Opinion
2011-1756 K CR
02-17-2015
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Reginald Jackson, Appellant.
PRESENT: : , PESCE and SOLOMON, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), rendered April 8, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of trespass (Penal Law § 140.05).
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
The proof adduced at a nonjury trial established that on March 29, 2010, during a dispute with his landlord, defendant called the police. Dissatisfied with the police investigation and resolution of the matter, defendant subsequently went to the 81st Precinct in Brooklyn to file a complaint. The police asserted that defendant was loud and disruptive while at the precinct. The precinct commander and a sergeant informed defendant that if he did not calm down, he would have to leave the precinct. Thereafter, the sergeant and a patrol officer directed defendant to leave the precinct. Defendant defied the orders, and was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20 [1]) and trespass (Penal Law § 140.05). After a nonjury trial, he was convicted of trespass.
In exercising our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we accord great deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 645 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Zephyrin, 52 AD3d 543 [2008]). We must weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence and whether the finder of fact failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (id.; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348). In this case, an acquittal would have been unreasonable. Consequently, the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence. Defendant remained unlawfully in the precinct (see Penal Law § 140.05), as he had lost his license and privilege to remain in the precinct by defying lawful orders not to remain in the premises, "personally communicated to him by . . . [an] authorized person" (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]; see People v Leonard, 62 NY2d 404, 408 [1984]; People v Munroe, 18 Misc 3d 9, 11 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).
Defendant failed to object when the prosecutor asked leading questions to elicit certain testimony from a police officer (cf. People v Rouse, 4 AD3d 553, 555-556 [2004]). In any event, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion to permit leading questions ( see People v Weaver, 302 AD2d 872, 873 [2003]). Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, several of the questions were not leading, and the other questions "were not so leading that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion providently in permitting them" ( People v Jenkins, 21 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52196[U], *2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]; see People v Soler, 294 AD2d 286, 286-287 [2002]).
The orders communicated by the police to defendant clearly and unequivocally indicated that he had to leave the precinct. The orders were lawful and, personally communicated to defendant by an authorized person.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Aliotta, J.P., Pesce and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 17, 2015