Opinion
C087845
08-06-2020
In re I.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.F., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 13JW5445)
Appellant I.F., a minor, appeals the juvenile court's order sustaining a wardship petition on allegations he committed murder and personally used a knife in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) I.F. contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding he committed murder, (2) he should have received a jury trial in the juvenile court, and (3) this court should declare him eligible for discharge from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) at the age of 23. We reject these contentions. Accordingly, we shall affirm the jurisdictional findings and commitment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
This tragic case comes to us for the second time. (See In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735.) The juvenile court (Smith, J.) conducted the first of two contested jurisdictional hearings in the fall of 2015. Following a lengthy hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, finding the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that I.F., then age 12, murdered his sister L.F., age 8, and personally used a knife in the commission of the offense. (Id. at p. 740.) The juvenile court committed I.F. to the DJJ for 15 years to life, plus one year for the knife enhancement. (Id. at p. 758.) We reversed, finding the juvenile court erred in denying I.F.'s motion to suppress two of four prearrest statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). (In re I.F., supra, at p. 740.) We remanded the matter to the juvenile court for a new jurisdictional hearing. (Id. at p. 783.)
The juvenile court (Harlan, J.) conducted a second jurisdictional hearing in June 2018. By stipulation, the juvenile court received the evidence adduced at the first jurisdictional hearing, less the prearrest statements found to have been taken in violation of I.F.'s Miranda rights. The juvenile court also heard testimony from a small number of live witnesses. We summarize the properly admitted evidence from both jurisdictional hearings below. A. The Murder
B.F. and C.W. lived in Calaveras County with a blended family that included six children, ranging from one to 15 years of age. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) Most of the family attended a Little League baseball game on April 27, 2013, leaving the house at approximately 7:00 a.m. (Ibid.) I.F and L.F. stayed home. (Ibid.)
We refer to I.F.'s father and stepmother, B.F. and C.W., by their initials to protect their privacy and the privacy of their minor children. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.90 and 8.401.) We note that B.F. and C.W. have since married, and C.W. has taken B.F.'s last name. Nevertheless, we refer to C.W. by her previous initials, both for consistency's sake and to reflect her name at the time of the events in question.
C.W. received a call from I.F. at 12:06 p.m. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) I.F. told C.W. that someone had come into the house, hit L.F., and then run out. (Ibid.) C.W. and B.F. hurried home, leaving the rest of the children at the baseball field with C.W.'s grandmother. (Ibid.) C.W. called 911 on the way home. (Ibid.) She told the 911 operator that the children were okay, but " 'really scared.' " (Ibid.) The 911 operator dispatched police officers to the house and then called I.F. (Ibid.) A recording of the 911 operator's call to I.F. was admitted into evidence at the first hearing. (Ibid.)
During the call, a distraught I.F. reported that he was in the bathroom when he heard a door slam. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) He then heard someone yelling and banging on the bathroom door. (Ibid.) He emerged from the bathroom and saw a " 'Mexican' " man running out the sliding glass back door. (Ibid.) The man had long gray hair and was wearing blue " 'work pants' " or jeans and a black shirt. (Ibid.) Approximately 90 seconds into the call, I.F. told the 911 operator that the man " 'stabbed [L.F.] a bunch of times,' " adding, " 'she's like dead.' " (Ibid.)
When they reached the house, B.F. and C.W. found I.F. in the hallway with a phone in one hand and a baseball bat in the other. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) L.F. was lying on her back on the floor of her bedroom. (Ibid.) Her legs were buckled as though she had collapsed. (Ibid.) As B.F. approached, he saw that L.F. had a bloody cut on her forehead and blood on her shirt. (Ibid.) When he lifted L.F.'s shirt, he saw multiple stab wounds. (Ibid.) Although B.F. could see that L.F. was hurt, he did not know the extent of her injuries-or realize she had been stabbed-until he lifted her shirt. (Ibid.)
B.F. scooped L.F. up and carried her down the hall and out the front door. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) There, he was met by Calaveras County Sheriff's Deputy Shawn Cechini, who instructed B.F. to set L.F. down on the porch. (Ibid.) Paramedics arrived and determined that L.F. had no pulse and was not breathing. (Ibid.)
While paramedics attempted to revive L.F., Cechini spoke with I.F. (In re. I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) I.F. told Cechini that he had been using the bathroom. (Ibid.) He emerged from the bathroom and saw a man running towards the sliding glass back door. (Id. at pp. 741-742.) I.F. said he chased the man to the back door, and then, upon hearing L.F. call out, turned around and went to check on her. (Id. at p. 742.) As they talked, Cechini noticed that there was blood smeared across I.F.'s right forearm. (Ibid.)
L.F. was transported to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.) B. I.F.'s Prearrest Statements
Detective Wade Whitney of the Calaveras County Sheriff's Department interviewed I.F. on two separate occasions on the day of the murder. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 742-743.) At the time, police were trying to get additional information about the alleged intruder, who was already the subject of an intensive manhunt. (Ibid.)
These statements were not taken in violation of I.F.'s Miranda rights. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767-771.)
During the first interview, I.F. explained that he woke up between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. and made breakfast. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.) I.F. and L.F. ate and then watched a video. (Ibid.) After the video, L.F. retired to her bedroom and I.F. went to the bathroom. (Ibid.) While in the bathroom, I.F. heard a door slam. (Ibid.) He then heard someone yelling in heavily accented English, " ' "Hey, I know you're in here, come out." ' " (Ibid.) He then heard L.F. scream. (Ibid.)
I.F. said that he opened the door to the bathroom in time to see a man running toward the sliding glass back door. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.) The man, who weighed approximately 280 pounds, was wearing a black shirt or jacket and blue jeans or work pants. He had longer gray hair, and dark skin. I.F. told Whitney that he followed the man to the door, and then realized that L.F. might need help. (Id. at pp. 742-743.) He stopped, turned around, and ran towards his sister's bedroom, grabbing a knife from the kitchen counter, " 'just in case there's anyone else.' " (Id. at p. 743.) When he reached the bedroom, I.F. saw L.F. lying on the floor, her shirt covered in blood. (Ibid.) He dropped the knife, and then picked it up. (Ibid.) He then went back to the kitchen, returned the knife to the counter, and called C.W. (Ibid.)
During the second interview, I.F. reiterated that he was in the bathroom when he heard a door open, followed by a man with an accent yelling, " ' 'Hey, I know you're in here, come out." ' " (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) As before, I.F. said he heard L.F. scream, and then opened the bathroom door in time to see a man running towards the sliding glass back door. (Ibid.) I.F. estimated that he finished going to the bathroom and opened the door within 10 seconds of hearing the man's voice. (Ibid.)
Once again, I.F. said that he chased the man to the sliding glass back door, then turned and ran towards L.F.'s room, grabbing a recently washed knife from the kitchen counter as he passed. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) During the second interview, I.F. emphasized that he did not enter L.F.'s bedroom, but merely observed her body from the doorway. (Ibid.) He then went back to the kitchen, returned the knife to the counter, and called C.W. (Ibid.) I.F.'s description of the intruder was consistent with the description he offered during the first interview. (Ibid.) C. Other Prosecution Evidence
Sheriff's deputies and crime scene investigators searched the family home pursuant to a search warrant. They found no signs of a forced entry, and no fingerprints, footprints, or blood evidence on or around the sliding glass back door. Likewise, there was no evidence of an intruder on the deck or in the back yard. However, investigators recovered two latent fingerprints from the doorframe leading to L.F.'s room, which were not identified. Investigators also found a hair on the surface of L.F.'s skin, near the cleft of her buttocks. The hair belonged to L.F.; however, a male DNA profile was found on the root of the hair. The DNA sample was not identified, and was likely deposited by way of some bodily fluid, such as blood, semen, or saliva.
Investigators found a large quantity of blood in L.F.'s bedroom, where her body was discovered. The blood was concentrated in a corner of the bedroom, on L.F.'s bunkbed, the nearby walls, and the floor where her body was found.
Based on blood spatter patterns, Bradley Swanson, a criminalist with the California Department of Justice, opined that L.F. was attacked on the top bunk. According to Swanson, the attacker could have been standing on the top bunk, the rail of the lower bunk, or the floor. Swanson opined that a person five feet, nine inches tall (I.F.'s height at the time of the murder) would have been able to reach L.F. from the rail of the lower bunk, and would have been partially shielded from blood spatter or cast off by the bunkbed. Swanson opined that L.F. either jumped or was thrown from the top bunk to the floor. Swanson acknowledged on cross-examination that, given her injuries, it would have been difficult for anyone to move L.F. from the top bunk without becoming covered in blood.
Investigators found a Ghostbusters T-shirt in a hamper in I.F.'s bedroom. There was a drop of blood on the front of the T-shirt, which was later found to contain DNA matching the profiles of both I.F. and L.F. Blood matching L.F.'s DNA profile was also found on a pair of sneakers worn by B.F. and I.F. to do yard work.
Investigators found two red stains in the kitchen—one on the floor and another on a plate in the kitchen sink—both of which tested positive for blood. More important, they found two knives on a towel on the kitchen counter. One of the knives had a bent blade.
C.W. testified that the knives were new, having been received as a set for Christmas some four months earlier. She recalled washing the knives the night before the murder and setting them on the towel to dry. She testified that the knives were undamaged when she left the house on the day of the murder, adding that she would have noticed had one of the blades been bent.
C.W. explained that L.F. was not allowed to handle knives as a rule. She testified that L.F. complied with this rule, and had not cut herself with a knife or suffered any episode involving serious bleeding in the four months between Christmas and the murder.
The knives appeared clean to the naked eye. However, a microscopic examination of the damaged knife revealed reddish brown staining in the area between the handle and full metal tang. Criminalist Elizabeth Schreiber dissembled the knife and found more reddish brown staining on the inner portion of the tang. The reddish brown staining was later found to be blood, which matched L.F.'s DNA profile.
Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "tang," in part, as "a piece that forms an extension from the blade or analogous part of an instrument (as a table knife or fork, file, chisel, or sword) and connects with the handle and that may be a thin flat plate on each side of which a rounded piece is secured to form the handle or that may be a tapered piece inserted in the haft or handle." (Webster's Third New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2336, col. 3.)
A nonblood swab from the handle of the knife revealed a mixture of at least three possible contributors, including I.F. and L.F. A swab from the serrated portion of the knife, which was not identified as blood or nonblood, revealed a low-level mixture of at least four contributors, who were not identified.
Dr. Robert Lawrence, a forensic pathologist for the Calaveras County Coroner's Office, performed an autopsy on L.F. He found that L.F. suffered 22 stab wounds, mostly to her arms and chest area. Three of the wounds were fatal. Dr. Lawrence opined that L.F. died from shock and hemorrhage within 10 minutes of the attack.
Dr. Lawrence testified that L.F.'s wounds required intentional force and a sharp knife, but could have been caused by anyone, including a person of I.F.'s height and weight. He opined that L.F.'s stab wounds could have been caused by the damaged knife recovered from the kitchen, but could not conclusively say that the knife was the murder weapon. Lawrence also observed a number of "prod" injuries on L.F.'s body, which he described as tiny, circular defects in the skin where she was poked with the tip of a knife.
Lawrence opined that the knife could have been damaged in the course of the attack on L.F., theorizing that the blade could have struck costal cartilage between L.F.'s breast bone and ribs. However, he acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not examine L.F.'s costal cartilage.
With the exceptions noted above, investigators found little blood outside of L.F.'s bedroom. Investigators noted that the hall bathroom was unusually clean relative to the rest of the house. The sink was notably clean, and toys in the bathtub were damp or wet. Investigators also observed holes and slashes in the shower curtain. A luminol test indicated the presence of latent blood in the sink and on the faucets, light switch, and an area near the towel rack. However, investigators found no other signs of a cleanup, and samples collected from drain traps in the bathroom, though presumptively positive for blood, could not be confirmed.
Investigators observed a trail of blood evidence leading from L.F.'s bedroom to the front porch, but the trail was understood to correspond to B.F.'s path as he carried L.F.'s body.
Luminol was also used near the back glass door slider. No blood was detected there.
As noted, the attack triggered a manhunt for the alleged intruder. Law enforcement canvassed the neighborhood and reviewed surveillance videos from neighbors. A helicopter, search and rescue trackers, and canine handlers searched the area surrounding the family home. Although law enforcement received reports of suspicious characters in the area (discussed below), none of these search efforts turned up any sign of the intruder described by I.F. Several neighbors and a construction worker testified that they were out and about on the morning of the murder, and saw nothing unusual and no one matching I.F.'s description of the intruder. D. Defense Evidence
Dr. Terri Haddix, a forensic pathologist and neuropathologist, testified as a defense expert. Dr. Haddix reviewed the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Lawrence and other relevant materials, including photographs of the autopsy and crime scene. She also examined the knives recovered from the scene.
Dr. Haddix opined that the autopsy report and accompanying photographs failed to sufficiently document L.F.'s wounds. Among other things, Dr. Haddix faulted the autopsy report for failing to provide a ruler or scale showing the depth of each wound. In the absence of such measurements, Dr. Haddix said, it was impossible to compare L.F.'s wounds to any particular knife. However, Dr. Haddix acknowledged on cross-examination that she could not exclude the damaged knife as the murder weapon.
Dr. Haddix took issue with Dr. Lawrence's theory that the knife could have been damaged by coming into contact with L.F.'s costal cartilage. However, she agreed with Dr. Lawrence that L.F. likely exsanguinated within 10 minutes. Given the volume of blood on the carpet and floor, Dr. Haddix opined that L.F. was initially in a facedown or prone position, and was subsequently rolled over into the face up or supine position in which she was discovered.
Kenton Wong, a blood spatter expert, testified that he had reviewed the crime scene photographs and believed the killer was either standing on the top bunk or on the lower rail of the bottom bunk at the time of the attack. Based on the crime scene photographs, Wong opined the killer likely had "a significant amount of blood and blood spatter" on his hands, arms, upper torso, face, and hair.
Wong opined that L.F. was likely carried from the top bunk to the floor. He agreed with Dr. Haddix that L.F. was originally in a facedown position on the floor, but was subsequently rolled over into a face up position. On cross-examination, Wong opined that L.F. was likely in a facedown position for several minutes.
Wong noted that luminol testing is merely presumptive for the presence of blood, rather than confirmatory. Other substances containing iron, such as certain ceramics or tiles, could also generate positive results when treated with luminol.
Wong also noted that blood is "pervasive," and hard to completely clean. According to Wong, most adults would be hard pressed to remove blood evidence without leaving signs of a cleanup, such as swirl marks or diluted blood, or bloody rags or towels. Wong examined photographs of I.F.'s bedroom and thought it "highly unlikely" that a 12 year old with I.F.'s organizational and hygiene skills would have been able to remove blood spatter from his person in a short time, without leaving signs of a cleanup. On cross-examination, Wong acknowledged that a person covered in blood spatter could have walked across the hallway to the bathroom and washed the blood away in the shower. In that case, however, Wong would have expected to see more blood evidence in the bathtub area.
B.F. and C.W. testified as character witnesses for I.F. Both testified that I.F. and L.F. had a normal sibling relationship. They rarely bickered, and never fought, and C.W., for her part, had no qualms about leaving L.F. in I.F.'s care.
The defense called numerous witnesses who testified to unusual goings on in and around the area. Two neighborhood teenagers testified they entered a vacant house next door to I.F.'s house sometime before the murder. A male voice yelled at them to get out and they fled.
Several neighbors testified that they saw strange men on the day of the murder. One neighbor saw a Native American man with a dark complexion and shoulder length salt and pepper hair on the morning of the murder. The man was between five feet, ten inches to six feet tall and physically fit, with broad shoulders and a tapered waist. Another neighbor saw a white or Hispanic man on the evening of the murder. The man was approximately five feet, ten inches tall, with a stocky build and a military-style crew cut. Yet another neighbor testified that he saw the same man, around the same time, but described him as a white male, approximately five feet, ten inches tall, with a medium build and medium length brown hair. None of these men, as described by the neighbors, matched I.F.'s description of the alleged intruder.
Another witness, a former schoolmate of I.F.'s older brother, testified that he encountered a slender white man with a knife on a highway in a neighboring county around the time of the murder. The man, who claimed to be walking home from I.F.'s community, warned that "people were getting killed" there. Yet another witness testified that he was walking his young children in a stroller along a path in another neighboring county when a man screamed from a passing car that he wanted to eat his children. The man was not Hispanic and did not speak with an accent. E. Jurisdictional Determination and Commitment
Following closing argument, the juvenile court ruled from the bench, stating: "All right. I believe the court has previously indicated that it has listened to and read all the volumes of the transcripts. The court has also gone over the evidence that it was presented, listened to CDs, also heard testimony here in court, and listened to opening and closing remarks of the attorneys. [¶] Taking that all into consideration, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegation in the petition is true and accordingly sustains the petition as to a violation of [s]ection 187[, subdivision ](a) of the Penal Code, a felony murder in the second degree. [¶] [The] [c]ourt also finds true the allegation that the commission of the offense included the use of a knife."
At the dispositional hearing, I.F. was made a ward of the court and committed to the DJJ for the maximum term of 16 years to life, with credit for 1,900 days.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
I.F. argues the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding that he murdered L.F. He argues the evidence raises no more than a mere suspicion that he may have been the murderer, which is not enough to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding. We are not persuaded.
We review a juvenile's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence using the same substantial evidence standard of review applicable to defendants in adult criminal cases. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848-849.)
We do not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) "Thus, in an appeal from a juvenile criminal as in any other criminal appeal, we are in no position to weigh any conflicts or disputes in the evidence. The juvenile trial court was the trier of fact and the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses; we are not. Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we cannot substitute our own inferences or deductions for those of the trial court. . . . In short, in juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontracted, which will support the decision of the trier of fact." (Id. at p. 1373.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that I.F. murdered L.F. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jurisdictional finding, as we must, there was ample evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude that (1) I.F. and L.F. were home alone at the time of the murder, (2) the murderer used one of the knives recovered from the kitchen to stab L.F., and (3) the murderer made no escape through the sliding glass back door, as I.F. claimed. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.) From these findings, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that I.F. stabbed L.F., tried and failed to remove incriminating evidence from the murder weapon, and then fabricated a story about an unknown intruder. That the evidence may be squared with another explanation does not render the evidence insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933 [" ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment" ' "].)
I.F. challenges the juvenile court's implied finding that the knife recovered from the kitchen was the murder weapon. He observes the prosecution's expert was unable to conclusively say that the damaged knife caused L.F.'s wounds. He questions the prosecution's theory that the murderer washed the knife well enough to remove visible blood from the blade, but not well enough to remove concealed blood from the tang or nonblood DNA from the handle. He speculates that L.F.'s blood could have been on the tang of the knife for any number of reasons, and may have been there for "a long period of time." These arguments amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.
In any event, substantial evidence supports the implied finding that the knife was the murder weapon. Although Dr. Lawrence was unable to conclusively identify the knife as the murder weapon, neither prosecution nor defense expert could conclusively eliminate it, and strong circumstantial evidence suggests it was. L.F.'s blood was found on the tang of the knife, an inaccessible area that could reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with casual contact. C.W. testified that the knife was new, having been received as a Christmas present some four months before the murder. She explained that the knife was undamaged when she left the house on the morning of the murder, and off limits to L.F. as a matter of house rules, which L.F. generally followed. She also testified that L.F. had not suffered any injury resulting in serious bleeding in the four months preceding the murder, and she would have known if she had. From this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that the murderer used the knife to kill L.F., damaging the blade in the process.
Taking a slightly different tack, I.F. argues that, even accepting the implied finding that the knife was the murder weapon, insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional finding that he was the murderer. According to I.F., "No evidence, nor any rational inference from the evidence, demonstrates that only a person inside the home could have done those things. Rather, an intruder could have come into the house and found the knife, used it to commit the murder, then washed it off and left it by the sink before fleeing the house." I.F.'s argument misapprehends our substantial evidence standard of review.
It is possible, of course, that an intruder could have entered the family home, committed a crime of opportunity with a knife he happened to find on the kitchen counter, and then paused to wash the knife before making his escape. But there was substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murderer was I.F., and the intruder a mere figment of I.F.'s imagination.
I.F.'s prearrest statements undermine his theory that an intruder murdered L.F., and then stopped to wash the knife. I.F. consistently maintained that he was in the bathroom when he heard the sound of a door opening or closing, followed by the sound of a man yelling, followed by the sound of L.F. screaming. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 741-744.) He repeatedly asserted that he opened the bathroom door in time to see a man "running" through the house towards the sliding glass back door. (Ibid.) He estimated that he opened the bathroom door within 10 seconds of hearing the man's voice and explained that the man never stopped to see who was behind him as he fled the house. Nothing in I.F.'s statements supports an inference that an alleged intruder stopped to wash the knife, and the juvenile court could reasonably reject that theory. (People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 932.) Indeed, the record contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could reasonably reject any theory involving an alleged intruder.
As noted, there was no physical evidence that an intruder ran through the house or left through the sliding glass back door. Likewise, there was no physical evidence that an intruder fled the crime scene by way of the backyard. In fact, the only physical evidence that could conceivably support I.F.'s intruder theory was the unknown DNA found on the root of L.F.'s hair and the latent fingerprints recovered from the doorframe leading to her room. But the juvenile court could reasonably believe that an intruder who brutally murdered a young girl and ran through the house and backyard would have left more than a single DNA sample on the root of L.F.'s hair and two latent fingerprints. The juvenile court could also reasonably believe that an intruder operating under the time constraints suggested by I.F.'s prearrest statements would have been unlikely to have acted as the murderer did here, inflicting numerous "prod" injuries on L.F.'s body, washing the murder weapon, and waiting for L.F. to exsanguinate before rolling her over.
Although I.F. presented evidence of strange men and mysterious happenings in the neighborhood and surrounding communities, the juvenile court could reasonably credit the testimony of the numerous prosecution witnesses who observed the house on the morning of the murder and participated in the manhunt immediately thereafter, none of whom saw anyone matching the description of the alleged intruder. From the totality of the evidence adduced at the jurisdictional hearings, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that I.F.'s story about an alleged intruder was a fabrication. Having so concluded, the juvenile court could reasonably infer, by process of elimination, that I.F. was the murderer.
I.F. argues that "mere presence" at the scene of the crime does not support a finding of guilt. (See People v. Foster (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 866, 868 ["Mere presence at the scene of the crime standing alone is not sufficient to justify a finding of guilt"].) That may be so, but the prosecution established substantially more than mere presence here. The prosecution also extensively rebutted I.F.'s intruder theory, and affirmatively connected him to the crime through circumstantial evidence. Of greatest significance, the prosecution showed that L.F.'s blood had been detected on I.F.'s T-shirt and the tang of the knife believed to be the murder weapon, which was one of the knives that I.F. admitted handling around the time of the stabbing. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 742-744.) The prosecution also showed that blood was visible on I.F.'s arm shortly thereafter. (Id. at p. 742.) Thus, in addition to I.F.'s presence at the scene of the crime, the evidence raised a reasonable inference that I.F., as the only other person shown to have been in the house, must have committed the crime.
This factor distinguishes People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, on which I.F. relies. There, another panel of this court reduced the first degree murder conviction of one of three gang member defendants (Lara) to second degree murder, finding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that Lara aided and abetted an assault with a firearm on another gang member, Lucero, but insufficient to support a finding that he subsequently fired the shots that killed Lucero or willfully aided and abetted the murder. (Id. at p. 319.) I.F. emphasizes the court's conclusion that Lara's presence at the scene and participation in the initial assault was insufficient to raise an inference that he also fired the fatal shots or aided and abetted the person who did so. (Id. at pp. 319-320.) But, as should be obvious from our brief description, the circumstances before the court in Lara were very different from those presented here. Unlike Lara, the present case does not involve multiple defendants, the possibility of aiding and abetting liability, or a corroborated account of a third party suspect. (Id. at pp. 319-321.) Here, as we have explained, the record discloses substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could reasonably reject any theory involving a third party intruder. Having done so, the juvenile court could draw a nonspeculative inference that no one but I.F. could have committed the crime. Nothing in Lara undermines our conclusion that the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding was supported by substantial evidence.
I.F. argues the prosecution's blood evidence was underwhelming, consisting of only a few incriminating drops in what was otherwise a very bloody crime scene. I.F. theorizes that whoever stabbed L.F. would have been covered in blood, and urges that no 12 year old would have been able to wash away such blood evidence, without leaving evidence of a cleanup. These arguments, like many of I.F.'s other arguments, amounts to yet another invitation to reweigh the evidence, an invitation we again decline.
I.F. offers other such arguments, which for the sake of brevity, we decline to discuss individually. It suffices to reiterate that the juvenile court, not this court, assesses the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts in the evidence. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) Thus, it was the exclusive province of the juvenile court, as trier of fact, to consider whether L.F. was cool to the touch when first responders arrived, determine whether inconsistencies in I.F.'s statements about the intruder were attributable to the stress of seeing his sister killed, and evaluate whether the prosecution's theory of the case could be reconciled with evidence that I.F. and L.F. had a harmonious relationship, with no previous history of animosity. None of these arguments alter our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding.
In any case, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that the absence of additional blood evidence was not dispositive. As even I.F. acknowledges, the relative dearth of such evidence also undermined the defense theory that an intruder stabbed L.F. and ran through the house to the sliding glass back door. Indeed, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that an intruder making a hasty escape would have been more likely to leave behind blood evidence than 12 year old I.F. who, whatever his limitations, could nevertheless be said to have washed the murder weapon and removed a bloody T-shirt from his person. On the record before us, the juvenile court could also reasonably infer that I.F. attempted some sort of cleanup in the hall bathroom, which was damp, tested presumptive positive for blood, and appeared unusually clean relative to the rest of the house. The juvenile court could also reasonably credit criminalist Swanson's testimony that the killer could have been standing on the rail of the lower bunk at the time of the attack, in which case, he would have been partially shielded from blood spatter or cast off by the bed. Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that I.F. was the murderer, despite the absence of additional blood evidence. That more such evidence does not connect I.F. to the crime does not change our conclusion that substantial evidence does.
In sum, though I.F. raises many interesting factual issues, he fails to carry his burden of demonstrating that no reasonable trier of fact, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1371-1372.) We therefore reject I.F.'s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. B. Right to a Jury Trial
Next, I.F. argues he was entitled to a trial by jury under the state and federal constitutions. We disagree. " 'There is a well-understood distinction between a juvenile wardship adjudication on the one hand, and adult criminal proceedings leading to a "felony conviction." ' [Citation.] It is settled that while certain constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles (e.g., notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination, double jeopardy, proof beyond a reasonable doubt), '. . . the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.' [Citation.] Thus, juveniles enjoy no state or federal due process or equal protection right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings." (People v. Fowler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 581, 585; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 545-547, 550 [plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.], 551-552 [conc. opn. of White, J.] (McKiever); People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1019 (Nguyen); In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320, 332 (Daedler).)
I.F. urges us to disregard these precedents. He directs our attention to In re Javier A. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 913 (Javier A.), in which the court of appeal reviewed the historical underpinnings of the juvenile justice system, and called on the California Supreme Court to overturn the rule announced in Daedler, that juveniles are not entitled to jury trial under the California Constitution. (Id. at p. 975.) Our Supreme Court has not only refused to retreat from the rule announced in Daedler, it has effectively reaffirmed it.
Contrary to I.F.'s persistent suggestion, Javier A. was not an opinion originating from "this court." --------
In Nguyen, the court rejected an adult criminal defendant's claim that a prior juvenile adjudication for a serious felony could not be used in a subsequent adult proceeding to enhance his sentence because there had been no right to a jury trial in the juvenile proceedings. (Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1014-1015.) In so doing, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in McKiever for the proposition that "the Constitution does not afford the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings." (Id. at p. 1019.) The Nguyen court explained: "The court's decision in McKiever not to find a constitutional jury trial right in juvenile proceedings reflected its concern that the introduction of juries in that context would interfere too greatly with the effort to deal with youthful offenders by procedures less formal and adversarial, and more protective and rehabilitative—at least to a degree—than those applicable to adult defendants." (Id. at p. 1023.) The court continued: "Implicit in the high court's juvenile justice decisions is the premise that this particular safeguard [i.e., a jury trial] is not constitutionally essential to a fair and reliable adjudication in a juvenile case." (Id. at p. 1026; see also id. at p. 1028 (disn. opn. of Kennard, J. ["In California a minor accused of a crime in a juvenile court proceeding— unlike a person accused in an adult criminal proceeding—has no right to a jury trial"].)
We conclude the United States and California Supreme Courts have spoken clearly on the question of jury trials in juvenile cases, and this precedent compels us to reject I.F.'s claim that he was entitled to a jury trial, notwithstanding the policy arguments advanced in Javier A. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) C. Eligibility for Discharge from DJJ
I.F. notes that, after his successful first appeal but before the second dispositional hearing, the Legislature amended section 607 to potentially increase confinement to age 25. I.F. seeks a declaration from this court that he will be eligible for discharge from the DJJ under the statute in effect at the time of his original dispositional hearing-no later than the age of 23. The People concede the issue in the abstract, even though nothing in the record suggests that DJJ intends to hold I.F. past the age of 23, and the juvenile court did not reach the issue. We decline I.F.'s request for a declaration as unripe and beyond the reach of this direct appeal. (Wilson & Wilson v. City of Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573 [Unripe cases are those in which an actual dispute or controversy has yet to come into existence].)
III. DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J. We concur: /S/_________
MAURO, Acting P. J. /S/_________
MURRAY, J.