Opinion
2013-06-14
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jeffrey JONES, Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered January 14, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered January 14, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3] ). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because “the minimal inquiry made by County Court was insufficient to establish that the court engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” ( People v. Box, 96 A.D.3d 1570, 1571, 946 N.Y.S.2d 525,lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 1024, 953 N.Y.S.2d 557, 978 N.E.2d 109 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Hamilton, 49 A.D.3d 1163, 1164, 856 N.Y.S.2d 375;People v. Brown, 296 A.D.2d 860, 860, 745 N.Y.S.2d 368,lv. denied98 N.Y.2d 767, 752 N.Y.S.2d 7, 781 N.E.2d 919). Indeed, on this record there is no basis upon which to conclude that the court ensured “that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” ( People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145). We nevertheless reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for youthful offender status ( see People v. Guppy, 92 A.D.3d 1243, 1243, 937 N.Y.S.2d 921,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 961, 950 N.Y.S.2d 113, 973 N.E.2d 211;People v. Potter, 13 A.D.3d 1191, 1191, 786 N.Y.S.2d 793,lv. denied4 N.Y.3d 889, 798 N.Y.S.2d 735, 831 N.E.2d 980), and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender ( see generally People v. Shrubsall, 167 A.D.2d 929, 930–931, 562 N.Y.S.2d 290). Finally, we conclude that “the court's reliance on the presentence report for its determination that defendant would not be afforded youthful offender status ‘constitutes an adequate explanation for the denial of defendant's request for such status' ” ( People v. Wargula, 86 A.D.3d 929, 930, 926 N.Y.S.2d 337,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 862, 932 N.Y.S.2d 28, 956 N.E.2d 809).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.