Opinion
1-23-0046
09-29-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF JOSEPH T., a Minor, v. JOSEPH T., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant. v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 20 JD 1582; 20 JD 1365; 20 JD 1402 The Honorable Kathryn Vahey, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LAVIN JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that respondent was the perpetrator in the offenses at issue. In addition, the court properly denied respondent's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence where the arresting officers possessed probable cause to believe that respondent committed a petty offense in their presence.
¶ 2 At age 15, respondent Joseph T. was alleged to be delinquent with respect to a trilogy of cases that occurred over a period of less than two hours on the afternoon of October 29, 2020. Before he could proceed to an adjudication hearing, however, he was found to be unfit and unable to be restored to fitness in a timely fashion. The trial court then proceeded to a discharge hearing under the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/104-20, 104-25 (West 2022)) in all three cases. Following that hearing, the court found respondent "not not guilty" of (1) the attempted murder and attempted armed robbery of Llourdes Casas as well as aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated battery (the Casas case) (20 JD 1582); (2) the first-degree murder of Jhonny Guaman (the Guaman case) (20 JD 1402); and (3) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) as well as unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) (the weapons case) (20 JD 1365).
The record indicates that respondent had an I.Q. of 53 and a moderate intellectual disability. He also had attention deficit disorder, short-term memory deficits, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar episode disorder unspecified with psychotic features.
¶ 3 On appeal, respondent asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator in the offenses against Casas and Guaman. He also asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because the police lacked probable cause to believe he had committed any offense. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 4 II. Background
¶ 5 A. Pretrial Hearing
¶ 6 At the hearing on respondent's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the collective testimony of Officer Yvette Carranza and Sergeant Adrian Vivanco showed that at about 3:06 p.m. on October 29, 2020, they were on patrol in an unmarked car with Officer Carlos Yanez. While driving in Englewood, they saw four to six male juveniles, one of whom was respondent, walking in the middle of the street. Officer Carranza testified that she observed the group "[f]or seconds up to a minute or so." Officer Yanez then drove toward the group.
¶ 7 Sergeant Vivanco testified that the officers said, "jump on the sidewalk-use the sidewalk *** to continue your route." According to Officer Carranza, Officer Yanez said, "Get off the street, there's a sidewalk to walk on." Officer Yanez then continued driving. When the officers looked back, however, they saw that the group was still in the middle of the street. Specifically, Officer Carranza testified that "they weren't following our orders to get out of the street when there's a sidewalk." Officer Yanez made a U-Turn.
¶ 8 Officer Carranza testified that by the time Officer Yanez had completed the U-Turn, the group had moved to the sidewalk by the mouth of an alley. When the officers began exiting their vehicle, respondent, clutching a red fanny pack across his chest, took off running. The fanny pack appeared to contain a heavy object weighing it down. In addition, Officer Carranza testified that in her experience, "that's where you conceal any kind of weapons or contraband," although she acknowledged that the object could have been a legal item. The officers gave chase and Officer Yanez detained respondent in a vacant lot. According to Sergeant Vivanco, he watched as Officer Yanez removed a firearm from the fanny pack.
¶ 9 The bodycam footage of Officer Carranza and Officer Yanez was admitted into evidence. That footage showed that after making a U-turn, the officers stopped next to a group that included respondent. Although respondent had been standing next to the sidewalk, he ran once Officer Carranza opened her car door. After respondent was detained in the vacant lot, Officer Yanez removed a firearm from respondent's fanny pack.
Although Officer Yanez was not in court, the parties stipulated to the admission of the officer's bodycam footage.
¶ 10 The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress. agreeing with the State's argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest respondent because they had witnessed him walking in the middle of the street in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-1007(a) (West 2020)) and a similar municipal ordinance (Chi. Mun. Code 9-60-080(a)). The court found that the officers' testimony was credible and consistent, and their accounts were corroborated by the bodycam footage. The court stated, "I don't doubt that those kids were in the street, that the officers drove past them and when they hadn't moved they went back." Moreover, "as rare as it would be in the City of Chicago, as unlikely as we were to see something like that, those kids could be detained and given a code."
Respondent also filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement, which the court granted.
¶ 11 B. Discharge Hearing
¶ 12 1. The Casas Case
¶ 13 At the discharge hearing, Casas, the first victim, testified that she was walking in an alley in Pilsen when two young, brown-skinned boys jumped her. They wore hoodies and one of them may have also worn a face covering. Although the boys knocked Casas to the ground, beat her and tried to take her rolling bag, she fought them off. After she had done so, a four-door Jeep arrived. Casas believed that the Jeep's driver may have been female. Before the perpetrators fled in the Jeep, one of them fired a gun at her. In addition, she knew she had been hit because the bullet skimmed her head, causing it to bleed. Casas went to the police station later that day to show the police her wound, although she never went to the doctor. According to Casas, the attack happened too quickly for her to identify anyone. Casas similarly testified that she was shown photos at some point but could not identify anyone.
¶ 14 A surveillance video captured two individuals running toward Casas as she rolled her bag through the alley. The first wore a black face covering, black hoodie, light-colored jeans and gym shoes whereas the second wore a black hooded tracksuit with gray on the chest. In addition, the tracksuit had a grey vertical stripe and narrower vertical white stripes down each sleeve as well as white stripes down each pant leg. The individual in the tracksuit also wore brown work boots. ¶ 15 In the video, the first individual put a gun to Casas's face and neck while the second individual put a gun to the back of her neck. Both individuals beat and kicked her as she lay on the ground. Subsequently, a black Jeep SUV bearing dealer license plate "1840K" approached and the first individual walked away. The second individual, however, continued hitting Casas, who got up and threw a rock at the Jeep. Moreover, the video captured the second individual firing a gun at Casas. The two individuals fled in the Jeep without the bag.
¶ 16 Sergeant Juan Salazar testified that later that day, Casas came to the police station with a bruise to her upper arm and a large cut toward the top of her head. He did not show her a photo array, however, because she said she was unable to make an identification. Additionally, Officer Laura Salgado testified that she recovered a fired cartridge case from the location where the shooter stood.
¶ 17 2. The Guaman Case
¶ 18 With respect to the Guaman case, Hector Sanchez testified that at about 2 p.m., he was sitting in his car after completing grocery deliveries near 920 West Belle Plaine. In his driver's side mirror, he saw that three people were roughhousing two to three car lengths behind him. One of the individuals wore a black Addias tracksuit with three white stripes along the side of each pant leg, although Sanchez acknowledged that such pants were fairly common. Sanchez also acknowledged that he was unable to see any of the individuals' faces. When Sanchez looked down at his phone, he heard a pop. Sanchez then saw in the side mirror that two of the three individuals were entering a brown SUV displaying a dealer license plate. He subsequently discovered the third man lying on the ground with blood on his forehead and called 911.
¶ 19 When the police arrived, Sanchez relayed what had occurred. He told the police he did not see anyone's face, but he did not recall stating that the individual in the tracksuit was 5'10" tall. Officer Jill Martinek later testified that Sanchez had made that statement. Additionally, Sanchez testified that five days after the incident, he told the police that the SUV appeared to have been manufactured between 2012 and 2015, and had a dealer license plate ending with the letter K.
¶ 20 Nicholas Topping testified that he was working from home at 913 West Belle Plaine Avenue when a black SUV or crossover vehicle stopped in the street outside his window and two African Americans exited. Topping did not see their faces but one of the individuals wore a dark, long-sleeved top and black running pants with white stripes down the sides. The two individuals then ran toward a passerby who was wearing a backpack. According to Topping, the individual wearing track pants struck the passerby in the chest and neck with what appeared to be a semiautomatic pistol. As Topping walked toward the back of his unit, he heard a gunshot. He returned to the window to find that the man with the backpack was lying on the ground holding his chest, and the other individuals and the SUV were gone. Subsequently, Topping told the police what he had observed, described the offenders' clothing and told the police that individual with the gun was thin and 6' tall. We note that respondent's height was 5'4."
¶ 21 The State presented surveillance footage showing two individuals exit a dark Jeep and run toward the sidewalk that Guaman was walking on. The individuals' faces were not visible on the video, but one wore light colored pants and a dark shirt, while the other wore black track pants with white stripes and a dark top with stripes on the sleeves. Neither individual was the driver of the vehicle. As they ran toward the sidewalk, both individuals raised their arms as if brandishing weapons. Although partially obscured, the video suggested that a struggle ensued. The individual wearing light colored pants initially returned to the vehicle while the struggle apparently continued in his absence. After several seconds, however, he ran to the sidewalk once more. He and the individual in the tracksuit then ran back to the Jeep and fled.
¶ 22 Officer Thomas Murphy testified that he recovered a cartridge case at the scene. In addition, the parties stipulated that at 2:41 p.m., Guaman died from a gunshot wound to his chest in the manner of homicide.
¶ 23 3. The Weapons Case
¶ 24 Similar to her pretrial testimony, Officer Carranza testified that about 3:06 p.m., she and her partners saw a group of 4 to 6 juveniles, including respondent, walking in the middle of the street near 1320 West 57th Street, a high crime area. Officer Yanez, who was driving, spoke to the juveniles and then drove away. As he did so, however, the officers saw that the juveniles remained in the middle of the street. Consequently, he made a U-turn. When the officers started to speak to the individuals a second time, respondent ran, holding onto a red fanny pack as he did so. Following a brief chase, Officer Yanez detained respondent in a vacant lot, placing him in handcuffs. According to Officer Carranza, Officer Yanez was holding the red fanny pack and said that he had recovered a 9 mm firearm from inside. Officer Carranza's bodycam footage substantially corroborated her testimony.
¶ 25 Sergeant Vivanco similarly testified that when he opened his car door after the officers made a U-Turn, respondent took off running, holding onto a fanny pack that was across his chest. The fanny pack had a bulge that made it look as though a heavy object was inside. Eventually, Sergeant Vivanco observed Officer Yanez detain respondent and saw that the fanny pack had been unzipped. Officer Yanez then handed the sergeant a 9 mm semi-automatic pistol that was approximately 6 inches in size or less. Video footage from the bodycams of Officer Yanez and Sergeant Vivanco corroborated the sergeant's account.
¶ 26 4. Post-Arrest
¶ 27 In the photograph taken of respondent following his arrest, respondent wore a black Adidas tracksuit with grey on the chest and stripes on the sleeves and pant legs. He also wore brown work boots. Two days after respondent's arrest, Sergeant Salazar learned that a 2015 Jeep Cherokee was recovered in Oak Lawn. The Jeep had a make, model, color and license plate matching the vehicle used in the Casas case. In addition, the Jeep had a rear scuff mark consistent with Casas's statement that she threw a rock at the vehicle involved in her attack. When the vehicle was recovered, four black individuals between 16 and 20 years of age, including one female, were inside the vehicle. The parties stipulated that a handgun recovered from the vehicle was a black Sagem 1935S semiautomatic weapon. Furthermore, forensic scientist Marc Pomerance testified that the two fired cartridges recovered from the scene of the attack on Casas and the murder of Guaman were fired from the 9 mm semi-automatic firearm found in respondent's fanny pack.
¶ 28 5. The Trial Court's Findings
¶ 29 The trial court found respondent "not not guilty" of the attempted murder and the attempted armed robbery of Casas as well as aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated battery. Additionally, the court found him "not not guilty" of the first-degree murder of Guaman. The court also found respondent "not not guilty" of AUUW and UPF in the weapons case. Accordingly, the court remanded respondent to the Department of Human Services (DHS) for treatment for an extended term not to exceed August 24, 2026.
The court also found respondent not guilty of an additional AUUW count in the weapons case.
¶ 30 In reaching these determinations, the trial court found that the video of the attack on Casas was "good and clear." While one individual was tall and skinny and wore light blue jeans and a black hoodie, the other individual "was wearing the exact unique track suit that [respondent] was arrested in." In addition, the video showed respondent holding a firearm and captured both individuals kicking and hitting Casas in the head and body, including with a gun. The video further captured respondent firing a gun at Casas after a black Jeep with a dealer license plate ending in K appeared.
¶ 31 Although the video of the attack on Guaman was from a more distant vantage point and was not as clear as the video in the Casas case, it nonetheless showed that a Jeep stopped ahead of where Guaman was walking before two individuals emerged. With respect to the person in the tracksuit, the court found the video showed "the uniqueness of the jacket, and the top third is light colored. The stripes are consistent with the stripes that [respondent] was wearing when he was arrested." In addition, the individual in the tracksuit extended his arm as if holding a firearm and Guaman was subsequently shot. The testimony of Toppings and Sanchez also showed that the same individual was hitting Guaman with a firearm. Similar to the Casas case, Sanchez had seen that the Jeep had a dealer license plate number ending in K.
¶ 32 With respect to the weapons case and respondent's arrest, the court found that the bodycam footage was "good, excellent in fact, and clear" and corroborated the officers' testimony. That footage also showed that respondent had a small firearm on his person when arrested and expert testimony showed that the casings from both the Casas and Guaman cases were fired from that weapon. In addition, respondent's tracksuit was "very particular," not generic. The court observed that respondent's pants were black except for two thin white stripes with wider black stripes in between running down the outside of both legs. His hoodie was black but the top third of the front of the hoodie was silver. Two wide, white stripes with a silver stripe in between ran down each sleeve. Not only was his tracksuit unique, but he also wore ankle high construction boots of a tan suede material with a band of dark brown leather at the top.
¶ 33 II. Analysis
¶ 34 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 35 On appeal, respondent first asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses against Casas and Guaman. Specifically, he contends that the State did not establish his identity.
¶ 36 A discharge hearing under section 104-25 is not a criminal prosecution; rather, it is a civil proceeding following a finding of unfitness. People v Mayo, 2017 IL App (2d) 150390, ¶ 3. The purpose of such hearing is to determine whether a respondent is innocent. Id. If the State does not prove the respondent's guilt, he must be acquitted. People v. Orengo, 2012 IL App (1st) 111071, ¶ 25. If the evidence of guilt is sufficient, however, the respondent is found "not not guilty." Id. ¶ 24. In that instance, the respondent is not convicted but is remanded for further treatment. Id. ¶ 25. The question of his guilt is deferred until the respondent becomes fit to stand trial. Mayo, 2017 IL App (2d) 150390, ¶ 3. If the respondent remains unfit at the expiration of that period, the court must decide whether he is subject to involuntary commitment. Id.
¶ 37 While the court's judgment following a discharge hearing is not a determination of guilt, the standard of proof is the same. Id. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the offense alleged. In re Christian W., 2017 IL App (1st) 162897, ¶ 24. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient so long as such evidence proves the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 27. In addition, "[t]he identification of distinctive clothing worn by a defendant may be sufficient to sustain his conviction, particularly when other evidence of guilt exists, and a positive facial identification is not required." People v. Ward, 66 Ill.App.3d 690, 693 (1978). The trial court is responsible for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts in the testimony, and drawing reasonable inferences. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 25. Furthermore, the court is not required to disregard inferences that naturally flow from the evidence or search for all potential explanations consistent with the respondent's innocence in order to raise those explanations to the level of reasonable doubt. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28.
¶ 38 The question on review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime, and the identity of the perpetrator, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Christian W., 2017 IL App (1st) 162897, ¶ 24; but see People v. Hughes, 59 Ill.App.3d 860, 862 (1978) (stating that "we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant was the perpetrator (emphasis added)). We answer that question in the affirmative.
¶ 39 Casas testified, and the surveillance video showed, that her attackers wore hoodies. More specifically, the video showed that one attacker wore a black hooded tracksuit with gray on the chest. In addition, grey vertical stripes and narrower vertical white stripes ran the length of each sleeve, while white stripes ran the length of each pant leg. The person wearing that tracksuit also wore brown work boots. Taken as a whole, the record supports the trial court's finding that the perpetrator's attire was unique, notwithstanding respondent's argument to the contrary and notwithstanding Sanchez's testimony that the pants were, standing alone, somewhat common. See also People v. Young, 46 Ill.App.3d 798, 801 (1977) (stating that an identification based solely on clothing "similar to that normally found in the community is generally unreliable," but the description of a suspect's "body and color together with the description of the clothes" may be sufficient, even without a description of facial characteristics); cf. Hughes, 59 Ill.App.3d at 862 (finding, where the victim's description of her attackers' clothing was uncorroborated, that their "mode of dress was [not] so distinctive or uncommon as to justify a positive identification").
¶ 40 The appearance of the perpetrator who attacked Casas while wearing a tracksuit was also consistent with the witnesses' description of the perpetrator involved in Guaman's murder. Sanchez observed an individual in a black hoodie and an Adidas tracksuit with three white stripes along the side of each pant leg. Topping similarly described an offender wearing black running pants with a white stripe down the sides. In addition, the surveillance footage in the Guaman case showed an individual wearing black track pants with white stripes and a dark top. ¶ 41 Lest there be any doubt that the Casas and Guaman cases were connected to one another, the surveillance video from the Casas case showed that the perpetrators' Jeep displayed a dealer license plate with the number "1840K" and Sanchez testified that the perpetrators in the Guaman case fled in an SUV with a dealer license plate ending in K. Moreover, the court was entitled to find that evidence from the weapons case clearly connected respondent to both victims.
¶ 42 The officers' bodycam footage and the photograph taken upon respondent's arrest showed that respondent wore brown work boots and a tracksuit with grey or silver on the chest and stripes on the sleeves and pant legs. While this attire is consistent with the perpetrator at issue in the Guaman case, it is identical to the attire worn by the person who assaulted Casas. In addition, the court properly found that firearm evidence tied respondent to both crimes because it is indisputable that he was found in possession of the semiautomatic pistol fired at each victim. Given that respondent was found in possession of that weapon, we categorically reject respondent's suggestion that the weapon needed to have been tested for fingerprints or DNA. See also People v Williams, 182 Ill.2d 171, 192 (1998) (stating that "[p]roof of physical evidence connecting a defendant to a crime has never been required to establish guilt"); People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 20 (finding that circumstantial evidence showed the defendant was the shooter where an officer testified that the shooter wore a blue hoodie, reached into a parked vehicle and went inside a house, and where the defendant was found inside that house with keys to that vehicle and a blue hoodie bearing gun residue).
¶ 43 In light of the foregoing, respondent's assertion - that his identification rests solely on a partial description of the perpetrator's apparel- has no basis in reality. Respondent's reliance on cases involving weak eyewitness identifications is also misplaced given that the State's case does not rest upon any eyewitness's ability to identify respondent. Instead, it rests upon surveillance videos, bodycam footage, respondent's photograph upon his arrest, ballistics evidence and the witnesses' testimony regarding the events that unfolded, the offenders' apparel and their choice of getaway vehicle. Cf. People v. Watkins, 46 Ill.2d 273, 277 (1970) (stating that viewing a perpetrator "under poor conditions [with a] fleeting opportunity for identification can cause an erroneous identification if the police displayed to the witness only one picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he saw"); People v. McGee, 21 Ill.2d 440, 444-45 (1961) (stating that the witnesses' identification of the intruder occurred under circumstances allowing a "great opportunity for mistake," that the witnesses had only a fleeting view of the intruder, that no witness had an adequate view of his features, and one witness's identification was based solely on a jacket shown to him by the police). Although the witnesses in the Guaman case may have overestimated respondent's height, this isolated discrepancy did not require the trial court to find that respondent was not the perpetrator, particularly given that the court was free to make its own estimate of the perpetrator's height after viewing the surveillance video in light of all the other evidence in the case.
¶ 44 The record further supports the determination that of the two offenders involved in these cases, respondent himself shot the victims.
¶ 45 The offender wearing the tracksuit raised his arm to fire at Casas. In addition, Topping testified that the person in the tracksuit struck Guaman with what appeared to be a semiautomatic pistol before a gunshot was heard. The surveillance video from the Guaman case also showed that respondent's companion walked away from Guaman before respondent did, but suddenly ran back to where he had left respondent and Guaman on the sidewalk. This strongly suggests that something happened in the interim. While respondent argues that the video from Guaman's case does not show respondent shooting him, the court was nonetheless entitled to infer from the foregoing evidence that respondent was indeed the shooter. See Ward, 66 Ill.App.3d at 692 (stating that the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence is a matter for the trier of fact to resolve).
¶ 46 Moreover, respondent was found in possession of the murder weapon and the court was entitled to find he demonstrated consciousness of guilt by running from the police. People v McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 448 (1995) (recognizing that a trier of fact may find guilt based on the defendant's flight in conjunction with other factors). Although respondent suggests that he merely fled as a means of complying with the officers' order to get off the street, we find this to be entirely disingenuous. We note that respondent did not stop running upon reaching the sidewalk.
¶ 47 Respondent also invites us to speculate that he may have merely worn the fanny pack containing the firearm at the request of an older friend, as no other evidence in the Casas and Guaman cases placed a fanny pack on his person. Yet, he ignores the equal, if not greater, possibility that he chose to store the firearm in the red fanny pack because he himself had just used it to shoot Casas and Guaman. Courts are not required to disregard inferences that naturally flow from the evidence or raise respondent's speculation to the level of reasonable doubt. See Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28.
We also note that respondent has not addressed the availability of accomplice liability. See People v. Caraga, 2018 IL App (1st) 170123, ¶ 54 (stating that a common design may be inferred from the circumstances); see also People v. Rebollar-Vergara, 2019 IL App (2d) 140871, ¶ 67 (acknowledging that an offender may be charged as a principle but convicted as an accomplice).
¶ 48 Here, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that respondent was responsible for the offenses committed against Casas and Guaman. We find no basis to set aside that determination.
¶ 49 B. Motion to Suppress
¶ 50 Next, respondent asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion quash arrest and suppress evidence because the arresting officers lacked probable cause to believe he committed a petty offense. We will uphold the trial court's findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but we review de novo the court's legal conclusion as to whether suppression is appropriate. People v. Carter, 2021 IL 125954, ¶ 21; see also People v. Jones, 215 Ill.2d 261, 273 (2005) (recognizing that we may consider the evidence presented at the suppression hearing as well as evidence presented at trial).
¶ 51 At a motion to suppress hearing, the movant must make aprima facie showing that the evidence in question was obtained through an illegal search or seizure. People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 27. If the movant does so, the State may present its own evidence that the search was lawful. People v. Spain, 2019 IL App (1st) 163184, ¶ 26. That being said, the ultimate burden of proof belongs to the movant. People v. White, 2021 IL App (1st) 191095, ¶ 19.
¶ 52 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Carter, 2021 IL 125954, ¶ 21 (citing U.S. Const., amend IV; Ill. Const 1970, art. I, § 6); see also People v. Moss, 217 Ill.2d 511, 518 (2005) (stating that Article I, Section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides the same protection as the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution). In addition, reasonableness generally requires an officer to have a warrant supported by probable cause. People v. Love, 199 Ill.2d 269, 275 (2002). That being said, an officer possessing probable cause may affect a warrantless arrest in a public place for any felony or misdemeanor committed in his presence. People v. Redman, 386 Ill.App.3d 409, 423 (2008). Probable cause exists when facts within a police officer's knowledge would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime. People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill.2d 453, 472 (2009). The question is an objective one, rendering an officer's subjective intent irrelevant. White, 2021 IL App (1st) 191095, ¶ 23. Whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances and practical considerations, not technicalities. Hopkins, 235 Ill.2d at 472.
¶ 53 Pursuant to a lawful arrest, officers may also search the arrestee's person. Spain, 2019 IL App (1st) 163184, ¶ 25. The search is based on the need to disarm the individual and discover evidence, but the search does not require officers to possess additional probable cause to search for evidence or weapons. People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 28. In addition, this search includes items immediately associated with the arrestee's person, such as a wallet, purse or backpack that is in the arrestee's physical possession. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 42, 50. Furthermore, police officers may conduct a custodial search of an individual arrested for a petty offense. People v Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 19.
¶ 54 Here, Officer Yanez had probable cause to arrest respondent based on his violation of the Vehicle Code. Section 11-1007(a) states that "where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway." 625 ILCS 5/11-1007(a) (West 2020). Violation of that statute constitutes a petty offense. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 4. That being said, a violation of section 11-1007(a) does not occur absent proof that it was practicable to use the sidewalk. See People v. Shipp, 2020 IL App (2d) 190027, ¶ 45.
¶ 55 Office Carranza and Sergeant Vivanco testified that they saw a group of male juveniles, including respondent, walking in the middle of the street. In addition, the officers testified that despite being told to move, the group did not immediately do so. Furthermore, the trial court found the officers' testimony to be credible. Consequently, we find the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the officers saw respondent in the middle of the street not once, but twice.
¶ 56 Sergeant Vivanco also testified that the officers said, "jump on the sidewalk-use the sidewalk." Officer Carranza testified, "they weren't following our orders to get out of the street when there's a sidewalk." Thus, their testimony supports a reasonable inference that not only did a sidewalk exist, but it was available for practicable use. Nothing in the record otherwise renders that inference unreasonable. Cf. Shipp, 2020 IL App (2d) 190027, ¶ 47 (finding the State failed to establish that it was practicable to use the sidewalk where video footage of the scene "showed significant amounts of plowed snow blocking the entry to sidewalks" and "there were mounds of snow likely blocking access").
¶ 57 Respondent states on appeal that "[t]he sidewalks were not visible in the officers' body camera footage." Yet, respondent's brief also states that "the officers' testimony and the footage from their body cameras show that [respondent] had complied with their request and had moved off the street and onto the sidewalk by the time the officers approached the group for a second time." (Emphasis.) Thus, respondent has argued both that the sidewalk was and was not visible in the bodycam footage.
¶ 58 Inconsistent representations aside, Officer Carranza's video provides a clear view of an unobstructed sidewalk that respondent was standing next to before he took off running. Officer Yanez's video and Sergeant Vivanco's video also clearly showed an unobstructed sidewalk. This too supports an inference that at all relevant times, the sidewalk was available for respondent's practicable use. Because respondent walked in the middle of the street despite the availability of a sidewalk, the officers possessed probable cause to arrest him and to search his fanny pack pursuant to that arrest.
¶ 59 Respondent nonetheless argues that his conduct could not support a finding of probable cause because he had moved out of the street by the time the officers completed a U-turn. Yet, he has failed to explain how this negates the officers' testimony that they had already seen him walking in the middle of the street. By the time he moved out of the street, the violation was a fait accompli. Furthermore, the officers' subjective intent and short delay in arresting respondent do not negate probable cause under our objective inquiry. See White, 2021 IL App (1st) 191095, ¶¶ 25-26 (finding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for gambling illegally on the street despite the officer's acknowledgment that he initially intended only to break up the game rather than arrest the defendant); see also People v Ballard, 206 Ill.2d 151, 174 (2002) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 US. 293, 310 (1966)) (stating that individuals do not have a constitutional right to be arrested, and that police are not required to guess the precise moment at which probable cause develops or halt investigations at that time). Moreover, the trial court was not required to find that the officers' delay somehow rendered their testimony about observing respondent in the middle of the street uncredible.
¶ 59 Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly denied respondent's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In light of our determination, we need not consider respondent's remaining arguments.
¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 61 The record contains substantial evidence showing that respondent was the individual who attacked Casas and murdered Guaman. Thus, the court properly found him "not not guilty" of the offenses at issue and remanded him to the custody of DHS. In addition, the arresting officers, having observed respondent violate the Vehicle Code in their presence, possessed probable cause to arrest him and perform a search pursuant to arrest. Accordingly we find no error.
¶ 62 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 63 Affirmed.