Opinion
June 15, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Linakis, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant's conviction of the crimes charged (see, People v Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1111; People v Conyers, 130 A.D.2d 677). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's pro se contention that the verdict convicting him of assault in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree was repugnant to the verdict acquitting him of criminal use of a firearm in the first degree has not been preserved for appellate review (see, People v Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985; People v De Meo, 123 A.D.2d 879, 880, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 826). In any event, we find the contention to be without merit (see, People v Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 6, rearg denied 55 N.Y.2d 1039; People v De Meo, supra).
We also find that the trial court's ruling permitting the Assistant District Attorney to examine a statement made by the defendant to his investigator has not been preserved for our review. Defense counsel not only failed to timely object to the trial court's ruling, but specifically consented to turn over the subject statement following a discussion on the record relating to the statement's contents (cf., People v Conklin, 64 A.D.2d 671; People v Marsh, 59 A.D.2d 623, lv denied 43 N.Y.2d 798).
Lastly, the defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant claims that the District Attorney failed to permit him to testify before the Grand Jury. He also challenges the sufficiency of the indictment. The Trial Justice properly refused to review the prior determination of another Justice denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The prior determination constituted the law of the case and was binding upon any Judge of coordinate jurisdiction (see, People v Finley, 104 A.D.2d 450, adhered to on rearg 107 A.D.2d 709; People v Hartigan, 90 A.D.2d 506). Although this court is not bound by the prior order as law of the case (see, People v Finley, supra), we agree that the indictment should stand. The defendant did not notify the District Attorney's office of his intention to testify until 21 days after the indictment was handed down and, therefore, his request to appear was untimely (see, CPL 190.50 [a]). Nor was the indictment factually insufficient as it set forth sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the conduct with which he was charged (see, CPL 200.50 [a]; People v Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 293; People v Di Noia, 105 A.D.2d 799, 800). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Niehoff and Spatt, JJ., concur.