Summary
deferring to trial court decision that was supported by uncontradicted expert testimony, court held that “[j]udicial review of a treatment plan is of a limited nature” and “[l]acking expertise in the field of psychiatry, a court may not determine whether the best possible decision was made but rather only whether the treatment plan was rationally based on pertinent information and permissibly implemented”
Summary of this case from Johnson v. StateOpinion
No. 78-283
Decided March 22, 1979.
Appellant appealed from an order affirming his certification for involuntary treatment in the State Hospital.
Affirmed
1. MENTAL HEALTH — Discharged Mental Patient — Appeal — Commitment Proceeding — Not Moot. Since a former mental patient may suffer pervasive and detrimental consequences resulting from an erroneous commitment, such a person may bring an appeal from a commitment proceeding even where he has been discharged during the course of the appeal.
2. Involuntary Commitment — Judicial Review — Treatment — Limited Basis. Judicial review of psychiatric treatment plans in involuntary commitment proceedings is limited to determining whether the plan was rationally based on pertinent information and was permissibly implemented.
3. Involuntary Commitment — Judicial Review — Close Scrutiny — Finding — — Mental Illness — Place of Confinement — Evidence — Met — Clear and Convincing Standard. Although, in reviewing the involuntary commitment of assertedly mentally ill individual, court must closely scrutinize the proof of mental illness and the course of action and place selected for treatment in order to determine that such is designed to benefit the individual while minimally curtailing his liberty, nevertheless, where record indicated that plaintiff had attempted suicide and had intended to shoot his mother-in-law, that he was diagnosed as a severe depressive individual who had no grasp of his problems and was incapable of rationally resolving them by himself, and that, according to a doctor's testimony, his uncontrollable rage and grief made him dangerous to himself and others, the court's findings that plaintiff was mentally ill and should be committed to the state hospital were not erroneous and met the required clear and convincing standard.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Pueblo, Honorable Donald E. Abram, Judge.
James V. Phelps, Pueblo County Attorney, Paul J. Willumstad, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee.
Theodore R. Shaman, Jr., for respondent-appellant.
Appellant Amaya was brought to the Colorado State Hospital in Pueblo on December 16, 1977, by a sheriff's officer pursuant to the psychiatric emergency treatment provisions of § 27-10-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), and was subsequently certified for involuntary treatment by a staff psychiatrist, D.K. Foss, M.D. Amaya then requested and was granted a hearing, following which the court affirmed the certification. Contending that the order of commitment was improper and that the place of treatment was inappropriate, Amaya now appeals and we affirm.
Mootness
The People object initially to the bringing of this appeal, contending that since Amaya was released from all involuntary treatment on February 10, 1978, the case is now moot. We do not agree.
An adverse finding of mental illness may cause a former patient great difficulty. His reputation may be by some considered damaged, and the record of such treatment could endanger future employment or other societal relationships. The General Assembly recognized this potential stigma when it enacted § 27-10-115, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), forbidding discrimination against persons who have received voluntary or involuntary psychiatric evaluation or treatment.
[1] Since an order of commitment based on an erroneous diagnosis can be reviewed on appeal, Zimmerman v. Angele, 137 Colo. 129, 321 P.2d 1105 (1958), and since a person committed by virtue of such an allegedly erroneous order may experience pervasive and detrimental consequences as a result, we decline to dismiss the appeal. See Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952); Coronado Development Corp. v. Real Estate Commission, 40 Colo. App. 328, 574 P.2d 514 (1978).
Trial Court Rulings
[2] Amaya first contends that he was not receiving care and treatment suited to his particular needs as provided by § 27-10-116(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.). Judicial review of a treatment program is of a limited nature. Lacking expertise in the field of psychiatry, a court may not determine whether the best possible decision was made but rather only whether the treatment plan was rationally based on pertinent information and permissibly implemented. See In re Jones, 338 F.Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972). The validity of the treatment plan prescribed by Dr. Foss was uncontradicted by other expert testimony, and was found by the trial court to be appropriate. We defer to the decision of the trial court in this regard as it was supported by the evidence and bore appropriate medical application to Amaya's circumstances.
Amaya also argues that the State Hospital was not the least restrictive environment for treatment under his circumstances as required by § 27-10-116(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.). We agree with appellant that it is essential for the court to scrutinize carefully the asserting party's proof of mental illness and, if such is established, to select a course of action designed to treat the individual beneficially while minimally curtailing his liberty. See People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978).
[3] Reviewed in this light, the record here reveals that approximately one month prior to the hearing Amaya had attempted suicide by shooting himself in the chest, and had apparently originally intended to shoot his mother-in-law as well. Amaya was deeply depressed over marital problems, and was diagnosed as a severe depressive individual who had no grasp of his problems and was incapable of rationally resolving them by himself. Dr. Foss indicated that because of unrelieved and, at the time, uncontrollable rage and grief, Amaya should be considered dangerous to himself and others, and specifically recommended involuntary confinement in the State Hospital in the best interests of Amaya and of society.
Given this uncontradicted evidence, the court's finding that Amaya was mentally ill and its determination that he should be confined in the State Hospital were not erroneous and met the clear and convincing evidentiary standard enunciated in § 27-10-111(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.) and People v. Lane, supra.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE RULAND and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.