Opinion
A147008
09-07-2017
In re I.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.V., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J15-01072)
I.V. appeals from a dispositional order in juvenile delinquency proceedings declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), and placing him on probation with various conditions. The initial wardship petition, alleging a violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), for inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse, cohabitant, or co-parent, did not specifically allege that I.V. and his girlfriend, E.D., were in a "dating relationship" at the time he committed acts of alleged domestic violence against her. The primary issue here is whether I.V.—charged in an amended petition and found to have committed the lesser included offense of violating section 243, subdivision (e)(1) for battering a former or current spouse, cohabitant, co-parent, fiancée, or dating partner—received notice adequate to satisfy due process. Concluding that there was no due process violation and that the trial court properly permitted amendment of the petition to allege the lesser included offense, we affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. BACKGROUND
A. October 11, 2015 Domestic Violence Incident
I.V. and E.D. had been dating for over a year when the incident that eventually prompted this appeal occurred. Throughout their relationship, I.V. had been abusive toward E.D. on five occasions, each time leaving bruises and once breaking E.D.'s glasses. On October 11, 2015, I.V.—then 17 years of age—committed the charged incident of domestic abuse against his girlfriend, E.D. During that evening, I.V. and E.D. were at E.D.'s house, while her family was home. At some point in the evening, I.V. became suspicious E.D. was cheating on him and obtained E.D.'s phone without her consent. I.V. could not unlock E.D.'s phone, but was able to see notifications for messages, including a Snapchat message. Although there is a dispute between I.V. and E.D. as to what the text message said, the message was from the boy with whom I.V. believed E.D. was cheating on him. As a result, I.V. became upset and began arguing with E.D.
Snapchat is an instant messaging application for smartphones, which deletes texts seconds after the recipient opens and reads them.
During their argument, I.V. bit E.D. on the left cheek—in her words, "like, kind of hard"—hurting her and leaving a mark. While I.V. was biting her, E.D. tried to push him away from her, which later caused her nails to hurt. After arguing for some time, I.V. began crying and went onto the balcony, where he put his leg over the railing. E.D. eventually coaxed I.V. back inside the house, and asked him to leave, as it was around the time of night when her parents did not like her having friends over. I.V. refused to leave. I.V. then punched E.D. in the stomach and tried to grab his phone (which E.D. was holding since I.V. had hers), scratching her on the stomach in the process.
E.D. then tried to go to her parents' room for help, but I.V. stopped her by grabbing her right arm. Eventually, I.V. let go and went to the kitchen, where he searched through the cabinets and grabbed a knife. I.V. then left E.D.'s residence and went next door, where the boy who had texted E.D. lived. Knife in hand, I.V. knocked at that residence's front door to confront the boy. Simultaneously, E.D. told her mother what had happened, prompting her mother to call the police.
When the police arrived, the first officer on the scene saw I.V. with a knife in his hand. The officer asked I.V. to sit down, and I.V. threw the knife over a fence. The police eventually arrested I.V. I.V. has consistently denied ever intentionally hurting E.D. E.D. obtained a civil restraining order against I.V. after this incident.
B. October 14, 2015 Wardship Petition
On October 14, 2015, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that on October 11, 2015, I.V. had "willfully and unlawfully inflicted corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon [E.D.], who was the spouse of [I.V.], a person cohabiting with [I.V.], and/or the mother or father of [I.V.'s] child"—in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a). At the crux of I.V.'s appeal is that this petition did not specifically and explicitly note the People were alleging he and E.D. were in a "dating relationship."
C. October 15, 2015 Detention Hearing
At a hearing on October 15, 2015, the trial court found that "the notice of this hearing has been given as required by law," and that the People had made a "prima faci[e] showing that [I.V. was] a person described by [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 602," with no objections raised by I.V. The court specifically stated that "the alleged victim is someone with whom [I.V.] had [a] dating or companionship or [sic] relationship." The court found probable cause to continue I.V.'s detention in juvenile hall.
D. November 5, 2015 Contested Jurisdiction Hearing
At the contested jurisdiction hearing on November 5, 2015, E.D., I.V., and the first police officer on the scene testified as to the October 11, 2015 incident. Toward the end of the hearing, the court sua sponte brought up the issue which is now the subject of this appeal. Noting that the petition did not allege I.V. and E.D. were in a "dating relationship," the court stated: "This charge does not give notice to the defense as to that particular clause that you're relying on in the statute. They can't defend against that portion of the statute which isn't charged in the language of the petition. So it's lacking." The court then modified the wardship petition, reducing the charge from section 273.5, subdivision (a), to section 243, subdivision (e)(1). The district attorney argued no modification of the petition was necessary because "the statutory language is the proper legal authority here."
Section 273.5, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide: "(a) Any person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim described in subdivision (b) is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of up to six thousand dollars ($6,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment. [¶] (b) Subdivision (a) shall apply if the victim is or was one or more of the following: [¶] (1) The offender's spouse or former spouse. [¶] (2) The offender's cohabitant or former cohabitant. [¶] (3) The offender's fiancé or fiancée, or someone with whom the offender has, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship, as defined in paragraph (10) of subdivision (f) of Section 243. [¶] (4) The mother or father of the offender's child."
Section 243, subdivision (e)(1) provides in relevant part: "When a battery is committed against a spouse, a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child, former spouse, fiancé or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating or engagement relationship, the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment."
E. November 20, 2015 Disposition Hearing
At the disposition hearing, the court considered the report submitted by the probation department and largely adopted its recommendations. The court also heard testimony from I.V.'s father. Ultimately, the court noted that "[t]his is a very, very disturbing case on a lot of levels," "that the minor has [not shown] a great deal of remorse for [E.D.] here," and that "he needs to be in the custody of the county in a rehabilitative place." The court then declared I.V. "a ward with no termination," removed him from the custody of his parents, and ordered him placed for six months at the "Ranch regular program plus the customary 90-day parole period." The court also ordered the "[s]tandard conditions of probation," an apology letter from I.V. to E.D., counseling sessions, a 52-week batterers' intervention program, and a no-contact order with regard to E.D.
I.V. filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"We review the order authorizing the amendment [of a wardship petition] for an abuse of discretion." (In re D.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 313, 321 (D.W.).) "Here, [I.V.] argues the court abused that discretion by depriving him of his due process right to adequate notice of the charge[ ] against him." (See ibid.)
B. I.V. Received Adequate Notice
1. Relevant Language from Section 273.5 and I.V.'s Challenge to the Wardship Petition
Subdivision (a) of section 273.5 provides that "[a]ny person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim described in subdivision (b) is guilty of a felony." Subdivision (b) of the statute, in turn, provides that "[s]ubdivision (a) shall apply if the victim is or was one or more of the following," and includes a list of potential relationships that would satisfy this element of the offense. (§ 273.5, subd. (b), italics added.) One of the specified relationships is "someone with whom the offender has, or has previously had . . . [a] dating relationship." (§ 273.5, subd. (b)(3).)
I.V. argues that the juvenile court violated his "right to due process and adequate notice under the Fourteenth Amendment" of the United States Constitution, as well as under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, because the district attorney failed to allege he and E.D. were in a "dating relationship." Instead, in the wardship petition, the district attorney charged I.V. with violating section 273.5, subdivision (a), by "willfully and unlawfully inflict[ing] corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon [E.D.], who was the spouse of [I.V.], a person cohabiting with [I.V.], and/or the mother or father of [I.V.'s] child." Because there is no dispute that I.V. and E.D. were in a dating relationship at the time of the alleged offense, we reject this argument as further explained below.
2. The Initial Wardship Petition Provided I.V. with Adequate Notice of the Charge of Violating Section 273.5 , Subdivision (a)
" ' " 'Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.' " ' " (In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 440 (Robert G.).)
In the context of criminal pleading, by analogy, section 959 provides that "[t]he accusatory pleading is sufficient if it" meets certain criteria, including proper jurisdiction, the defendant's name, and a showing "[t]hat the offense was committed at some time prior to the filing of the accusatory pleading." Section 952 further provides that, "[i]n charging an offense, each count shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains in substance, a statement that the accused has committed some public offense therein specified. Such statement may be made in ordinary and concise language without any technical averments or any allegations of matter not essential to be proved. It may be in the words of the enactment describing the offense or declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused." (Italics added.)
" ' "[I]n a nutshell . . . the accused is entitled to notice of the offense of which he is charged but not to the particular circumstances thereof . . . ." ' " (People v. Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 354-355 (Mason), italics added; accord, Brown v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 628, 632-633 [notice provided by complaint].) "The charging document provides notice to the accused. As long as it serves that purpose, it is adequate." (In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 127.) The initial wardship petition here was sufficient under relevant legal standards to provide I.V. with adequate notice of the offense alleged.
I.V. contends he did not receive adequate notice of the charge of violating section 273.5, subdivision (a) because the petition only alleged that E.D. was his "spouse," "cohabit[ant]," "and/or the mother" of his child, and did not specifically allege what he claims is a key element of the offense—he and E.D. were in a "dating relationship." We disagree. The wardship petition plainly meets minimum requisites of section 959. The petition complies with section 952 as well, since its words were "sufficient to give [I.V.] notice of the offense of which he is accused": he allegedly violated section 273.5, subdivision (a). The notice pleading standard established by these statutes is adequate to satisfy due process demands here. Although the petition does not list "dating relationship" in the phraseology of subdivision (b), we take that to be a "particular circumstance" of one element of the alleged offense. (See Mason, supra, 184 Cal.App.2d at p. 355.)
The "particular circumstance" involved in this case—that I.V. and E.D. were in a dating relationship—is not an element of the charged offense. It is simply one way in which the relationship status that is an element of the offense may be proved. Subdivision (a) of section 273.5 provides that "[a]ny person who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim described in subdivision (b) is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished" in certain ways. Subdivision (b) of the statute, in turn, provides that "[s]ubdivision (a) shall apply if the victim is or was one or more of the following," and lists four types of qualifying relationships, including "dating relationship." (§ 273.5, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) We are satisfied that the petition as originally filed adequately alleged a qualifying relationship. We do not agree with the trial court's apparent conclusion to the contrary.
The Legislature has, over the years, expanded the number of victims covered by section 273.5, subdivision (a)—including now those who are or were formerly in a "dating relationship." (See Stats. 2013, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5461; cf. Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 849-850 [discussing the use of "dating relationship" in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, which utilizes the same definition as in the Penal Code].) This amendment "reflect[s] the Legislature's understanding that domestic violence occurs in both cohabiting and noncohabiting intimate relationships." (People v. Burton (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.) Some commentators have pointed out that youth are often overlooked in domestic violence statutes. (See, e.g., Note, Refining the Meaning and Application of "Dating Relationship" Language in Domestic Violence Statutes (2007) 60 Vand. L. Rev. 939, 943 ["It is incumbent upon state legislatures and courts to do more for teenaged victims of dating violence by extending protection to all victims of abuse."] (Refining the Meaning).) Dating violence is as prevalent and real among youth as among adults; teens in violent dating relationships deserve from our domestic violence prevention laws the same protections as adults in violent relationships. (See Isabelle Scott, Domestic Violence Practice and Procedure (2017) § 11:17, p. 1291 ["In the form of 'dating violence' or 'date rape,' domestic violence is as prevalent among teenagers and young adults as it is among married adults."]; accord, Refining the Meaning, supra, at pp. 945-946, 979 ["[S]omewhere between one in three and one in five high school students will encounter violence in a dating relationship . . . . If statutes contain 'dating relationship' language, they need to be effective; if courts are confronted with young people in dating relationships, they need to know how to respond."].) By including a "dating relationship" in the list of covered relationships, we understand the Legislature to have been responding in part to this concern. --------
Contrary to the premise of I.V.'s argument, in any event, the initial wardship petition is not the sole source of notice to the alleged juvenile delinquent for purposes of due process. We look also to "the evidence revealed at the detention hearing and the evidence and other information available through discovery as well." (In re Jesse P. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1183.) Here, assuming arguendo the petition by itself did not provide I.V. adequate notice—although, as stated above, we think it did—certainly he was put on notice at the October 15, 2015 detention hearing, when the court explicitly stated that "the alleged victim is someone with whom he had [a] dating or companionship or [sic] relationship." Thus, we fail to see how there was any deficiency in the notice I.V. received, since the district attorney was alleging he had violated section 273.5, subdivision (a), by willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon E.D., someone with whom he was (admittedly) in a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (b)). (Cf. People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 368 ["[D]efendant could not have been taken unawares."].)
3. I.V. Received Adequate Notice of the Sustained Finding of Violating Section 243 , Subdivision (e)(1)
Having concluded I.V. received adequate notice of his alleged violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), we now turn to a more precise question raised by this appeal: whether he received adequate notice that he allegedly violated section 243, subdivision (e)(1), the provision under which the trial court ultimately sustained his wardship petition as true. We conclude he did.
As noted, " ' " '[d]ue process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.' " ' " (Robert G., supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 440.) In Robert G., the Supreme Court described a two-prong test for how courts ought to assess whether, in the context of a defendant being found to have committed a lesser offense than the one alleged, adequate "notice [as] required by due process [has been] given . . . either 'when the specific language of the accusatory pleading adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the elements of the lesser offense' [citations], or when 'the lesser offense is "necessarily included" within the statutory definition of the charged offense.' " (Id. at pp. 440-441, original italics, quoting People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 369.)
We resolve the due process issue in respect to section 243, subdivision (e)(1) on the latter prong of the Robert G. test, and as a result, need not address the former prong. (See Robert G., supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 440-441.) "[B]attery . . . in violation of . . . section 243, subdivision (e)(1)" is "a lesser, necessarily included offense" of section 273.5, subdivision (a) (see People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580 & fn. 3), a point I.V. concedes. Because we have concluded I.V. received adequate notice on the section 273.5, subdivision (a) charge, we must also conclude that I.V. received adequate notice of the lesser included, amended charge under section 243, subdivision (e)(1).
4. The Court Properly Amended the Wardship Petition
We turn finally to whether the court properly amended I.V.'s wardship petition, lowering the charge to allege a violation of section 243, subdivision (e)(1), prior to finding that he had violated that statute, i.e., that he had "committed [battery] against . . . a person with whom [h]e . . . has, or has previously had, a dating . . . relationship." (§ 243, subd. (e)(1).) I.V. contends the court changed an element of the charged offense by adding "dating relationship" to the petition. We disagree and conclude the court did not err in allowing amendment of I.V.'s petition.
"[T]he Supreme Court reconciled the liberal civil rules with the requirements of due process by limiting amendments of the offense charged to amendments charging a lesser offense either necessarily included in the offense charged or expressly pleaded in the charging allegations. [Citations.] . . . . [¶] . . . [T]he juvenile court has discretion to permit amendment of a juvenile court wardship petition to correct or make more specific the factual allegations supportive of the offense charged when the very nature of the charge remains unchanged." (In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 481, italics added.) "In the absence of a showing of prejudice, amendment of the petition was not an abuse of discretion." (Ibid.) Here there is no prejudice; after the trial court amended the wardship petition to reduce the charge from section 273.5, subdivision (a), to section 243, subdivision (e)(1) (a lesser, necessarily included offense), "the very nature of the charge remain[ed] unchanged." (See In re Man J., at p. 481.)
" ' "[Due] process requires that a minor, like an adult, have adequate notice of the charge so that he may intelligently prepare his defense." ' " (D.W., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 321; accord, Robert G., supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 442.) I.V. has not shown how amending the petition prejudiced him or otherwise made him unable to " ' "intelligently prepare his defense." ' " (See D.W., at p. 321.) Although the charge in the wardship petition did not explicitly list "dating relationship," it did list the correct Penal Code provision (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and relevant facts (the date and nature of the incident alleged, and the victim), and so I.V. had an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. Based on this information, I.V. clearly should have understood that, by operation of section 273.5, subdivision (b)(3) ("dating relationship"), subdivision (a) of the statute applied to him. Therefore, I.V. has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in amending the wardship petition to allege a lesser included offense.
Had the district attorney specifically alleged in the original petition that he and E.D. were in a "dating relationship," we have no reason to believe I.V.'s defense would have been any different than the one he actually pursued. Among the first answers I.V. gave when he testified on direct examination was that E.D. was his girlfriend. At no time during the trial did the defense raise any objections based on lack of adequate notice or some other violation of I.V.'s right to due process. Thus, we cannot see how he would have changed his defense strategy had the district attorney charged a violation of section 273.5, subdivision (b)(3), or included language alleging a "dating relationship" in the original petition. By simply alleging I.V. had violated section 273.5, subdivision (a) in the initial wardship petition—which included the material facts of the alleged domestic violence incident—the district attorney adequately put I.V. on notice that, if he could, he might wish to try to defend on the ground that his relationship with E.D. was too distant to support the charge. He never did so.
III. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Streeter, J. We concur: /s/_________
Ruvolo, P.J. /s/_________
Rivera, J.