Opinion
No. 2013–585QCR.
09-17-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael JACKSON, Appellant.
Opinion
Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from a sentence of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Gene R. Lopez, J.), imposed January 30, 2013, upon his conviction of disorderly conduct, upon his plea of guilty.
ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.
Following defendant's arrest for driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 11924–a ), and failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172[a] ), defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20) pursuant to a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement in full satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, and was sentenced to, among other things, a $250 fine. He now seeks at least partial relief from the amount of the fine, which is the lawful maximum fine for the offense (see Penal Law § 80.054 ), on the ground that it is unduly harsh and excessive.
As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement “has no basis to now complain that his sentence was excessive” (People v. Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816, 817 1984; see e.g. People v. Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 2010; People v. Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 2009; People v. Rosario, 47 Misc.3d 141[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 50622[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; People v. Anant, 44 Misc.3d 138[A], 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 51252[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014] ). We find no reason to conclude that the court abused its sentencing discretion or that “ “extraordinary circumstances exist warranting a modification of the sentence in the interest of justice” (People v. Taylor, 44 Misc.3d 129[A], 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 50986[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; see CPL 470.153; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 86 1982 ). The fine is not inherently onerous, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant lacks “ “the resources to pay ... the fine, despite the appointment of assigned counsel to represent him” (People v. Watson, 90 AD3d 1666, 1668 2011; see also People v. Gallacher, 278 A.D.2d 935, 936 2000 [“ “Although the fine is the maximum amount allowed by law, there is no evidence that defendant is unable to pay the fine”]; cf. People v. Helm, 260 A.D.2d 803, 803 1999 [fine reduced where “there is no dispute that defendant is indigent and qualified for assigned counsel ... (because his) income (is) at or below the poverty level”] ), and, indeed, he has paid the fine. In any event, given that, after being stopped for a traffic violation, defendant exhibited indicia of impairment by alcohol, and that a urine analysis revealed the presence of a metabolite of cannabis in his system (he admitted to the arresting officer that he had smoked marihuana only 15–20 minutes before being stopped), the $250 fine is not unduly harsh or excessive.
Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.