Opinion
April 13, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We concur in the findings of the Supreme Court that the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial ( see, CPL 30.30) was not violated.
The defendant was arraigned upon a felony complaint on September 18, 1990, and therefore the People had to be ready for trial within six months of that date ( see, People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 239; see also, People v. Durette, 222 A.D.2d 692), a period here amounting to 181 days. The People's first unambiguous, affirmative representation of trial readiness did not occur until May 26, 1992 ( see generally, People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331). Nevertheless, upon deducting from the 181 days the delay resulting from the defendant's and the codefendants' pretrial motions, delay to which the defendant or his codefendants consented, delay caused by continuances requested by the defense, and the periods of time during which a defendant was without counsel through no fault of the court ( see, CPL 30.30), only 163 days of the period from September 18, 1990, to May 26, 1992, are chargeable to the People. Therefore, they were ready within the time limit of the statute. Further, we find no post-readiness delay chargeable to the People ( see, People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529; People v. Caussade, 162 A.D.2d 4, 8-9). Accordingly, the defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied.
The defendant's claim that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support his conviction is not preserved for appellate review ( see, People v. Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 250). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
With regard to the defendant's Batson claim ( Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79), we find no basis to conclude that the People's peremptory challenges of four black potential jurors were exercised in a racially-discriminatory manner ( see, People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, aff'd 500 U.S. 352).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or are without merit.
Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.