Opinion
848 KA 17-00683
03-19-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
LINDA M. CAMPBELL, SYRACUSE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (KENNETH H. TYLER, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
LINDA M. CAMPBELL, SYRACUSE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (KENNETH H. TYLER, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CURRAN, TROUTMAN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20 [1] ) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]). We affirm.
Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in precluding him from presenting at trial certain hearsay testimony of third-party culpability (see generally People v. Thibodeau , 31 N.Y.3d 1155, 1158-1159, 81 N.Y.S.3d 785, 106 N.E.3d 1145 [2018] ). We reject that contention. At trial, defendant made an offer of proof with respect to the prospective testimony of a police officer that she had been told by another person that someone else—i.e., a person other than defendant—was responsible for killing the victim. The officer's proposed testimony about another person's statements concerning the statements of yet another person constituted double hearsay. "Double hearsay is admissible only if each hearsay statement falls within an exception to the hearsay rule" ( Kamenov v. Northern Assur. Co. of Am. , 259 A.D.2d 958, 959, 687 N.Y.S.2d 838 [4th Dept. 1999] ; see People v. Myhand , 120 A.D.3d 970, 973, 991 N.Y.S.2d 222 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 952, 7 N.Y.S.3d 281, 30 N.E.3d 172 [2015] ). Here, the court properly determined that the officer's proposed testimony was inadmissible inasmuch as the statement made to her relaying the purported third-party admission constituted hearsay and did not fall within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule (see generally People v. Brensic , 70 N.Y.2d 9, 14, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, 509 N.E.2d 1226 [1987], remittitur amended 70 N.Y.2d 722, 519 N.Y.S.2d 641, 513 N.E.2d 1302 [1987] ; People v. Meadow , 140 A.D.3d 1596, 1598, 33 N.Y.S.3d 597 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 933, 40 N.Y.S.3d 361, 63 N.E.3d 81 [2016], reconsideration denied 28 N.Y.3d 972, 43 N.Y.S.3d 260, 66 N.E.3d 6 [2016] ).
In light of our conclusion that the officer's proposed testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the court properly determined that the initial declarant's purported hearsay admission of culpability did not fall within the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule (see generally Thibodeau , 31 N.Y.3d at 1158-1159, 106 N.E.3d 1145 ). To the extent defendant contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense by the court's ruling precluding the proposed testimony, we conclude that his contention is unpreserved (see People v. Lane , 7 N.Y.3d 888, 889, 826 N.Y.S.2d 599, 860 N.E.2d 61 [2006] ), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a] ).
Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). Even assuming, arguendo, that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we cannot conclude that " ‘the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded’ " ( People v. Ray , 159 A.D.3d 1429, 1430, 73 N.Y.S.3d 325 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1086, 79 N.Y.S.3d 107, 103 N.E.3d 1254 [2018] ; see People v. Edwards , 159 A.D.3d 1425, 1426, 73 N.Y.S.3d 323 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1116, 81 N.Y.S.3d 376, 106 N.E.3d 759 [2018] ). The witness testimony and video footage admitted at trial provided ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant and the victim engaged in an argument and that defendant stabbed the victim while the victim was taking a shower. Moreover, the jury was entitled to infer that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim inasmuch as the evidence established that defendant inflicted a stab wound in the vicinity of the victim's vital organs, which resulted in the victim's death (see People v. Goley , 113 A.D.3d 1083, 1083, 977 N.Y.S.2d 847 [4th Dept. 2014] ; see also People v. Ross , 270 A.D.2d 36, 36, 704 N.Y.S.2d 560 [1st Dept. 2000], lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 803, 711 N.Y.S.2d 171, 733 N.E.2d 243 [2000] ). Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.