Opinion
B221600
08-25-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ZVI HENRY KRIPLE, Defendant and Appellant.
William Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel Jr. and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA085637)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Thomas Falls, Judge. Affirmed.
William Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel Jr. and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Zvi Henry Kriple was convicted of animal cruelty. (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b).) The trial court granted Kriple's motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and suspended imposition of sentence, placing him on formal probation for three years. Kriple appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, evidentiary and instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In June 2008, Zvi Kriple asked the stable superintendent at Fairplex Park in Pomona (Nancy Tripp) if he could bring in a horse that needed to be seen by a veterinarian and have x-rays. He said he would bring the horse in for the x-rays and then remove it, and Tripp granted permission. Kriple was a horse trainer. Horse trainers are responsible for the feeding, health and welfare of horses and have authority to euthanize a horse if necessary.
On June 17, at Kriple's request, veterinarian and equine practitioner Dr. John Hoyme examined Kriple's horse In Schefla's Honor in the stable area at the Pomona Fairplex. The horse was "skinny"--"pretty thin," with the bones of its rib cage visible; it also had laminitis (also known as "founder") and had bilateral upper fixation of the patella. Dr. Hoyme spoke with Kriple about the horse's condition and discussed euthanizing the horse which Dr. Hoyme believed to be the "wisest course of action." Kriple said he had boarded the horse elsewhere and it had not been properly fed there. He said he wanted to try to save the horse.
Dr. Hoyme cut one of the three ligaments surrounding the horse's kneecaps to enable the horse to move its legs and walk. He x-rayed the horse's feet because the horse had "severe" laminitis, "it had been present for a while," and it was chronic. The horse was sore and uncomfortable but could get around.
Horses essentially walk on their "fingertips"—the last part of their feet. The lamina holds the hoof and foot together. Laminitis or founder is inflammation of the lamina, and it is very painful, "like ripping of the nail off of our finger." The pressure of the horse's own body weight causes a lot of pain for a horse suffering with this condition. When the lamina remains inflamed for a long time, the tension will put the hoof down and bring the coffin bone down toward the boot of the foot. It may rotate or actually come out of the bottom of the foot. The area can become infected because of the separation of the lamina. Laminitis is a medical emergency for a horse. It is very painful for the horse. "Pain management is probably the biggest thing, making sure . . . the horse is seen on a regular basis" by a veterinarian—a couple of times a week during the acute stage. When the condition becomes chronic, "there's no way of actually bringing the horse back to its normal . . . level or where it was before."
Dr. Hoyme told Kriple he was going to need to hire a good farrier (horseshoer) that he could work with because it was going to be a long process. The coffin bone had separated from the hoof which was painful. The horse also had abscessing which made its prognosis for returning to comfortableness worse. Horses with chronic laminitis require treatment which is quite lengthy and involves costly procedures to try to make the horse comfortable. More often than not, treatment does not work. More often than not, such horses are euthanized. Kriple asked Dr. Hoyme to look at his horse again during the Pomona Fair but he was busy and could not see the horse. He did not see the horse again.
On September 5, at about 9:00 a.m., a trainer at the Pomona Fairplex told Dr. Todd Brokken some horses in the stable were not being seen and nothing was being done for them. Dr. Brokken examined In Schefla's Honor. The horse's stall had not been cleaned in a while. The horse was "parked out," meaning it had its legs pushed forward instead of a normal weight-bearing stance because it was in pain standing on its feet. It was very reluctant to move, and its front hooves had rings and chronic abscessing, indicating the condition had existed for a while. The horse also had cellulitis. Dr. Brokken concluded the horse had chronic laminitis.
Dr. Brokken's assistant asked Tripp to look in on Kriple's horse and she did so before 1:00 p.m. The stable was dirty and the horse was "obviously in discomfort." He was in "standard founder pose," sitting back on his hind end to try to get the weight off his front end. It was hot that day. The horse was sweating with a blanket on and had hives on its neck. Tripp was concerned for the horse and told Kriple to return to the barn to care for his horse. He said he would be back by 6:00, but she told him to come sooner because the horse needed immediate attention.
Tripp contacted the California Horse Racing Board (CHRB) to investigate. Senior Investigator Frank Fink was a CHRB licensed peace officer assigned to the Thoroughbred Racing Division and his duties included enforcing CHRB rules and regulations at all horse racetracks. Fink had known Kriple for several years.
CHRB Rule 1894, entitled "Duties of Trainer," provides "Trainers are responsible for the condition of horses in their care and are presumed to know the rules." CHRB Regulation 1902.5, entitled "Animal Welfare," states: "No person under jurisdiction of the Board shall alone or in concert with another person permit or cause any animal under his control or care to suffer any form of cruelty." To become licensed as a horse trainer, a prospective licensee must pass written, practical and oral exams. Kriple had been a licensed horse trainer since 1988.
Fink observed In Schefla's Honor. He saw that the horse appeared underfed and filled its water bucket. Fink contacted Kriple and told him he needed to respond to the track immediately. After Kriple arrived, Fink asked if the horse was under a veterinarian's care. He asked to see the medications prescribed for the horse. Kriple showed him a "little jar of hemorrhoid cream" and a bottle of bute, "sort of a horse aspirin."
Later that day Dr. Brokken looked in on the horse again, with Kriple present. Dr. Brokken discussed the horse's condition and asked what treatment the horse had received. Kriple said Dr. Hoyme had seen the horse but could not recall how long it had been since then. Dr. Brokken said the horse had gone through the disease process "for a very long time" and was suffering. The prognosis was poor and he believed the best thing for the horse was to humanely euthanize it. Kriple agreed.
Dr. Brokken contacted the official veterinarian for the Pomona Fairplex, Dr. Jennifer Durenberger. At about 7:00 p.m. that day, she went to Kriple's barn and saw a significantly underweight horse, in a dirty stall with feces spread throughout it. When she asked about the underweight horse, Kriple said he thought it was a "nervous horse"— tending to burn calories faster. She asked if the veterinarian had seen the horse, and he said, "No." When she wanted to know why, he said he had dealt with veterinarians in the past and "had a pretty low opinion of them because they tended to be wrong." Regarding In Schefla's Honor, Kriple told her the horse had recurring episodes of laminitis and it had been going on for years, off and on; the horse would be alright for some time and then would have "these episodes." Typically, with founder, if a horse is treated very aggressively initially, you may be able to get ahead of it; the typical course would be to bring the horse to a hospital so it could receive more intensive care.
Each time a horse is seen by a veterinarian at a racetrack, by 10 a.m. the following day, the veterinarian is to submit a confidential report to the state, indicating the name of the horse, the trainer, and any procedure done or medication dispersed. At Fink's request, the assistant to the state veterinarian for southern California (Aimee Nakagawa) checked the records for horses treated at Pomona Fairplex Park. According to records for the period beginning July 16, 2008, and ending September 5, 2008, only one of Kriple's horses (Muisakitun) was treated during this time; there was no record of In Schefla's Honor being examined by any veterinarian.
A veterinary pathologist (Dr. Janet Moore) conducted a necropsy (animal autopsy) on In Schefla's Honor, a 10-year-old underweight male horse. Both front hooves were deformed, and the horse had chronic laminitis for weeks or months. The horse's front legs were removed and frozen for later examination. Further examination revealed the left hoof was swollen and there was pus, indicating an infection, along with cellulitis. The right hoof had pus seeping out of the coronary band, more pronounced cellulitis and chronic laminitis which is very painful for a horse. Cellulitis is a bacterial infection and should be treated with antibiotics.
Kriple was charged with animal cruelty in violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b).
At trial, the People presented evidence of the facts summarized above. Kriple testified in his own defense. He said he owned the mare that had given birth to In Schefla's Honor. He brought In Schefla's Honor over from Ireland and raced him perhaps four times as a three-year-old, but the horse always had problems with his feet and the "vets . . . could not really recognize what it was." Kriple retired the horse from racing and used him as a stud, resulting in five fillies and a colt.
In June 2008, Kriple said, In Schefla's Honor was "real sore on his feet" so he took the horse to Pomona on a veterinarian's recommendation to get him better care there. Kriple said he knew about and could recognize laminitis but did not believe his horse suffered from it. When he took In Schefla's Honor for x-rays, Dr. Hoyme suspected laminitis and said "it's painful—painful procedure" which Kriple was "fully aware of." Kriple testified Dr. Hoyme told him, "Well, we can treat him, try to make him comfortable as possible, and for that reason you will have to go to . . . your farrier and ask him to look at the horse and take care of his feet." He also mentioned diet - not too much grain and a special kind of hay.
Kriple said he had the horse seen by three different farriers—Pat Gomez, Eduardo Gomez and Urio Rafaeli—who saw the horse several times. In the beginning, he had some concern, but his concern was reduced due to their opinions. He soaked the horse's feet in Epsom salts. He said Dr. Hoyme did not ever mention the horse had to be euthanized. He said Dr. Hoyme did not discuss abscessing.
He said he understood Dr. Moore's testimony to mean In Schefla's Honor's laminitis had stabilized and he never would have euthanized his horse if he had known this. He said Dr. Brokken was grossly negligent.
Kriple testified In Schefla's Honor had a swollen coronary band, swollen forefeet and pus coming out but this was not necessarily bad and was common in horses with bruises. He said he felt pressured to euthanize In Schefla's Honor but was given the option of taking the horse off of the Fairplex grounds.
According to Kriple, he had been the leading trainer at Los Alamitos at one time. After veterinarians had recommended euthanasia for two other horses, he had rejected the recommendations and cared for two horses he was later able to race. El Aguilio had an injured foot, but Kriple worked with it and it later won 10 races. Synner Or Saint was very sick, with only 25 percent of its lungs (and the remaining 75 percent of lung tissue was dead). Kriple said he begged a veterinarian (Dr. Von Bluecher, Dr. Brokken's supervisor) to continue treatment and the horse went on to win several races.
Pasqual Gamez was a farrier licensed by the CHRB. He said he had known Kriple for 12 or so years and used to shoe his horses. He said he trimmed In Schaefla's Honor's hooves in August 2008, and the horse did not have laminitis. If so, he would have told Kriple. He was going to shoe the horse but could not because of bruises and bloody spots on the horse that were painful. He told Kriple to put the horse's feet in hot water and Epsom salts. He would not shoe the horse until it was well. He said he had more experience with horses' feet than a veterinarian, looking at 40 to 50 horses per day.
Eduardo Gamez (Pasqual Gamez's son) said he was a farrier licensed in Arizona. He knew Kriple and In Schefla's Honor and trimmed its hooves in June 2008 at Kriple's farm in Temecula. The horse's feet were in fair condition; there might have been a little bruising from pawing at the ground because of flies all around.
In rebuttal, CHRB investigator John Olive testified regarding his investigation of C.R. Fox, another horse in Kriple's care and in a stable Kriple rented. The horse's left front leg was deformed, swollen and cocked out at a pretty bad angle. The right front hoof had grown out about 12 inches—far more than it should have. John Olive testified that Kriple told him two veterinarians (Hackathorn and Guillen) had told him to euthanize the horse.
The jury convicted Kriple as charged.
The trial court granted Kriple's motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and suspended imposition of sentence, placing Kriple on formal probation for three years.
Kriple appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Kriple Has Failed to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Connection with Dr. Brokken's Testimony.
Dr. Brokken testified as the prosecution's first witness. Kriple complains of the following exchange:
"[The prosecutor]: And briefly tell us what specifically drew your attention to the horse, what condition—what physical features of the horse.
"[Dr. Brokken]: Well, I was drawn to the horse because of—the adjacent trainer had stated that
"[Defense counsel]: That's hearsay, Your Honor.
"[The prosecutor]: State of mind, Your Honor.
"The court: Overruled. [¶] Go ahead.
"[Dr. Brokken]: The reason why I went to go see the horse, because the adjacent trainer had stated the horse had not received any food for a few days. So as that happened, I went to look at the horse.
"[Defense counsel]: That's hearsay, Your Honor.
"The court: It's not offered
"[Defense counsel]: Motion to strike.
"The court: Denied. [¶] Finish your answer.
"[Dr. Brokken]: Okay. I went to go see the horse after he stated that three or four horses that were stabled at the end adjacent to his barn were not being seen, nothing was being done. So I went to check out the horses."
According to Kriple, his counsel should have let the trial court finish speaking to explain the testimony was not admitted for the truth of what the trainer said but rather to explain why Dr. Brokken went to see the horse. Then, he says, his counsel should have requested a limiting instruction (CALJIC No. 2.09). In Kriple's view, in the absence of these steps, the jury was told he was "very negligent in not giving the Horse any food for a few days, and the jurors' minds were poisoned against [him], even though the statement was presumably not true, because if there had been any truth in it, surely the prosecutor would have put the adjacent trainer on the witness stand to testify about the matter." Citing People v. Sanchez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 622, 633, he says the jury could have used this evidence as one of multiple instances of a course of conduct demonstrating his guilt. Because there could be no tactical reason for his counsel's conduct, he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced as a result. We disagree.
CALJIC No. 2.09 provides: "Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. [¶] At the time this evidence was admitted you were instructed that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted."
First, defense counsel did object to the testimony and, as a result, the jury heard that the testimony was permitted only to show Dr. Brokken's state of mind leading him to go and see In Schefla's Honor. Beyond this, counsel may have elected not to belabor the point or to draw further attention to the testimony so his failure to request a limiting instruction does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this record. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) Inasmuch as there was considerable evidence through other witnesses' testimony that both In Schefla's Honor and another of Kriple's horses was underweight, very skinny, and with rib cages prominent, Kriple fails to explain and cannot establish that he was prejudiced by this testimony in any event. Moreover, from at least June 2008, he knew his horse was diagnosed with severe laminitis and that the horse was in considerable pain but the horse was not seen by a veterinarian again after mid-June with no apparent meaningful efforts to mitigate the horse's apparently obvious and considerable pain and suffering in the meantime until it was euthanized in early September. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 655-656.)
II. Kriple Has Failed to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel with Respect to Dr. Hoyme's Letter (Exhibit F).
Although Dr. Hoyme was never questioned in this regard, defense counsel asked Kriple about a letter from Dr. Hoyme which was marked for identification as Exhibit F. After defense counsel had finished his closing argument, he indicated he wanted the prosecutor to agree to allow the admission of this letter which he said he had received in a packet of discovery from the California Racehorse Commission. He said he had realized he had forgotten to ask Dr. Hoyme about the letter until after he had been excused so he did not ask the doctor to come back and it was "not a huge deal." He did, however, show it to Kriple while he was on the stand and asked him about its contents. It said the horse had "severe laminitis" and indicated Dr. Hoyme had given "some suggestions about shoeing the horse to relieve the pain in his feet." Kriple confirmed that was what Dr. Hoyme had told him. He emphatically denied Dr. Hoyme had told him he had to euthanize In Schaefla's Honor and said he did not discuss abscessing. The prosecutor responded that the letter was hearsay with no basis for admission as an inconsistent statement; part of it was about another horse.
Kriple argues the letter was important because "it was crucial to establish what Dr. Hoyme's recommendations to him were and that he followed those recommendations" so his counsel was ineffective because he forgot to introduce this letter. We disagree.
According to the letter dated November 1, 2008 (two months after In Schefla's Honor was euthanized), Dr. Hoyme said he examined In Schefla's Honor for Kriple. X-rays revealed "severe laminitis with rotation of his third phalanx. He also had an[] upward fixation of the patella which caused his hind legs to lock." He cut the patellar ligament to correct the upward fixation and "made some suggestions on shoeing in hopes it would relieve some of the pain in his feet." He addressed the care of a different horse and then said during the 2008 race meet at Fairplex, Kriple asked him to stop by but he was working with another horse at the time and forgot to stop.
Leaving to one side the validity of the prosecutor's objection to the admission of this evidence, Kriple cannot demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence. The statements in the letter were not inconsistent with Dr. Hoyme's testimony and, even without the admission of the letter as an exhibit, Kriple himself testified to its content in his own testimony. He says Dr. Hoyme said nothing about shoeing in his testimony but he mischaracterizes the record. Dr. Hoyme said he told Kriple he would have to work closely with a good farrier and, as the jury learned, the farrier shoes horses. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 655-656.)
III. Kriple Has Failed to Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Near the conclusion of the direct examination of Dr. Moore, the prosecutor asked, "Were you contacted by the public defender in this matter?" She responded, "Yes, I was." The prosecutor inquired, "And did you write a letter to the public defender summarizing your findings regarding this case?" She answered, "Yes, I did." The prosecutor then indicated, "I have no further questions. Thank you, ma'am."
Defense counsel then asked Dr. Moore, "You got a call from some lawyer about this case, Grady Russell? That would be me." She agreed. He then went on to confirm the conversation for the jury, indicating he had said "few humans on earth could understand what you had written in your report, and you sort of laughed about that," proceeding to put her findings in "more lay language." At the start of the next court session, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor's mention of a public defender. The prosecutor apologized but said whatever prejudice there could have been was minor and that the jury could separate the fact Kriple might be represented by a public defender and be fair. Defense counsel argued the jury could resent Kriple using their tax money to get a free ride off of the state when he was out there racing horses. After hearing further argument on the subject, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he would like the court to inquire of the jurors separately or give a curative instruction but as defense counsel had pointed out, "why waive [sic] the red flag in front of the jury?" but was not prepared to grant a mistrial.
According to Kriple, he was denied his right to due process because the prosecutor's references constituted a "deceptive or reprehensible method to persuade the jury," and it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result absent such misconduct. We disagree.
First, it was not necessarily clear from the prosecutor's final questions that defense counsel was a public defender; it was defense counsel who further inquired and confirmed his status. Further, he rejected the trial court's offer to inquire of the jury and/or give a curative instruction, and having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that a mistrial was not warranted. (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 283-284.) Rather, the jury was presented with compelling evidence of Kriple's conduct justifying its verdict, and he cannot establish prejudicial error.
IV. Kriple Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudicial Error in the Admission of Investigator Olive's Rebuttal Testimony Regarding C.R. Fox.
At an earlier Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the trial court determined that Investigator Olive could not testify regarding an investigation relating to another horse in Kriple's care (C.R. Fox). However, after Kriple testified that he had been the top trainer at Los Alamitos and had done everything necessary to save other horses despite veterinarians' recommendations that the horses should be euthanized, Olive was permitted to testify regarding C.R. Fox. C.R. Fox had broken its leg in a claiming race and Kriple, as the horse's trainer (the horse was owned by a partnership not involving Kriple), was told the horse should be euthanized. However, the horse was not euthanized until seven or eight months later when it was found to have a severely deformed leg and was in considerable pain and had not been seen by a vet at all during that time.
We reject Kriple's claim the evidence was improperly admitted as character evidence. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the evidence was proper impeachment evidence, and Kriple cannot establish prejudice in any event. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (i) [in determining the credibility of a witness jury may consider existence or nonexistence of any fact to which he has testified].)
V. Kriple Has Failed to Demonstrate Instructional Error Relating to CALJIC No. 14.96 and Has Therefore Failed to Establish He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in this Regard.
According to Kriple, the version of CALJIC No. 14.96 given by the trial court did not properly define criminal negligence, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result. According to the record, without elaboration, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated to the instructions as given, and the jury was instructed as follows:
"Defendant is accused in Count 1 of having violated section 597, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, cruelty to an animal, a felony.
"Every person who willfully and unlawfully subjects any animal to needless suffering, in a criminally negligent manner is guilty of animal cruelty.
"The word 'animal' includes a horse. The word 'cruelty' includes every act, omission or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted.
"A person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for animal life or the indifference to the consequences of that act.
"In order to prove such a crime, each of the following elements must be proved:
"1. That the Defendant had custody or was responsible for providing care for the animal; and
"2. Subjected the animal to needless suffering." (Italics added.)
Kriple says the jury should have been instructed with a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.36 (relating to criminal negligence in connection with acts dangerous to human life). In Kriple's view, the instruction given did not sufficiently stress the extreme quality of the negligence to be proven and did not explain what was not criminal negligence. We disagree. The modified version of CALJIC 14.96 (as given) explained: "A person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for animal life or the indifference to the consequences of that act"—language substantially similar to the language in the instruction Kriple asserts here. (Italics added.) Kriple's claim of error must fail.
CALJIC No. 3.36 states: "['Criminal negligence'] ['Gross negligence'] means conduct which is more than ordinary negligence. Ordinary negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care. [¶] ['Criminal negligence'] ['Gross negligence'] refers to [a] negligent act[s] which [is] [are] aggravated, reckless or flagrant and which [is] [are] such a departure from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same circumstances as to be contrary to a proper regard for [human life] [danger to human life] or to constitute indifference to the consequences of those act[s]. The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent act[s] could reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the [death] [danger to human life] was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure but the natural and probable result of an aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act." (Italics added.)
At oral argument, Kriple cited People v. Riazati (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 514 in support of his claim of instructional error (as well as his insufficiency of the evidence claim). In Riazati, the trial court granted the defendant's request that, in defining the elements of the crime of animal neglect under subdivision (b) of section 597, the court instruct the jury that "a defendant's alleged act or omission must create a high degree of risk of death or great bodily injury to an animal." (Id. at p. 527, original italics.) (In part, the jury was instructed "'Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when: [¶] '1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury[;][¶] AND [¶] '2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. [¶] 'In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for animal life or indifference to the consequences of that act.' (Italics [in first numbered paragraph in original].)" (Id. at p. 528, further italics added.) As such, the gross or criminal negligence required under subdivision (b) of section 597 was defined for the jury in Riazati in language substantially similar to the language used in this case.)
However, the issue in connection with Riazati's claim of instructional error (in addition to whether Riazati had invited that error) was "whether criminal liability under section 597[ subdivision] (b) may be imposed on a person who has custody of, or is responsible for providing care to, an animal and commits an act or omission proscribed by that subdivision that recklessly exposes the animal to a high risk of great bodily injury." (Riazati, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, original italics.) The Riazati court determined that, not only was his claim barred by the invited error doctrine, but Riazati's argument lacked merit as permitting the imposition of "liability [under this statute] for grossly negligent conduct that exposes a cared-for animal to a high risk of great bodily injury is consistent with the Legislature's judicially recognized intent to protect such animals from grossly negligent conduct that exposes them to a risk of death." (Id. at p. 531.) Accordingly, Riazati does not assist Kriple.
"Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language." (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570; see also People v. Speegle (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1413; and see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 326 [by agreeing to court's instruction without objection, defendant forfeits claim of error].) Moreover, given this record, Kriple cannot establish prejudice in any event. (People v. Speegle, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413.)
VI. Substantial Evidence Supports Kriple's Conviction.
Based on the factual summary above and our review of the entire record, we are satisfied the jury's determination Kriple was guilty of animal cruelty under Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b), is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 23.)
In light of our conclusions as to Kriple's preceding arguments, it follows that his claim of cumulative error must fail.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WOODS , J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
JACKSON, J.