consequently, Kuykendoll cannot establish the prejudice prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, and the trial court did not err in denying Kuykendoll's motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37. ¶ 18 Affirmed.