Opinion
E067102
06-02-2017
In re K.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.R., Defendant and Appellant.
Martin Kassman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Seth Friedman and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1501392) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Roger A. Luebs, Judge. Affirmed. Martin Kassman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Seth Friedman and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 9, 2015, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that defendant and appellant K.R. (minor; a female born Aug. 2012) (1) willfully and unlawfully used force and violence upon Jane Doe 1 (JD1) under Penal Code section 242, on or about September 5, 2015 (¶ 1); and (2) willfully and unlawfully used force and violence upon Jane Doe 2 (JD2) under Penal Code section 242, on or about May 8, 2015 (¶ 2).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
On February 3, 2016, minor admitted paragraph 1 of the petition. The juvenile court accepted the admission and found that minor came within the provisions of section 602. The court then placed minor on nonwardship probation under section 725, subdivision (a), for six months, on terms and conditions recommended by a probation officer. As agreed by the parties, the court dismissed paragraph 2 of the petition "subject both to comment and restitution."
In July 2016 the probation department filed an application and request to revoke probation and proceed to disposition. The court instead extended the nonwardship probation to November 1, 2016.
On October 19, 2016, the juvenile court found that minor had successfully completed her nonwardship probation and terminated it. The court found that minor was entitled to relief under section 786, and ordered the petition dismissed and minor's juvenile record sealed.
Minor's counsel asked the court to add the Moreno Valley Unified School District to its sealing order regarding paragraph 2 of the petition. The prosecution opposed the request. The court denied minor's request to seal her school records. Minor appeals.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
On September 5, 2015, minor, who was 13 years old at the time, committed a battery against JD1 in the parking lot of a shopping mall. A prior police report had been made on May 8, 2015, after minor committed battery on JD2 at her middle school. Minor admitted the battery that occurred at the mall.
On February 3, 2016, the juvenile court dismissed paragraph 2 of the petition, the middle-school battery, retaining the ability to comment on and order restitution for it. The court placed minor on nonwardship formal probation for six months, ordering, among other things, that she have no contact with either JD1 or JD2, write a letter of apology to JD1 and JD2, complete 40 hours of community service, and take anger management classes.
DISCUSSION
Minor claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion to seal her school records.
Under section 786, subdivision (a), the court "shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice" once the court finds the minor satisfactorily completed probation for any offense. The court, however, "may" seal school records under section 786, subdivision (e), "if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry, and rehabilitation of the individual."
On appeal, we review the denial of sealing a juvenile record under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668 [appellate court reviewed the trial court's denial of a petition under section 7781 to seal juvenile records for abuse of discretion]; V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1469, disapproved on another point in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 415 [appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to grant to deny a section 782 motion to dismiss a juvenile petition under the abuse of discretion standard].)
A "trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) If the record shows that a trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, then the appellate court must remand for an informed exercise of the power. (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944.)
In this case, minor's counsel asked the juvenile court to seal minor's school records. Counsel argued:
"We'd ask, your Honor, that the Moreno Valley Unified School District be added to the [court record] sealing order that will be provided regarding paragraph two. It was over a year ago. It was in middle school. [Minor has] had excellent behavior since. She's at a new school. So we'd ask those records be sealed. There is no expectation any of this type of behavior will continue."
The prosecutor responded:
"At this point I don't have any objection to the dismissing of the case, however I do object to the sealing of the records for the school. I believe that issue—that's a continuing issue in our court. I believe the school has a right to know the issues that were involved particularly since this appears to be a fight that was involved at school. [¶] Other than that, I have no objection to the other agencies as far as sealing the records."
The court denied minor's request to seal her school record, and held:
"I decline to exercise my discretion to notify the school district to seal their records since she's still a student with many more years left in school. I think it's in her rehabilitative interest to have the district have access to those records and other schools that she may be transferring to[,] to have access to the records as they provide a safe learning environment for her."
The court, in essence, found that sealing minor's middle school records would not "promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of [minor]." (§ 786, subd. (e)(2).) (In re J.W., supra, 2326 Cal.App.4th at p. 670 [appellate court upheld juvenile court's denial of petition to seal juvenile records but left open the possibility of sealing records after more time had passed].)
Minor's reliance on In re Joshua R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 864 (Joshua R.) is misplaced. In Joshua R., the juvenile court dismissed the minor's juvenile adjudication after he successfully completed probation. (Id. at p. 866.) The court, however, declined to seal his record "because of an ongoing probation condition stating he was not permitted to own a firearm before he turned 30 years old." (Ibid.) The minor argued that this was in error and the appellate court agreed. In Joshua R., the issue was "whether the substantive Penal Code section [29820] addressing future firearm ownership for minors in his situation conflict[ed] with the Welfare and Institutions Code section [786] requiring the juvenile court to seal records upon the successful completion of probation." (Ibid., italics added.) The appellate court concluded the statutes could "be harmonized to effect the purposes of each." (Ibid.) After discussing the different statutes, the appellate court concluded that "although Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 requires sealing the record, the form described in [Penal Code] section 29820, subdivision (d), is exempt from the requirement of destruction for the limited purpose of determining 'eligibility to acquire a firearm.' Thus, while the rest of the record must be sealed and destroyed by the date the court specifies in the order it will issue after remand, the Firearm Form need not be ordered destroyed until Joshua's 30th birthday." (Id. at p. 869.) The court went on to state that the goal behind section 786 "is to allow certain juvenile offenders who have successfully completed their probation to lead productive lives without the black mark of a record hanging over their heads for employment and educational purposes." (Joshua R., at p. 869.) And, the goal of Penal Code section 29820 "is to prevent those who have committed certain offenses as juveniles from owning firearms before they turn 30 years old." (Joshua R., at p. 869.) Therefore, "[o]rdering the record sealed, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, while at the same time allowing the DOJ to maintain the Firearm Form until Joshua turns 30 will serve both purposes." (Ibid.)
Penal Code section 29820, states: (a) This section applies to any person who satisfies both of the following requirements: [¶] (1) The person is alleged to have committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, an offense described in subdivision (b) of Section 1203.073, any offense enumerated in Section 29805, or any offense described in Section 25850, subdivision (a) of Section 25400, or subdivision (a) of Section 26100. [¶] (2) The person is subsequently adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, an offense described in subdivision (b) of Section 1203.073, any offense enumerated in Section 29805, or any offense described in Section 25850, subdivision (a) of Section 25400, or subdivision (a) of Section 26100. [¶] (b) Any person described in subdivision (a) shall not own, or have in possession or under custody or control, any firearm until the age of 30 years. (c) A violation of this section shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. [¶] (d) The juvenile court, on forms prescribed by the Department of Justice, shall notify the department of persons subject to this section. Notwithstanding any other law, the forms required to be submitted to the department pursuant to this section may be used to determine eligibility to acquire a firearm."
Here, minor contends that the language in Joshua R., that the records should not hang over minor's head for "educational purposes," is supported by section 786, subdivision (b), and that the record should reflect that the act never occurred, even to inquiring "educational institutions." In Joshua R., however, the records referred to the minor's court records that he requested be sealed under section 786, subdivision (a). (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) The black mark of a record did not refer to Joshua's school records, separately governed under section 786, subdivision (e). As provided above, under section 786, subdivision (e), the court "may" decide that school records can hang over minors' heads. To the contrary, under section 786, subdivision (a), the court "shall" not allow for court records to hang over minors' heads. Joshua R., therefore, is not applicable to the analysis under section 786, subdivision (e).
Section 786, subdivision (b), provides: "Upon the court's order of dismissal of the petition, the arrest and other proceedings in the case shall be deemed not have occurred and the person who was the subject of the petition may reply accordingly to an inquiry by employers, educational institutions, or other persons or entities regarding the arrest and proceedings in the case." --------
In this case, the juvenile court exercised its discretion to find that whichever school minor attends should be able to reference the middle school records concerning minor's past actions as an aid to her rehabilitation. Although minor argues that "it is in the interest of her rehabilitation and reentry for her to go forward without the black mark of an unsealed school district record," the juvenile court reasoned that having the record unsealed and available for schools could also assist in minor's rehabilitation. We cannot say that the court's reasoning was so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. The court listened to the arguments of both minor's counsel and the prosecution and thoughtfully came to its decision to deny sealing minor's school records. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON
J. SLOUGH
J.