Opinion
108800
05-10-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert Anthony JONES, Appellant.
Mitchell S. Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant. Kristy L. Sprague, District Attorney, Elizabethtown (Jamie E. Martineau of counsel), for respondent.
Mitchell S. Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant.
Kristy L. Sprague, District Attorney, Elizabethtown (Jamie E. Martineau of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch, Clark and Pritzker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal, by permission, from an order of the County Court of Essex County (Meyer, J.), entered August 29, 2016, which partially denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 and 440.20 to vacate the judgment convicting him of the crimes of murder in the second degree, kidnapping in the first degree and rape in the first degree and to set aside the sentence, without a hearing.
On December 30, 1993, defendant was convicted of the federal crimes of bank robbery (four counts), interstate transport of firearms and use of a firearm during a crime of violence and was sentenced to serve 181 months in federal prison. The following week, in accordance with defendant's instructions, the attorneys who represented defendant on the federal charges contacted the Essex County District Attorney and indicated that defendant—who at that time remained unnamed—could provide information regarding a June 1987 unsolved disappearance of a 16–year–old girl (hereinafter the victim). Following extensive discussion and negotiation, defendant entered into and signed a written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to murder in the second degree, kidnapping in the first degree and rape in the first degree in exchange for a maximum aggregate sentence of 18 years to life in prison. Defendant further agreed to be interviewed by the police, during which time he would fully explain the circumstances of the victim's disappearance, acknowledge criminal responsibility for her death, identify the location of her remains and assist the authorities in recovering those remains. Defendant further agreed to execute a sworn statement setting forth all relevant facts resulting from this police interview. Defendant signed the written plea agreement and acknowledged, before a notary public, that he had read and executed the agreement after being advised by counsel, and that he had entered into it "freely, voluntarily, and of [his] own accord."
In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was interviewed—in the presence of counsel—by the State Police, at the start of which he acknowledged, among other rights, his right to remain silent and to stop the interview at any time. Defendant then proceeded to describe, with excruciating detail, his crimes against the victim and the location of her body. The interview was transcribed and defendant thereafter swore before a notary public that he had read the transcription of the interview and that the information he had given was "all true to the best of [his] knowledge and belief." Defendant was subsequently indicted and arraigned on the charges of murder in the second degree, kidnapping in the first degree and rape in the first degree and he pleaded guilty to those charges. Although not included in the written plea agreement, defendant also waived his right to appeal. Thereafter, as contemplated by the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 18 years to life.
More than 20 years later, after his application for parole was denied, defendant moved, pursuant to CPL 440.10 and 440.20, to vacate the judgment of conviction and to set aside his sentence, primarily asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. County Court partially denied the motion without a hearing, finding that defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally barred by CPL 440.10(2)(c) because they could have been raised on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, had he taken one, and that, in any event, his contentions lacked merit. With permission of this Court, defendant now appeals.
County Court did, however, grant that aspect of defendant's motion seeking to vacate his adjudication as a second felony offender and to correct his sentence for rape in the first degree to reflect such vacatur.
Initially, we disagree with County Court that defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally barred under CPL 440.10(2)(c). Under that provision, a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction must be denied when the trial record contains sufficient facts that would have allowed for "adequate review of the ground or issue raised ..., [but] no such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the defendant's ... unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actually perfected" ( CPL 440.10[2][c] ). Here, defendant bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on, among other things, his attorney's failure to (1) make a motion to suppress his confession as having been procured through coercive police tactics, including threats to his wife and father, and in violation of his right to counsel, (2) challenge his arrest as unsupported by probable cause and (3) attack the facts underlying his convictions, including the corroborating evidence supporting his allegedly coerced confession. Defendant also asserts that his attorney improperly advised him to reject a more favorable plea deal that allegedly offered him a shorter aggregate prison term of 20 years. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "constitutes a single, unified claim that must be assessed in totality" and defendant's allegations are grounded upon matters appearing both on the record and outside the record, CPL 440.10(2)(c) does not operate to bar defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ( People v. Taylor, 156 A.D.3d 86, 91–92, 64 N.Y.S.3d 714 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1120, 77 N.Y.S.3d 345, 101 N.E.3d 986 [2018] ; see People v. Maxwell, 89 A.D.3d 1108, 1109, 933 N.Y.S.2d 386 [2011] ; see generally People v. Evans, 16 N.Y.3d 571, 575 n 2, 925 N.Y.S.2d 366, 949 N.E.2d 457 [2011], cert denied 565 U.S. 912, 132 S.Ct. 325, 181 L.Ed.2d 201 [2011] ).
Nevertheless, defendant was not entitled to a hearing on his motion. It is not necessary to conduct a hearing on every motion made pursuant to CPL 440.10 and, indeed, a hearing is not required when the motion can be resolved on the motion submissions and the record (see People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796, 799, 497 N.Y.S.2d 903, 488 N.E.2d 834 [1985] ; People v. Pabon, 157 A.D.3d 1057, 1058, 69 N.Y.S.3d 192 [2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 986, 77 N.Y.S.3d 663, 102 N.E.3d 440 [2018] ; People v. LaPierre, 108 A.D.3d 945, 946, 969 N.Y.S.2d 605 [2013] ). "To demonstrate the existence of questions of fact requiring a hearing, [a] defendant [is] obliged to show ‘that the nonrecord facts sought to be established are material and would entitle him [or her] to relief’ " ( People v. LaPierre, 108 A.D.3d at 946, 969 N.Y.S.2d 605, quoting People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d at 799, 497 N.Y.S.2d 903, 488 N.E.2d 834 ; see People v. Brandon, 133 A.D.3d 901, 903, 20 N.Y.S.3d 432 [2015], lvs denied 27 N.Y.3d 992, 1000, 38 N.Y.S.3d 103, 59 N.E.3d 1215 [2016] ).
Significantly, "[a] defendant is not denied effective assistance of trial counsel merely because counsel does not make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success" ( People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 287, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 [2004] ; see People v. Brandon, 133 A.D.3d at 903, 20 N.Y.S.3d 432 ; People v. Trombley, 91 A.D.3d 1197, 1203, 937 N.Y.S.2d 665 [2012], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 914, 966 N.Y.S.2d 366, 988 N.E.2d 895 [2013] ). The record belies defendant's assertion—supported solely by his own self-serving affidavit (see People v. Lewis, 138 A.D.3d 1346, 1348, 30 N.Y.S.3d 387 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1073, 47 N.Y.S.3d 232, 69 N.E.3d 1028 [2016] ; People v. Brandon, 133 A.D.3d at 904, 20 N.Y.S.3d 432 )—that his confession was coerced and/or obtained in violation of his right to counsel and, thus, should have been challenged by way of a suppression motion. The record establishes that defendant's own actions precipitated his arrest, prosecution and the resulting plea agreement, as the authorities did not have any "leads or ... reasonable prospects for the development of any leads" until defendant directed the attorneys who represented him on the federal charges to approach the Essex County District Attorney with information regarding the victim's disappearance. Additionally, the written plea agreement, sworn transcript of defendant's police interview and the plea colloquy all demonstrate that defendant was aware of his right to remain silent and that his statements to the police regarding his crimes against the victim were voluntarily given in contemplation of securing a favorable plea deal for himself and for his wife—who was facing federal charges for her involvement in the bank robberies. Moreover, during the plea colloquy, defendant swore that his confession had not been obtained illegally or involuntarily, that he was pleading guilty of his "own free will" and that neither he nor any member of his family had been "threatened or abused in any way" in order to induce his confession. Under these circumstances, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to make a motion to suppress defendant's confession (see People v. Lewis, 138 A.D.3d at 1348–1349, 30 N.Y.S.3d 387 ; People v. Vonneida, 130 A.D.3d 1322, 1322–1323, 13 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1093, 23 N.Y.S.3d 650, 44 N.E.3d 948 [2015] ). For similar reasons, counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge defendant's arrest as unsupported by probable cause (see People v. Baez, 24 A.D.3d 112, 115–116, 804 N.Y.S.2d 316 [2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 809, 812 N.Y.S.2d 448, 845 N.E.2d 1279 [2006] ).
At defendant's parole hearing, he stated that his counsel had repeatedly advised him against coming forward with information.
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In addition, defense counsel's representation was not deficient when he did not challenge defendant's confession as uncorroborated (see CPL 60.50 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, any such challenge would have likely been futile, as his confession was sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of the victim's remains at the particular burial location described by defendant, not far from his family's cabin (see People v. Mulgrave, 163 A.D.2d 538, 539, 558 N.Y.S.2d 607 [1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 989, 563 N.Y.S.2d 777, 565 N.E.2d 526 [1990] ). Finally, given the crimes to which defendant pleaded guilty, County Court could not have lawfully imposed the alleged plea offer of a 20–year determinate prison sentence that defense counsel supposedly advised defendant to reject (see Penal Law § 70.00[1] ). Defendant's remaining contentions are conclusory in nature, unsupported by his motion submissions or, to some extent, contradicted by the record (see People v. Pabon, 157 A.D.3d at 1058, 69 N.Y.S.3d 192 ). In short, considering his guilty plea, the circumstances leading up to that plea and the fact that defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea bargain, defendant failed to demonstrate that the factual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in his affidavit, if true, would entitle him to relief (see People v. Oddy, 144 A.D.3d 1322, 1324, 41 N.Y.S.3d 316 [2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1131, 64 N.Y.S.3d 681, 86 N.E.3d 573 [2017] ; People v. Decker, 139 A.D.3d 1113, 1117, 30 N.Y.S.3d 751 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 928, 40 N.Y.S.3d 357, 63 N.E.3d 77 [2016] ; People v. St. John, 163 A.D.2d 687, 688, 558 N.Y.S.2d 294 [1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 944, 563 N.Y.S.2d 73, 564 N.E.2d 683 [1990] ). Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to a hearing, and County Court properly denied his motion (see People v. Lewis, 138 A.D.3d at 1349, 30 N.Y.S.3d 387 ; People v. Baptiste, 306 A.D.2d 562, 570, 760 N.Y.S.2d 594 [2003], lv denied 1 N.Y.3d 594, 776 N.Y.S.2d 226, 808 N.E.2d 362 [2004] ).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch and Pritzker, JJ., concur.