Opinion
2-20-0757
03-25-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THEODORE KNOX, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 90-CF-2176 Honorable James K. Booras, Judge, Presiding.
ZENOFF, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ZENOFF, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Defendant showed neither cause nor prejudice in seeking to file a successive postconviction petition claiming that his natural life sentence for murder violated the proportionate-penalties clause given that he was only 20 years old at the time of the crimes. Defendant failed to show cause, as he could have brought a claim in his initial petition that the trial court failed to properly consider his youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Recent case law imposing constitutional limits on juvenile sentencing simply provided additional support for such a claim. Defendant also failed to show prejudice, because his claim was not a constitutional claim cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. He did not argue that his sentence was incommensurate with his offenses, violating the proportionate-penalties clause. Rather, his claim amounted to an abuse-of-discretion claim that the trial court did not properly weigh the mitigating factor of youth. 1
¶ 2 Defendant, Theodore Knox, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County denying his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (f) (West 2020)). Because he failed to make a prima facie showing of cause or prejudice, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1) and sentenced to "natural-life imprisonment" without parole.
¶ 5 On direct appeal, we set forth the facts established at the trial. See People v. Knox, 241 Ill.App.3d 205 (1993). Briefly, the evidence established that defendant belonged to a street gang called the "Royal Family." He was a soldier in the gang and took orders from Daniel Blalock Sr. and Oscar Parham. Knox, 241 Ill.App.3d at 207.
¶ 6 On February 17, 1988, defendant, Blalock Sr., Parham, and two other gang members, Ronald Walker and Daniel Blalock Jr., were at Parham's girlfriend's apartment. While there, they arranged to buy marijuana from two Hispanic men. Defendant and his companions were then involved in fatally shooting the two Hispanic men in a utility room near the apartment. Although the extent of defendant's involvement in the shooting was disputed at trial, the jury found him guilty of first-degree felony murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Knox, 241 Ill.App.3d at 210. Defendant, who was 20 years old when the murders occurred, was sentenced to natural-life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We affirmed. Knox, 241 Ill.App.3d at 217.
¶ 7 Thereafter, defendant filed several pleadings, including a 1993 postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1993)). We affirmed the dismissal of that petition. See People v. Blalock, Nos. 2-93-0709, 2-93-0763, 2-93-0819 cons. (1995) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 2
¶ 8 On November 9, 2010, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2010). The proposed petition did not challenge defendant's sentence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contended that the petition he sought to file was not successive, because he had not previously filed a petition under the Act. People v. Knox, 2013 IL App (2d) 110937-U, ¶ 13. We held that defendant's 1993 petition was brought under the Act and, thus, he was required to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test of section 122-1 (f) of the Act. Knox, 2013 IL App (2d) 110937-U, ¶ 19. Because he had failed to do so, we affirmed the denial of his motion for leave to file a successive petition. Knox, 2013 IL App (2d) 110937-U, ¶ 20.
¶ 9 In July 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. The proposed petition did not challenge defendant's sentence. The trial court denied the motion because defendant did not show cause and prejudice. On appeal, we granted appellate counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed. See People v. Knox, No. 2-17-0821 (2017) (summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 10 Most recently, on July 23, 2020, defendant filed another motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He alleged cause based on developments, since his 1993 sentencing, in both the law and brain science related to youthful offenders. He alleged prejudice because, in light of those developments, his sentence violated both the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). He attached to his proposed petition numerous documents, including (1) news and social science articles regarding brain development in young adults; (2) affidavits from a codefendant, a correctional officer, and family members; and (3) other documents showing his rehabilitative efforts in prison. 3
¶ 11 The trial court denied the motion, ruling that defendant did not establish either cause or prejudice. Defendant, in turn, filed this timely appeal.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant asserts that he made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice to justify filing a successive postconviction petition. In support, he argues that the law and community standards regarding the sentencing of young adults have evolved since his 1991 sentencing. In that light, he contends that his mandatory natural-life sentence violates the proportionate-penalties clause as applied to him. He raises no claim regarding the eighth amendment.
¶ 14 The Act provides a procedure for a prisoner to assert that his conviction was based on a substantial denial of his rights under the federal or state constitutions or both. People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 20 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2020)). The Act contemplates the filing of a single petition. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 81. To that end, section 122-1 (f) of the Act requires that a petitioner obtain leave of court to file a successive petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). Leave may be granted only if the petitioner demonstrates cause for failing to bring the claim in his initial postconviction proceeding and prejudice resulting from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). A petitioner shows (1) cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded his ability to raise a specific claim during the initial postconviction proceeding and (2) prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during the initial postconviction proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (f) (West 2020).
¶ 15 The cause-and-prejudice test is higher than the standard applied at a first-stage review of a petitioner's initial petition. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. To survive a first-stage review, 4 a petition needs only to allege a claim with an arguable basis in law or fact. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. However, a petitioner seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition must make a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. A failure to establish either prong is fatal to the motion. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37. We review de novo a trial court's denial of leave to file a successive petition. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 21.
¶ 16 Here, defendant asserts that recent Illinois case law-relying partly on the principles in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)-recognizes that life sentences can violate the proportionate-penalties clause as applied to a particular youthful offender. In that light, he contends that he has shown both cause and prejudice, which justifies bringing an as-applied proportionate-penalties-clause challenge in a successive postconviction petition. Because we have recently rejected claims nearly identical to defendant's, we follow our recent decisions and reject defendant's claim.
¶ 17 Most recently, in Howard, the defendant, also 20 years old, sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging that his discretionary life sentence for first-degree murder violated the proportionate-penalties clause as applied to him. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 1. In doing so, he relied primarily on Miller, People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, and People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, in arguing that he should be allowed to make an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge to his life sentence. See Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶¶ 26, 45. We rejected the defendant's contention, relying on three prior decisions of this court: People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, People v. Hoover, 2019 IL App (2d) 170070, and People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632. Accordingly, we 5 continue to adhere to the reasoning of Howard, LaPointe, Hoover, and Suggs in rejecting defendant's claim.
¶ 18 As we reiterated in Howard, the later emergence of additional support for a claim does not alone establish cause for failing to bring the claim earlier. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 39 (citing LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59). The decisions in Harris and House merely provided additional support for a constitutional challenge to a life sentence based on the particular facts of those cases. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 39. The absence of those cases did not prevent the defendant in Howard from alleging in his initial petition that the trial court violated the proportionate-penalties clause by failing to consider his youth and its attendant circumstances as mitigating sentencing factors. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 39. Thus, we held in Howard that the defendant failed to show cause for bringing a successive postconviction petition raising an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge to his life sentence. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 39.
¶ 19 Defendant here likewise failed to show cause. Defendant could have raised an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge to his sentence in his original postconviction petition. He could have asserted that his life sentence violated the proportionate-penalties clause because the trial court failed to properly consider his youth and its attendant circumstances in imposing the life sentence. Miller, Harris, and similar cases-decided after defendant's initial postconviction proceeding-merely provided additional support for such a preexisting claim. Thus, defendant has not shown cause for failing to raise his as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge in his initial postconviction petition.
¶ 20 In Howard, we also held that the defendant did not show prejudice. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40. Comparing our defendant's situation to LaPointe, we noted that there the 6 proportionate-penalties claim was likewise not of "constitutional dimension." Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40. We further explained that the defendant's argument was not of constitutional scope. He did not argue that "his sentence for murder [was] so disproportionate to the offense as to violate the constitution." Instead, his position was "simply that his youth was not adequately considered" at sentencing-comparable to an abuse-of-discretion argument. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40 (citing People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶ 30 (citing LaPointe and Hoover for the proposition that a trial court's failure to consider a defendant's youth is no more than a "garden variety claim" of an abuse of discretion as opposed to a constitutional claim)). The defendant could not show prejudice, because his claim was not of constitutional scope and, thus, not cognizable in a postconviction petition. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 40.
¶ 21 Here, defendant stands no better than the defendant in Howard. Like those in Howard, Hoover, and LaPointe, his claim is essentially that the trial court failed to adequately consider his youth at his sentencing. Critically, he does not claim that his life sentence violated the proportionate-penalties clause by being incommensurate with the offense. See LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 61. Thus, he has not shown prejudice resulting from his failure to raise the claim in his initial petition.
¶ 22 We note that defendant's reliance on cases from other appellate court districts (see e.g., Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362) is misplaced. We have previously rejected the reasoning of cases such as Johnson. See Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 47. We respectfully continue to disagree with the reasoning of those appellate court decisions because they are contrary to our 7 holdings in Howard, Hoover, and LaPointe. Recently, in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74, our supreme court cited LaPointe with approval, stating categorically that "Millers announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause."
We note that, in a Rule 23 Order filed on December 22, 2020, a panel of this court, including Justices Jorgensen and Brennan, held that a 19-year-old defendant made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice sufficient to justify filing a successive postconviction petition raising a disproportionate-penalties-clause challenge to his life sentence. See People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (2d) 180526-U. At the time Williams was filed, our supreme court had not yet issued the Dorsey opinion. The supreme court has granted leave to appeal in Williams. See People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (2d) 180526-U, petition for leave to appeal granted No. 126932 (Nov. 24, 2021); see also People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, petition for leave to appeal granted No. 126461 (Nov. 24, 2021) (State conceded on appeal, and court held, that there was cause for a 19-year-old defendant to bring a successive postconviction petition raising a disproportionate-penalties-clause claim), consolidated with Williams.
¶ 23 Lastly, we address defendant's contention that, because the same judge granted an 18-year-old codefendant (Parham) leave to file a successive postconviction raising a proportionate-penalties challenge to his life sentence, we should reverse and remand for another judge to appoint counsel and consider defendant's successive postconviction petition. However, we have already concluded that defendant was properly denied leave to file a successive petition. To the extent defendant is arguing that his motion for leave to file should have been granted merely because the same judge granted Parham's motion, we reject that contention. As explained above, our district 8 has rejected arguments nearly identical to the ones that defendant seeks to assert in his successive postconviction petition. Nor is there any indication that the trial court harbored any prejudice or animus against defendant.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 26 Affirmed. 9