Summary
In People v. Knupp, 179 A.D.2d 1030, 579 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1992), the State's witness first testified about the symptoms associated with the child-sexual-abuse syndrome.
Summary of this case from State v. MichaelsOpinion
January 31, 1992
Appeal from the Ontario County Court, Henry, Jr., J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Pine, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and new trial granted. Memorandum: Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree and several counts of sodomy in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child as a result of his sexual abuse of three of his daughters. The girls ranged in age from four to 10 years. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions; nevertheless, we conclude that defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of opinion testimony regarding intrafamilial child sexual abuse syndrome. Thus, we reverse defendant's convictions and order a new trial.
Where it is probative, expert evidence concerning rape trauma syndrome and child sexual abuse syndrome is admissible in a criminal case to aid the jury in understanding certain phenomena beyond the common ken (see, People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277; People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, rearg denied 69 N.Y.2d 823; People v. Gallow, 171 A.D.2d 1061, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 995; People v. Karst, 166 A.D.2d 920, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 987; People v. Page, 166 A.D.2d 886, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 842; People v Wellman, 166 A.D.2d 302, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 958; see also, People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249; Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112). In assessing the probative value of such evidence, the Court of Appeals has recognized "that the reason why the testimony is offered will determine its helpfulness, its relevance and its potential for prejudice" (People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 292, supra).
Here, the opinion testimony was elicited through the People's first witness. After vouching for the credibility of the children, the witness testified about the nature and various stages of intrafamilial child sexual abuse syndrome. The witness further stated that defendant's daughters, who would later testify for the prosecution, exhibited symptoms common to children suffering from intrafamilial child sexual abuse syndrome. In our view, the purpose for which the opinion testimony was offered was to set the stage for the prosecution's case. The witness testified about the symptoms associated with sexually abused child syndrome and then testified that all of defendant's children suffered from those symptoms. Obviously, the prosecution was attempting to raise the inference that, because the children exhibited those symptoms, they had been sexually abused (see, People v. Banks, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 284 [analogous situation involving rape trauma syndrome]). Where the expert testimony is introduced primarily to prove that a crime took place, its probative value is outweighed by the possibility of undue prejudice (see, People v. Taylor, supra, at 293).
Because the testimony was not offered to explain behavior exhibited by the victims that the jury might not have understood (cf., People v. Taylor, supra [testimony used to explain the victim's behavior following rape]; People v. Cintron, supra [testimony used to explain reactions of child sexual abuse victims to courtroom procedures]; People v. Keindl, supra [testimony used to rebut defendant's attempt to impair credibility of victims by evidence that they failed to make prompt complaint]), we conclude that "such testimony served to bolster the complainant[s'] credibility and interfered with the jurors' duty to assess the complainant[s'] veracity, unfettered and without undue influence by the opinion of an expert" (People v. Fogarty [No. 42], 86 A.D.2d 617). The error in admitting the opinion testimony, under these circumstances, operated to deprive defendant of a fair trial and thus warrant reversal in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15 [a]). Because the People's entire case turned upon the credibility of defendant's children, we conclude that the error cannot be deemed harmless.
Defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the opinion testimony. Inasmuch as People v. Taylor (supra) and People v. Banks (supra) were decided after the trial in the instant case, defense counsel should not be faulted for failing to object to that testimony.