Opinion
Docket No. CR-010556-23BX
11-17-2023
The People of The State of New York, v. John Jackson, Defendant.
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County (by David Berris, Esq.) For the Defendant: The Bronx Defenders (by William John, Esq.)
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County (by David Berris, Esq.)
For the Defendant: The Bronx Defenders (by William John, Esq.)
Matthew Bondy, J.
Defendant's substantive omnibus motion raises the distinction between the People's disclosure obligations for fact and testifying expert witnesses under §§ 245.20(1)(c) and (f). The court explains herein why the People's designation of a DMV witness as an expert was proper in this case. In doing so, the court attempts to remedy any confusion regarding the difference between fact and expert witnesses and the trial court's discretion to qualify an expert witness.
This decision also addresses, and rejects, the People's argument that a recent decision from the Fourth Department allows the People only to disclose impeachment material that relates to the subject matter of the case. The court instead continues to follow guidance from the First Department regarding the disclosure of impeachment materials. This guidance leads the court to hold that the People must produce underlying disciplinary records for substantiated and unsubstantiated complaints, without restriction as to the subject matter.
Defendant brought this motion seeking five enumerated requests for relief:
1. Invalidating the People's Certificate of Compliance ("COC") and Statement of Readiness pursuant to CPL § 245.50(3);
2. Issuing sanctions pursuant to CPL § 245.70(2) because the People have prejudiced defendant's ability to prepare for hearings and trial;
3. Compelling the People to produce additional discovery pursuant to CPL § 245.35(4);
4. Suppressing any and all statements taken from defendant for which the People served proper notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30, or in the alternative, granting a Huntley/Dunaway hearing; and,
5. Precluding the People from introducing at trial any evidence of defendant's prior convictions or bad acts pursuant to Sandoval/Ventimiglia.
Upon review and consideration of the parties' submissions, court file, and relevant law, the court rules as follows:
• Defendant's motions to invalidate the People's COC and Statement of Readiness, to issue sanctions, and to compel the People to produce additional discovery, are DENIED. However, the court orders the following:
- The People shall disclose unredacted IAB logs to defendant on or before December 5, 2023.
- The court will allow defendant sufficient time to review any unredacted IAB logs before trial.
• The court refers defendant's suppression and preclusion motions to the trial court but GRANTS the following hearings before trial:
-Huntley/Dunaway;
-Ventimiglia/Sandoval.
Procedural History and Timeline of the People's Disclosures
Defendant was arrested on May 3, 2023, issued a Desk Appearance Ticket, and charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (VTL § 511[1][a]) and violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL § 509[1]). On May 23, 2023, Defendant was arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charges, and released on his own recognizance.
The People filed a supporting deposition on June 12, 2023. On June 27, 2023, the People filed and served their COC, Notice of Readiness, and Automatic Disclosure Form. On August 7, 2023, the parties each submitted a letter to the court regarding discovery disputes. At an August 15, 2023 discovery conference, the parties reached an impasse regarding discovery issues and requested a motion schedule. Defendant filed his motion on September 6, 2023, the People filed their opposition on September 25, 2023, and defendant filed his reply on October 17, 2023.
Discussion
I. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the People's COC
A. The Legal Standards
The People's compliance with their discovery obligations is tied to the running of the speedy trial clock under CPL § 30.30. "The People 'shall not be deemed ready for trial' under CPL 30.30 until they have filed 'a proper certificate'" [of compliance] under CPL 245.50(1) (CPL 245.50[3])." (People v. Edwards, 74 Misc.3d 433, 437 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]).
A challenge to a statement of trial readiness requires an inquiry into "whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point to where it may be tried." (People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4 [1994]). "A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock." (Id.).
For the misdemeanor offenses at issue herein, pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), the prosecution must be ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of the action. Whether the People have satisfied their obligation is determined by "computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion." (People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 208 [1992]).
A valid COC is one that was "filed in good faith and [is] reasonable under the circumstances." (CPL§ 245.50[1]). "If any known discoverable materials were not exchanged prior to the filing of the COC, the prosecution must demonstrate how due diligence was exercised with regard to those items not exchanged. They must detail the reasonable inquiries made to obtain these discoverable materials." (People v. Perez, 75 Misc.3d 1205 A, at *3 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]).
CPL § 245.20(1) requires prosecutors to disclose to the defendant "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction and control." The statute sets forth a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to disclosure. CPL § 245.20(2), on the other hand, addresses the disclosures of items and information that are not in the prosecution's possession, custody or control and states in part that the prosecution "shall make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under subdivision one of this section and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control; provided that the prosecutor shall not be required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum material or information which the defendant may thereby obtain." This subsection further states, "For purposes of subdivision one of this section, all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution."
CPL § 245.55(1) mandates that a "flow of information [be] maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to place within his or her possession or control all material and information pertinent to the defendant and the offense or offenses charged," including discoverable evidence or information under CPL § 245.20(1)(k).
The required contents of a COC may be found in CPL § 245.50(1):
When the prosecution has provided the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article... it shall serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance. The certificate of compliance shall state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery. It shall also identify the items provided (§ 245.50[1]).
The last sentence of CPL § 245.50(1) states, "No adverse consequence to the prosecution or the prosecutor shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliance in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances; but the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in section 245.80 of this article." Furthermore, "The drastic remedy of eve-of-trial CPL § 30.30 dismissal for after-the-fact COC invalidity should be the exception, not the rule, and should be imposed only in the case of prosecutorial bad faith or unreasonable inaction[.]" (People v. Marin, 74 Misc.3d 1037, 1047 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]).
The parties have a continuing duty to disclose under CPL § 245.60. If additional discovery is provided prior to trial pursuant to § 245.60, CPL §§ 245.50(1) and (2) require the parties to serve and file a supplemental certificate of compliance:
Any supplemental certificate of compliance shall detail the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance. The filing of a supplemental certificate of compliance shall not impact the validity of the original certificate of compliance if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence pursuant to section 245.20 of this article, or if the additional discovery did not exist the time of the filing of the original certificate of compliance (CPL § 245.50[1-a]).
CPL § 245.10 contains a timeline for the automatic disclosures under § 245.20.
Untimely disclosures, however, do not necessarily invalidate a COC that was made in good faith after the exercise of due diligence:
As the legislative history of article 245 indicates, and as the article's sanctions and remedies provisions suggest, the new discovery law, designed as it was to be remedial in nature, should not be construed as an inescapable trap for the diligent prosecutor who professionally, assiduously and in good faith attempts to comply with their new and extensive requirements under the discovery statute, but through no fault of his or her own, is unable to comply with every aspect of the automatic discovery rules specified in CPL 245.20 (People v. Erby, 68 Misc.3d 625, 633 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2020]).(see also People v. Perez, 73 Misc.3d 171, 176 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021] ["[N]umerous courts have found that belated disclosures should not invalidate a certificate of compliance that was made in good faith after the exercise of due diligence where the delay resulted from, for example, minor oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, or a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable."]).
CPL § 245.60 imposes a continuing duty to disclose on the prosecution and the defendant. When either party "subsequently learns of additional material or information which it would have been under a duty to disclose pursuant to any provisions of this article had it known of it at the time of a previous discovery obligation or discovery order, it shall expeditiously notify the other party and disclose the additional material and information as required for initial discovery under this article." (CPL § 245.60).
Finally, the court may require the parties to "diligently confer to attempt to reach an accommodation as to any dispute concerning discovery prior to seeking a ruling from the court," require the parties to hold a "discovery compliance conference" prior to trial, require the prosecution to "file an additional certificate of compliance," and/or require "other measures or proceedings designed to carry into effect the goals of this article." (CPL § 245.35).
B. Analysis
1. The Parties' Arguments
Defendant sets forth two arguments in support of his motion to dismiss. First, defendant argues that the People improperly redacted IAB logs concerning Officer R. , a testifying police officer (see Defendant Mem., at 6-8). According to defendant, the People were required to file a motion for a protective order and establish good cause pursuant to CPL § 245.70(1) before they were permitted to redact the logs (see id. at 8). The People's failure to do so warrants invalidation of the COC (see id.).
In the interest of privacy, the court uses only the first initials of the officer's last name.
Second, defendant argues that the People failed to disclose the name of the "actual DMV representative who will testify," as defendant contends they must within 35 days of arraignment under CPL §§ 245.10(1)(a)(ii) and 245.20(1)(c) (id. at 9). Defendant argues at length that "[e]ven when the People are not currently in possession of relevant evidence, they must attempt to obtain the material." (Id. at 9).
In response, the People argue that the NYPD redacted the IAB logs pursuant to the New York Public Officer's Law (see People Mem., at 6). The People further argue that the redacted information, which includes the "name, contact information and precinct of the civilian complainant alleging the misconduct, as well as other identifying information of a civilian complainant," does not relate to the subject matter of this case against defendant (id.). In support of this argument, the People cite a recent Fourth Department case, People v. Johnson, - Misc.3d -, 2023 NY Slip Op 04064 at *1350 (4th Dept 2023), which the People claim substantiates the proposition that only information in an officer's personnel file that relates to the subject matter of a defendant's case must be disclosed pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1) (see People Mem., at 8). The People contend that they satisfied their CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) duties by disclosing summaries of the IAB complaints and the underlying IAB logs (see id. at 9).
With respect to disclosure of a DMV witness, the People argue that they stated in their automatic disclosures that they intend to call a DMV expert, and the timing of disclosure requirements for an expert witness are different under CPL § 245.20(1)(f) (see People Mem., at 10). Under that statutory subsection, the People contend that they are not required to disclose expert witness information until it becomes available, and at least 60 days prior to a scheduled trial date (see id. at 10-11). The People therefore claim they are compliant with the statute.
2. Analysis
a. Disclosure of DMV Witness
Turning first to the expert witness designation issue, the qualification of a witness to testify as an expert on a subject is within the reasonable discretion of the trial court and is appropriate when the testimony "would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror." (DeLong v. Erie County, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307 [1983]). "Before considering the opinion of an expert, the court must make a preliminary determination as to whether the proffered witness is an expert in the relevant field. To do so, the expert should be shown to possess the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted, or the opinion rendered is reliable in light of prevailing professional standards." (8 Carmody-Wait 2d § 56:142).
A witness need not have scientific training to be qualified as an expert witness at trial (see, e.g., People v. Siu Wah Tse, 91 A.D.2d 350, 353 [1st Dept 1983]) (holding that the trial court properly allowed a fifteen year veteran of the NYPD, who spent the last eight years studying the operation of Chinatown gangs, and whose knowledge was derived principally from observations, investigations, and information obtained from informants, to testify as an expert witness). Instead, an expert witness must have some specialized knowledge, which is not within the range of ordinary experience of most people (see 1 NY Evidence Proof of Cases § 14:19 ["An expert will generally be allowed to offer an opinion on an issue involving professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence. In other words, if the factual issue transcends the realm of knowledge that laypersons possess, expert testimony is required."]).
With respect to criminal discovery, CPL § 245.20(1)(c) addresses civilian fact witnesses and requires the People to disclose the following information:
The names and adequate contact information for all persons other than law enforcement personnel whom the prosecutor knows to have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto, including a designation by the prosecutor as to which of those persons may be called as witnesses. Nothing in this paragraph shall require the disclosure of physical addresses; provided, however, upon a motion and good cause shown the court may direct the disclosure of a physical address. Information under this subdivision relating to the identity of a 911 caller, the victim or witness of an offense defined under article one hundred thirty or section 230.34 or 230.34-a of the penal law, any other victim or witness of a crime where the defendant has substantiated affiliation with a criminal enterprise as defined in subdivision three of section 460.10 of the penal law, or a confidential informant may be withheld, and redacted from discovery materials, without need for a motion pursuant to section 245.70 of this article; but the prosecution shall notify the defendant in writing that such information has not been disclosed, unless the court rules otherwise for good cause shown. (CPL § 245.20[1][c]).
The disclosure timing requirements of CPL § 245.10 apply to this subsection.
On the other hand, CPL § 245.20(1)(f) addresses the disclosure and disclosure timing requirements of expert witnesses, including:
[T]he name, business address, current curriculum vitae, a list of publications, and a list of proficiency tests and results administered or taken within the past ten years of each expert witness whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial or a pre-trial hearing, and all reports prepared by the expert that pertain to the case, or if no report is prepared, a written statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. This paragraph does not alter or in any way affect the procedures, obligations or rights set forth in section 250.10 of this title. If in the exercise of reasonable diligence this information is unavailable for disclosure within the time period specified in subdivision one of section 245.10 of this article, that period shall be stayed without need for a motion pursuant to subdivision two of section 245.70 of this article; except that the prosecution shall notify the defendant in writing that such information has not been disclosed, and such disclosure shall be made as soon as practicable and not later than sixty calendar days before the first scheduled trial date, unless an order is obtained pursuant to section 245.70 of this article (CPL § 245.20[1][f]).
In this case, the People's Automatic Disclosure Form contains a heading for "Expert Opinion Evidence" and states, "The People anticipate calling a DMV expert, to be named at a later date." (People Mem., at Ex. 2). The Automatic Disclosure Form also contains a checked box, next to which states:
If checked, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that although the People have exercised reasonable diligence, this information is unavailable for disclosure within the time period specified in CPL § 245.10(1) and that the period for disclosure is stayed without need for a motion pursuant to CPL § 245.70 of this article. The People recognize that such disclosure shall be made as soon as practicable and not later than sixty calendar days before the first scheduled trial date. unless an order is obtained pursuant to CPL § 245.70 of this article (id.).
Thus, the People made it explicitly clear to the defense that their DMV witness is an expert witness and not a fact witness pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(c).
Moreover, this point is evident from the accusatory instrument itself. The allegations state that Officer R. was able to access DMV records through the police computer, a DMV printout showed defendant's suspended or revoked license, defendant could not produce a valid driver's license, and the DMV mails a notice of suspension/revocation to the driver at the last known address. Thus, the accusatory instrument makes no mention of any particular DMV employee having "evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto" (CPL § 245.20[1][c]), i.e., evidence or information regarding the alleged circumstances of defendant's arrest and the resulting charges. The defense's insistence that the People were obligated to disclose a DMV witness pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(c) therefore finds no support in the allegations of the accusatory instrument.
In his reply, defendant argues that "a DMV mail clerk is not an expert witness." (Defendant Reply Aff., at ¶ 18). Defendant opines that the People's DMV witness "is merely a lay person who has personal knowledge of how the DMV logs its records of mailing. The witness would explain how the letter was mailed, and how that event is recorded in a database... The mailing practices are not specialized information. There is nothing scientific about mailing records." (Id.).
Defendant's arguments are flawed. First, as previously explained, it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit a witness to testify as an expert (see People v. Inoa, 109 A.D.3d 765, 766 [1st Dept 2013]) [holding, "The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as an expert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recorded conversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony."]). Defendant may raise a challenge to the People's DMV witness's expert qualifications before the trial court, but at this time, such a challenge is premature - and certainly not grounds for dismissal of the accusatory instrument.
Second, in this same vein, defendant presumes to know the job title of the People's DMV witness ("mail clerk") and all topics of the witness's testimony. The People have not yet disclosed this information, and defendant therefore cannot know this information with certainty at this time. The DMV witness may testify regarding topics besides "the mailing of suspension notices," (id. at ¶ 16), and defendant's presumptions may be inaccurate and/or incomplete.
Third, as stated above, the People's DMV witness is not testifying as to the particular circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest, as this individual was not present for these events. Rather, the People represent that their DMV witness is an expert witness, meaning this person has specialized knowledge and/or experience - here, of DMV practices and procedures, although the People have not yet disclosed the topic or topics of testimony and opinion(s). Contrary to defendant's contentions, this information is not common knowledge and falls within the realm of expert knowledge.
Likewise, the defense's argument that "there is nothing scientific about mailing records" (Defendant Reply Aff., at ¶ 18) demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of expert witness testimony. As discussed above, expert witness testimony need not be scientific, such as testimony from an NYPD officer about gangs in Chinatown (see Siu Wah Tse, 91 A.D.2d at 353). Testimony from the DMV expert witness may include other DMV practices and procedures besides mailing records, e.g., the interpretation of a DMV abstract and the terminology used therein, reasons for license suspensions, any warning letters, the contents of a suspension letter, the number of suspension letters mailed, the method or methods of mailing and any other methods of notification, etc. - subjects which are "beyond the ken of the typical juror." (DeLong, 60 N.Y.2d at 307).
In this regard, defendant's argument that a DMV witness could not be a testifying expert witness because CPL § 245.20(1)(f) "speaks to reports, resumes, and lists of publications" (Defendant Reply Aff., at ¶ 18), misstates the statute. CPL § 245.20(1)(f) requires disclosure of, "Expert opinion evidence, including the name, business address, current curriculum vitae, a list of publications, and a list of proficiency tests and results administered or taken within the past ten years of each expert witness whom the prosecutor intends to call... and all reports prepared by the expert that pertain to the case, or if no report is prepared, a written statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." (CPL § 245.20[1][f]). An individual employed by the DMV could likely provide all items listed in the statute, except, perhaps, for publications. With respect to proficiency tests, some DMV employees presumably may take the Civil Service Examination.
Defendant further claims, "Labeling [DMV] witnesses as experts would confuse the jurors, and lead them to believe that the court is prohibiting them from finding the DMV's records are inaccurate." (Defendant Reply Aff., at ¶ 19). The court disagrees and finds there is no reason to think this would occur because the People's DMV witness will testify at trial. The defense will therefore have the opportunity to cross-examine this witness and try to elicit favorable testimony regarding all issues, including any alleged infirmities in the DMV's procedures, the absence of evidence as to any mailing to defendant, inaccuracies in DMV records, etc. The designation of the DMV witness as an expert does not preclude defense counsel from attempting to discredit the witness's testimony and advocating for defendant at trial, just as defense counsel would do with the People's other witnesses.
Both parties also discuss any potential violation of the Confrontation Clause. As long as the People produce a witness who can be adequately cross-examined regarding DMV notice procedures at the time of mailing to defendant, there will be no violation of the Confrontation Clause (see People v. Abelo, 79 A.D.3d 668, 670-71 [1st Dept 2010]). In any event, the Confrontation Clause has no bearing on the issue of whether the DMV is a fact or an expert witness and when the People must make their disclosures under CPL § 245.20(1).
Finally, defendant argues that "[e]ven if the DMV mail clerk is an expert witness, the Legislature did not endow prosecutors with infinite time to select a witness." (Id. at ¶ 21). According to defendant, CPL § 245.20(1)(f) requires the People to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the name of the DMV witness, and if they are unable to do so, they must file a motion under CPL § 245.70 (see id.). The defense claims the assigned ADA did not exercise the requisite "due diligence" and "never called or emailed the DMV at all." (Id. at ¶ 23).
However, CPL § 245.20(1)(f) does not mandate the manner in which the People must exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the information - and the People's Automatic Disclosures state that the People exercised reasonable diligence and were unable to obtain the information. The Automatic Disclosures also state, as required, that the information is unavailable for disclosure. So long as the People disclose the information within the timeframe set forth in CPL § 245.20(1)(f), they will have complied with the statute. The court will therefore not invalidate the COC on the grounds that the People should have disclosed the name of their DMV witness under CPL § 245.20(1)(c).
b. Redactions
With respect to the disclosure of underlying impeachment materials, the law is unsettled and lacks uniform appellate guidance. The court therefore begins its analysis with relevant case law from the First Department, which is binding on this court.
In Matter of Jayson C., 200 A.D.3d 447, 448 (1st Dept 2021), the appellant juvenile, who was facing criminal prosecution in Family Court, sought discovery of impeachment information under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). In response to the appellant's discovery demand, the presentment agency produced "disclosure letters" about the police officers involved in the appellant's arrest (id.). The "disclosure letters" summarized the officers' disciplinary histories, and the presentment agency argued that it need not provide any additional information under the Family Court Act (id.). The Family Court agreed with the presentment agency, denied the appellant's request for "'further witness information'" under the CPL, including under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv), and held that the provisions of the CPL cited by the appellants were "expressly inapplicable and preempted in juvenile delinquency cases" pursuant to the Family Court Act (id. at 449).
In reversing the Family Court's decision on equal protection grounds, the First Department emphasized, "The need for impeachment evidence is equally crucial in both delinquency and criminal proceedings. A similarly situated defendant in a criminal proceeding would be entitled to access to the impeachment materials requested by appellant." (Id. at 449.). The court found that CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) "broadly requires disclosure of all impeachment evidence," and the appellant was therefore denied equal protection of the laws (id.) (emphasis supplied). The Appellate Term, First Department subsequently relied on Jayson C. in People v. Rodriguez, 77 Misc.3d 23, 25 (App Term, 1st Dept 2022), holding that the People's failure to produce underlying impeachment materials was among the grounds for dismissal of the case.
On the other hand, in People v. Johnson, ___ Misc.3d ___, 2023 NY Slip Op 04064 at *1350 (4th Dept 2023), the Fourth Department held that CPL § 245.20(1)(k) is qualified by both requirements in CPL § 245.20(1) that impeachment material relate to the subject matter of the case and is in the People's possession, custody or control. The court further held that a defendant is "not automatically entitled to the entirety of a police officer's personnel file as impeaching material under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv), but rather only to the extent that the information 'relate[d] to the subject matter of the case' (CPL 245.20[1])." (Id.). The Fourth Department also held that summaries of an officer's disciplinary history would suffice (see id.).
The court is guided by Jayson C. and Rodriguez to require the People to produce underlying disciplinary records for substantiated and unsubstantiated complaints. Pursuant to these decisions, summaries are inadequate, and underlying impeachment materials are not restricted.
The court does not herein decide whether the underlying impeachment materials would be admissible at hearings or trial.
As for redactions, CPL § 245.20(6) limits the scope of permissible redactions to disclosures: "Either party may redact social security numbers and tax numbers from disclosures under this article." CPL §§ 245.20(1)(c), (d), (g), and (u)(iv) allow for redactions in limited circumstances not applicable here. Should a party wish to make further redactions to disclosures than those permitted by CPL §§ 245.20(6) and 245.20(1), CPL § 245.70 permits a party to move for a protective order upon a showing of good cause.
In light of this statutory framework, courts have held that the prosecution may not unilaterally redact Giglio material (see People v. Best, 76 Misc.3d 1210 (A), at *6 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2022]; People v. Guzman, 77 Misc.3d 1223 (A), at *4 [Crim Ct, New York County 2023]; People v. Sherman, 78 Misc.3d 975, 985 [Dist Ct, Suffolk County 2023]). Instead, the prosecution must seek a protective order (see People v. Goggins, 76 Misc.3d 898, 902 [Crim Ct, Bronx County, 2022]).
Any redactions of social security and tax identifying numbers were permissible but further redactions were not in the absence of a protective order. Accordingly, the court orders the People to disclose the unredacted IAB logs to defendant on or before December 5, 2023.
The court declines to invalidate the COC because of the redactions. The People believed in good faith that the redactions were permissible in accordance with their understanding of the law, which, as previously stated, is unsettled. However, the court will allow defendant sufficient time to review any unredacted logs before trial.
The court finds the People's June 27, 2023 COC to be valid and denies defendant's motion to dismiss.
The court's calculation of time is as follows:
May 23, 2023 - June 27, 2023 (35 days charged): Defendant was arraigned on May 23, 2023. The People filed and served their COC, Notice of Readiness, and Automatic Disclosure Form on June 27, 2023.
Defendant's Suppression Motions and Requests for Hearings
Defendant seeks to suppress any statements for which notice was served or in the alternative, he moves for a Huntley/Dunaway hearing. Defendant further requests that the People notify him of all misconduct and criminal acts that they intend to use at trial pursuant to CPL § 245.20(3) and to preclude the People from entering into evidence any of defendant's prior arrests or bad acts pursuant to Ventimiglia/Sandoval (see Defendant Mem., at 13-14).
The People oppose defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence and his motion for a Dunaway hearing but consent to his request for a Huntley hearing. The People further oppose defendant's Sandoval motion and request that admissibility be deferred for resolution by the trial court. The People state that they are aware of their discovery obligations under CPL §§ 245.10(1)(b) and 245.20(3) and will provide any existing information prior to the commencement of jury selection (see People Mem., at 25).
In light of these arguments, the court refers defendant's suppression and preclusion motions to the trial court but grants the hearings defendant requests, namely:
Huntley/Dunaway;
Ventimiglia/Sandoval.
II. Other Motions
Defendant further asks the Court to order the People to "comply with their discovery obligations" and asserts that the court "must grant this relief regardless of whether the Court deems the Certificate of Compliance valid." (Defendant Mem., at 13). The court finds this broad assertion of what the court must do to be vague and unspecific. The court assumes that the People know their obligations under the CPL and will comply with them.
Lastly, although defendant does not include this request in his notice of motion and instead briefly makes this request in his conclusion, the court denies defendant's reservation of rights to file additional motions subject to CPL § 255.20(3) for leave to file upon a showing of good cause.
The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the court.