Opinion
4-24-0462
06-11-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILNER JEANPIERRE, Defendant-Appellant
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County No. 23CF506 Honorable Rudolph M. Braud Jr., Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred in ordering defendant detained where it failed to address potential conditions of release.
¶ 2 Defendant, Wilner Jeanpierre, appeals the trial court's judgment granting the State's petition to deny him pretrial release based on the dangerousness standard. On appeal, defendant argues (1) the court erred in finding no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat he posed and (2) the State's verified petition was untimely because it was not filed at his first appearance before a judge. We agree with defendant's first argument and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In June 2023, defendant, Wilner Jeanpierre, was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2022)) and three counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(3)). He was arrested, and the trial court set his bond at $500,000. Defendant was unable to pay the bond and remained in pretrial custody.
¶ 5 On November 3, 2023, defendant filed a "Motion for Hearing" pursuant to section 110-7.5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)) "to determine appropriate pretrial conditions" of release. On December 6, 2023, the State filed a verified petition pursuant to section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)), seeking to deny defendant pretrial release based on the dangerousness standard.
¶ 6 On February 29, 2024, the trial court conducted a "hearing on the [State's] verified petition to deny defendant's pretrial release." The State proffered that on June 15, 2023, Chatham police officers were dispatched to defendant's residence in response to a reported sexual assault. Through their investigation, officers discovered that defendant's 11-year-old stepdaughter disclosed to her two sisters, defendant's 17-year-old biological daughter and his 18-year-old stepdaughter, that defendant "had inappropriately touched" her. Subsequently, "the 18-year-old disclosed that she had been assaulted by the defendant since she was 14 and that included penetration by the defendant since she was 16. The 17-year-old disclosed penetration [had occurred] two to three times a week for the past year." The 18-year-old shared with police a recording and text messages in which defendant admitted to having sex with her. The State introduced the probable cause statement into evidence, which contained substantially the same facts as its proffer.
¶ 7 In arguing that the trial court could impose conditions of pretrial release, defendant noted that he had no criminal history and scored in the low-to-moderate risk level on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI). Defendant suggested to the court that it could order him to "obtain a sex offender evaluation and commence any recommended treatment" and order him to comply with the two-year order of protection in his divorce proceedings that prohibited him from having contact with the three alleged victims in this case. Defendant further maintained that he would accept any additional conditions of release the court felt were necessary.
¶ 8 The trial court, in making its oral ruling granting the State's petition to detain defendant, stated the following:
"THE COURT: The verified petition that the state has filed is in compliance with the statute. You are charged with a detainable offense[ ]. The Court has considered the written pleading by the state, arguments in support, arguments by your counsel against and in favor of your pretrial release. I am specifically finding that the state has met their burden with respect to this petition by clear and convincing evidence based on the following: I need to be specific with my findings. The proffer contained in the petition, the verbiage used, the allegations of the potential alleged criminal activity ***. You're presumed innocent of the charges as you sit here today. ***
***
Based on [the VPRAI], the probable cause statement, I do find, specifically, based on the aforementioned, that there is no single condition or set of conditions that could be implemented to mitigate the threat or safety for the community at large. So I want to make sure that I'm crystal clear with my
findings, the allegations, per the proffer, in addition to the probable cause statement."
¶ 9 On February 29, 2024, the trial court also entered a written order granting the State's petition to deny defendant pretrial release. (The order was a pretrial detention form order. The date of the form itself was October 2023.) The form order contained a section for the court to provide its reasons for denying pretrial release. The nine reasons listed on the form are the nine factors listed in section 110-6.1(g) of the Code that the trial court is to consider when making a determination of dangerousness. See id. § 110-6.1(g). The trial court in this case checked the boxes indicating it was basing its decision on (1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses, (2) the identity of the people to whom defendant posed a threat, and (3) statements made by defendant. The court did not provide any additional explanation as to why no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed.
¶ 10 On March 12, 2024, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal utilizing the notice of appeal form in the Article VI Forms Appendix to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). The form lists several possible grounds for appellate relief and directs appellants to "check all that apply and describe in detail." Defendant checked two boxes. First, he checked the box indicating the trial court erred in determining no combination of conditions would reasonably ensure his appearance at later hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. In support of this ground for relief, defendant provided, in pertinent part, the following additional details: "The court ordered the Defendant detained almost entirely based upon the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and provided no explanation of its consideration of less restrictive conditions in its verbal ruling as transcribed or in its written order." Second, defendant checked the box next to the ground for relief labeled "Other." In support of the second ground for relief, defendant cited this court's decision in People v. Terry, 2024 IL App (4th) 231273-U, and provided the following additional detail: "The Court Order lacks specific, articulable facts for its decision-it fails to set forth reasoning specific to the Defendant for its conclusion at the Detention Hearing. Boxes are merely mechanically checked, with no additional explanation." Defendant also filed a memorandum in support of his notice of appeal, arguing (1) the court erred in finding no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat he posed and (2) the State's verified petition was untimely because it was not filed at his first appearance before a judge.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in finding no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat he posed and (2) the State's verified petition was untimely because it was not filed at his first appearance before a judge.
¶ 13 Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)) provides that all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. However, a defendant may be denied release if, in pertinent part, the State proves by clear and convincing evidence at a detention hearing that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and (3) no combination of conditions can mitigate against the threat the defendant poses to the safety of any person or the community. Id. §§ 110-6.1(a), (e)(1)-(3). We review a trial court's ruling denying a defendant pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. "[A]n abuse of discretion will be found only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." McGoey v. Brace, 2022 IL App (1st) 210322, ¶ 39.
¶ 14 First, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat his pretrial release posed to the safety of any person or the community. He asserts the court improperly based its finding solely on the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses without providing any "explanation of its consideration of less restrictive conditions in its verbal ruling as transcribed or in its written order." Defendant further contends the court failed to include specific findings in its written order explaining why less restrictive conditions could not be imposed.
¶ 15 Section 110-5(a) of the Code lists several factors a trial court must consider when "determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure *** the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release." 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). Section 110-10 of the Code sets forth the conditions of pretrial release that must be imposed (id. § 110-10(a)) and provides a nonexhaustive list of conditions that may be imposed, but only when they "include the least restrictive means and [are] individualized" (id. § 110-10(b)). If the court determines pretrial detention is necessary, section 110-6.1 provides that it must, in pertinent part, "make a written finding summarizing the court's reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).
¶ 16 Here, in finding no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed, the trial court stated in its oral ruling that it was basing its decision on the VPRAI, the allegations in the charging instrument, the State's proffer at the detention hearing, and the probable cause statement. This was the court's only mention of conditions of release during the hearing. The court's written order, which, again, was a form order requiring the court to check boxes next to statutory language, indicated the court was basing its decision to deny defendant pretrial release on the nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses, the identity of the people to whom defendant posed a threat, and statements made by defendant. The court did not provide any explanation in either its oral ruling or the written order as to why, based on the specific facts of this case and defendant's individual background and characteristics, no conditions of release could mitigate the threat defendant posed. Indeed, at no point did the court even address defendant's proposed conditions of release or any of the discretionary conditions that it could have imposed pursuant to section 110-10(b).
¶ 17 Based on the above, we find the trial court erred in ordering defendant detained where it failed to address potential conditions of release. As stated, the court mentioned conditions of release only once during its oral ruling, when it found that "no single condition or set of conditions *** could *** mitigate the threat" posed by defendant. The court never discussed any of the permissible conditions of release it could have imposed pursuant to section 110-10(b), let alone explain why it believed defendant would not comply with them, and it is unclear whether the court considered the factors set forth in section 110-5(a) that it was statutorily required to consider when determining which, if any, conditions of pretrial release would be appropriate. Moreover, the written order was not in compliance with section 110-6.1(h)(1) because it contained no explanation as to "why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1). The court merely checked boxes on a form order next to statutory language taken from section 110-6.1(g), and it did not include any facts specific to defendant's case or his background and characteristics.
¶ 18 Because the trial court failed to explain the basis for its finding that no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed, "this court cannot fulfill our role of determining whether the [trial] court properly exercised its discretion in ordering defendant's detention." Terry, 2024 IL App (4th) 231273-U, ¶ 12; see People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 24 (finding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make a record sufficient for this court to review its exercise of discretion); People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 22 (finding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to "make express findings, based on [the] defendant's individual circumstances, as to whether any condition or combination of conditions allow for [the] defendant's pretrial release"). Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion, and we remand for a new hearing on the State's petition consistent with this order.
¶ 19 In closing, we note defendant argues in his memorandum that the State's verified petition was untimely because it was not filed at his first appearance before a judge. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). However, no matter how liberally we construe defendant's notice of appeal, we cannot say it encompasses this claim. See Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 18 (stating that although this court liberally construes the contents of the notice of appeal, we lack the authority to excuse compliance with the supreme court rules governing appeals). Accordingly, we find defendant forfeited this argument, and we decline to address it on the merits. See Ill. S.Ct. Rs. 604(h), 606(d) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new hearing on the State's petition consistent with this order.
¶ 22 Reversed and remanded.