Opinion
1419 KA 09-02477.
12-31-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael D. JONES, Defendant–Appellant.
Catherine H. Josh, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Catherine H. Josh, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of attempted rape in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.351 ), attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree (§§ 110.00, 130.501 ) and assault in the second degree (§ 120.056 ), defendant contends that reversal is required based on pervasive prosecutorial misconduct on summation. We agree.
We note at the outset that, although defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review with respect to all but one alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct (see CPL 470.052 ), we exercise our power to review defendant's contention with respect to the remaining instances as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.156[a]; People v. Griffin, 125 A.D.3d 1509, 1510, 4 N.Y.S.3d 434). On summation, the prosecutor repeatedly invoked a “safe streets” argument (see People v. Tolliver, 267 A.D.2d 1007, 1007, 701 N.Y.S.2d 206, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 908, 707 N.Y.S.2d 392, 728 N.E.2d 991), even after Supreme Court sustained defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's use of that argument; denigrated the defense by calling defense counsel's arguments “garbage,” “smoke and mirrors,” and “nonsense” intended to distract the juror's focus from the “atrocious acts” that defendant committed against the victim (see People v. Morgan, 111 A.D.3d 1254, 1255, 974 N.Y.S.2d 687; People v. Spann, 82 A.D.3d 1013, 1015, 918 N.Y.S.2d 588; People v. Brown, 26 A.D.3d 392, 393, 812 N.Y.S.2d 561); improperly characterized the defense as being based on a “big conspiracy” against defendant by the prosecutor and the People's witnesses (see People v. Cowan, 111 A.D.2d 343, 345, 489 N.Y.S.2d 325, lv. denied 65 N.Y.2d 978, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1046, 484 N.E.2d 676); and denigrated the fact that defendant had elected to invoke his constitutional right to a trial (see People v. Rivera, 116 A.D.2d 371, 373, 501 N.Y.S.2d 817). Perhaps most egregiously, given that “the potential danger posed to defendant when DNA evidence is presented as dispositive of guilt is by now obvious,” the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she mischaracterized and overstated the probative value of the DNA evidence in this case (People v. Wright, 25 N.Y.3d 769, 783, 16 N.Y.S.3d 485, 37 N.E.3d 1127).
We recognize, of course, that “[r]eversal is an ill-suited remedy for prosecutorial misconduct” (People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 430 N.E.2d 885). It is nevertheless mandated when the conduct of the prosecutor “has caused such substantial prejudice to the defendant that he [or she] has been denied due process of law. In measuring whether substantial prejudice has occurred, one must look at the severity and frequency of the conduct, whether the court took appropriate action to dilute the effect of that conduct, and whether review of the evidence indicates that without the conduct the same result would undoubtedly have been reached” (People v. Mott, 94 A.D.2d 415, 419, 465 N.Y.S.2d 307; see Griffin, 125 A.D.3d at 1511, 4 N.Y.S.3d 434). In view of the substantial prejudice caused by the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, including the fact that the evidence of guilt is less than overwhelming (see Griffin, 125 A.D.3d at 1512, 4 N.Y.S.3d 434), we agree with defendant that reversal is required.
In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and a new trial is granted.